The impact of mandatory rules in International Commercial Arbitration by Siwy, Alfred
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 „The Impact of Mandatory Rules in International  
Commercial Arbitration“ 
 
 
 
 
Mag. Alfred Siwy, LL.M. 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Doktor der Rechtswissenschaften (Dr.iur.) 
Wien, 2011  
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 083 101 
Dissertationsgebiet  lt. Studienblatt: Rechtswissenschaften 
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Helmut Ofner, LL.M.  
 
 
 
  
The Impact of Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Arbitration 
 
Alfred Siwy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Für Birgit und Emil 
  2
Abbreviations 
 
AFDI   Annuaire Francais de Droit International 
AJCL  American Journal of Criminal Law 
AJIL   American Journal of International Law 
ALI  American Law Institute 
All ER  All England Law Reports 
Am. Rev.  
Int. Arb. Amercian Review of International Arbitration 
ArbInt  Arbitration International  
AWD  Außenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebsberaters 
BerGesVR Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 
BB  Der Bebriebsberater 
BGB  (deutsches) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
BG  (schweizerisches) Bundesgericht 
BGE   Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts 
BGH  (deutscher) Bundesgerichtshof 
BGHZ  Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen 
CMLR  Common Market Law Review 
ECLR  European Competition Law Review 
ECR  International Commerce Review 
Fn  footnote 
FS  Festschrift 
GYIL  German Yearbook of International Law 
HarvLRev Harvard Law Review 
Hess. LAG Hessisches Landgericht 
HS  Handelsrechtliche Entscheidungen 
ICLQ  International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
ICSID  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes  
ICSID Rev ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 
ILM  International Legal Materials 
IntALR International Arbitration Law Review 
IPR  Internationales Privatrecht 
  3
IPRax  Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 
JBl  Juristische Blätter 
JDI  Journal du droit international 
JZ  JuristenZeitung 
LAG  Landarbeitsgericht 
MichLR  Michigan Law Review 
NILR   Netherlands International Law Review 
NJW  Neue juristische Wochenschrift 
no.  marginal number 
OGH  Oberster Gerichtshof 
RablesZ Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 
RdC  Recueil des Cours  
RIW  Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 
SchiedsVZ Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren 
U.Chi.L.R. The University of Chicago Law Review 
Vand.J.T.L. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
VirginiaJIL  Virginia Journal of International Law 
WM  Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 
YBCA  Yearbook of commercial arbitration 
YbPrivIntL Yearbook of Private International Law 
ZvglRWiss Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 
  4
Table of Content 
 
I.  The Problem .............................................................................................................. 6 
II.  The Concept of the dissertation ................................................................................ 7 
III.  Definition OF mandatory rules in civil law .......................................................... 8 
A.  Distinction drawn between public and civil law ................................................. 10 
B.  Distinction due to the legislative intent of the rule ............................................. 10 
C.  The Interests Served by Mandatory Rules .......................................................... 11 
D.  The definition in EC Regulation No 593/2008 ................................................... 13 
E.  In doubt, a rule is not mandatory ........................................................................ 15 
F.  The Lex Fori as the Relevant Law for Determining the Mandatory Character 
 of a Rule .............................................................................................................. 15 
G.  Internal Mandatory Rules and International Mandatory Rules .......................... 16 
IV.  The application of mandatory rules .................................................................... 17 
A.  The “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie” ....................................................................... 17 
1.  The legislative intent of extraterritorial application of the mandatory rule .... 18 
2.  The necessity of a close connection between the case and the enacting state 21 
3.  The necessity that the rule must be compatible with the interests  
 of the forum state ............................................................................................ 23 
4.  Summary ......................................................................................................... 26 
B.  Application of mandatory rules solely of the lex causae  
 (“Schuldstatutstheorie”) ...................................................................................... 27 
C.  To apply or to give effect to the foreign rule ...................................................... 28 
D.  The Approaches of in Jurisprudence .................................................................. 30 
1.  Mandatory Rules in Continental European Case Law .................................... 30 
2.  The U.K. approach .......................................................................................... 44 
3.  An obligation to apply mandatory rules of EC member states in the  
 European legal space? ..................................................................................... 49 
4.  The U.S. approach .......................................................................................... 52 
5.  Introduction of U.S. elements to Continental European Theories .................. 59 
V.  The Influence of Mandatory Rules on International commercial Arbitration ........ 61 
A.  The Arbitrability of Issues governed by Mandatory Rules. ................................ 61 
1.  The Law Governing the Issue of Arbitrability. ............................................... 62 
2.  The impact of mandatory rules on the question of arbitrability ..................... 68 
VI.  The Influence of Mandatory Rules on the Choice of Law by the Arbitrators .... 77 
A.  The Conflict of Laws System Determining the Substantive Applicable Law .... 77 
1.  The denationalized approach .......................................................................... 77 
2.  The traditional approach ................................................................................. 78 
3.  The modern approach ..................................................................................... 80 
B.  The Application of Mandatory Rules By Arbitrators ......................................... 86 
1.  Interests involved in the application of mandatory rules ................................ 86 
2.  Mandatory Rules of the lex causae ................................................................. 91 
3.  The mandatory rules of third states ................................................................. 95 
4.  The Methodology for the Application of Mandatory Rules ......................... 102 
5.  The Relevance of mandatory rules of the seat of the arbitration .................. 123 
6.  Relevance of the mandatory rules of the place of enforcement .................... 124 
  5
VII.  The Relevance of mandatory rules for setting aside procedures. ..................... 126 
A.  Introduction ....................................................................................................... 126 
B.  The Influence of Mandatory Rules on Setting Aside and Enforcement 
 Procedures ......................................................................................................... 126 
1.  The Situation in Austria ................................................................................ 127 
2.  The Situation in Germany ............................................................................. 131 
3.  The Situation in Switzerland ......................................................................... 133 
4.  The influence of mandatory rules of third states in setting aside and 
 enforcement procedures ................................................................................ 135 
5.  The Situation in the United Kingdom ........................................................... 138 
6.  The Situation in the United States ................................................................ 144 
VIII.  Summary ........................................................................................................... 149 
A.  The Determination of a Mandatory Rule .......................................................... 149 
B.  The Application of Mandatory Rules by National Courts ................................ 150 
C.  The Relevance of Mandatory Rules for the Arbitrability of a Dispute ............ 151 
D.  The Application of Mandatory Rules by Arbitral Tribunals ............................ 153 
E.  The Relevance of Mandatory Rules for the Challenge of an Award ................ 153 
 
 
 
  6
 
I .  T H E  P R O B L E M   
 
Parties to international contracts will invariably agree to resolve their disputes by 
arbitration. One reason for this choice will be their expectation to be able to exercise a 
greater measure of control over the arbitral tribunal than they would over a national 
court. This will also apply to the application to the law the arbitrators are to apply to a 
contract. It is a fundamental principle of contractual freedom that the parties are free to 
choose the applicable law they wish the tribunal to apply to their case. In most cases, 
the arbitral tribunal will be obliged to follow this choice. However, national legislators 
enact rules of law they intend to be applicable regardless of the otherwise applicable 
law. Such mandatory rules in most cases protect fundamental interests of states which 
the legislators consider to important to be circumvented by the choice of law of the 
parties. Before national courts of the states which enacted such laws, the application 
will be natural consequence of the national conflict of laws rules. If the dispute is to be 
decided before foreign courts, this will be substantially different. As will be set out in 
detail in this thesis, legislators and courts have elaborated rules according to which 
national courts will apply foreign mandatory rules.  
Most modern systems of arbitration law, however, provide a detachment of the 
arbitrators from the conflict of laws systems of the lex arbitri. Therefore, the rules 
established for the application of foreign mandatory rules do not apply in arbitration. 
The absence of such rules would, however, lead to the situation that the parties could 
circumvent the application of rules which may be essential for the interests of states. 
Further, one party may invoke a mandatory rule claiming that the rule has a certain 
impact on the contractual relationship with the other party which the arbitral tribunal 
must take into consideration.  
The arbitral tribunal in such a situation must decide whether and under which 
circumstances it will apply mandatory rules of law both of the lex causae and of third 
legal orders. The examination of the rules which arbitral tribunal shall follow in such a 
case is the subject of this thesis.  
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I I .  T H E  C O N C E P T  O F  T H E  D I S S E R T A T I O N  
 
The rules for the application of mandatory rules have been established by domestic 
courts applying domestic conflict of laws rules. As will be shown in the first part of this 
thesis, these rules differ to a certain degree between systems of civil law and those of 
common law.  
This dissertation will therefore in a comparative approach first examine the rules 
providing for the application of mandatory rules of third states (as the arbitrator has no 
forum and therefore no domestic conflict of laws rules to apply, all mandatory rules are 
foreign to the arbitrator) before domestic courts. The rules established in Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland will be examined as examples for the approaches taken in 
civil law countries. Further, the approaches taken in the United Kingdom and the Unites 
States will be assessed as the most relevant common law systems. 
In a second step, the relevance of mandatory rules on the arbitrability of disputes will be 
addressed. It will be examined whether and to what extent national legislators can 
prevent a dispute from being arbitrated at all due to rules of domestic law.  
In a third step, the thesis will attempt to derive a rule for the application of mandatory 
rules by arbitrators from the various examined national systems. Though these systems 
vary, it will be shown that there are certain common elements which are required by all 
systems and which provide for a coherent rule which arbitrators can use as guidance 
when deciding on the application of a mandatory rule. Also the relevant jurisprudence 
of arbitral tribunals will be examined to determine which of the elements of the 
suggested rule have already been applied. 
In a final step, the relevance of mandatory rules in setting aside procedures will be 
studied. This chapter will deal with the consequences it may have if an arbitrator fails to 
apply a mandatory rule in arbitral proceedings.  
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I I I .  DEFINIT I ON OF MANDATORY RULES I N  CIVIL L AW 
As a general proposition, liberal states will - to a varying extent - grant parties the 
possibility to conclude contracts creating mutual obligations. However, states also 
pursue interests which are estimated higher than the freedom of private parties to 
conclude contracts. To protect these interests states limit the parties’ freedom of 
contract by enacting rules from which parties cannot derogate by agreement. Examples 
of such rules are manifold: Rules for consumer protection, rules for the protection of 
labourers, the prohibition of cartels and unfair competition or boycott legislation. 
However, not all of these rules qualify as mandatory rules in the sense described here 
below. 
 
The term “mandatory rule” is used throughout jurisprudence and literature without, 
however, always giving it clear contours and a meaning of its own. Therefore, the first 
task before discussing the influence of mandatory rules on commercial arbitration is to 
define the term “mandatory rule” and to delimitate it from related concepts. 
 
The problem posed by the notion of mandatory rules, at least in continental European 
doctrine, is that the criteria by which a mandatory rule is defined partially overlap with 
the criteria for establishing its applicability.  
 
The traditional conflict of laws rules based on Savigny’s teachings sought to assign to 
every relationship a seat. Therefore, e.g. tort issues (as the relationship between the 
tortfeasor and the injured party) were assigned to the place at which the tort had taken 
place (the seat of the relationship). The law at the place of the tort would therefore 
govern the claims of the injured party against the tortfeasor. A contract is governed by 
the law with the closest connection to the contract, which according to the Rome 
Convention, is the law of country of the party performing the characteristic element of 
the contract. In the examined civil law systems the applicable law is determined by all-
sided conflict of laws rules (“allseitige Kollisionsnormen”). Such rules determine that to 
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specific facts or legal figures (e.g. the legal capacity of parties, the formal validity of a 
contract, the existence of rights in rem) a specific national law is applied, e.g. the 
existence to a right in rem is determined by the law of the place in which the thing is 
located when the acquisition of the right in rem is completed, the law applicable to a 
contractual relationship is governed by the law of the country to which the contract has 
to closest relationship. This concept therefore applies foreign or domestic law to 
international cases based on objective criteria and under the same circumstances. There 
is no preference for the lex fori. This concept is based on the idea of the inter-
changeability of systems of civil law1, which in turn was originally based on the idea 
that systems of civil law were non-political and neutral.2 Modern authors argue that 
even civil law systems are politically charged and therefore the decision of legislators to 
apply rules of foreign civil law is a political decision based on liberalism.3 
 
However, this system was established to determine the applicable law balancing the 
interests of private parties. States, however, issue rules which are not part of the system 
of law designed to balance the interests of parties but which serve superior interests of 
the community. Legal relationships between private parties, however, may also have an 
impact on these superior interests of third parties. States did not wish to abandon its 
possibilities to protect these over-individual interests by enacting all-sided conflict of 
laws rules which determine foreign law as the applicable law. The assumed neutrality 
and  inter-changeability of civil law systems does not apply these rules.4 This is shown 
by such provisions as Art 7(2) Rome Convention, which states that “nothing in this 
Convention  shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a 
situation  where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract.“ Such rues intervene in the relationship between private parties. Beyond this, 
states may also have an interest that their mandatory rules are not only applied by their 
own judges but also by foreign judges and arbitrators. However, before determining 
                                                 
1 The term “civil law” in this thesis means both the civil law systems as legal systems 
opposed to common law systems and civil law in the meaning of the law governing the 
legal relationship between private parties. 
2 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht 16. 
3 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 13.  
4 Basedow, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8 (19). 
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under which circumstances to apply such rules they must necessarily be distinguished 
from the law which is applied to a legal relationship by all-sided conflict of laws rules. 
 
A.  D I S T I N C T I O N  D R A W N  B E T W E E N  P U B L I C  A N D  C I V I L  L A W  
 
One distinction between the law applicable by all-sided conflict of laws rules and 
mandatory rules is found in the distinction between public law, i.e. laws by which a 
state obliges its subjects, and civil law.5 This distinction, however, cannot be found 
consistently in every legal system and the differences between civil and common law 
systems make it useless6 Further, even in civil law systems it is not always clear 
whether rules pertain to the individual  or the other group. The distinction along the 
lines of the differentiation of public and private law is therefore futile. 
 
B.  D I S T I N C T I O N  D U E  T O  T H E  L E G I S L A T I V E  I N T E N T  O F  T H E  
 R U L E  
 
A second approach distinguishes mandatory rules from the otherwise applicable rules of 
law solely by reference to the legislative intent of the rule to be applied to the facts of a 
specific case. Lorenz defines mandatory rules solely by stating that they are rules that 
apply regardless of the otherwise applicable law because the state enacted them with 
this legislative intent.7 
 
This attempt is based on a correct assumption. National legislators enact mandatory 
rules with the intent that they be applicable to a legal relationship regardless of the 
otherwise appliable law. This definition, however, fails to define the term. One needs to 
define the term mandatory rule to then know whether it applies to a legal relationsship 
regardless of the otherwise applicable law.8 It is therefore not sufficient to refer only to 
                                                 
5 Which is a distinction which was made by the German Supreme Court in early 
Judgements, see BGH, 11 February 1953, BGHZ 9, 34. 
6 Frank, RabelsZ 34 (1970) 56 (71); Radtke, ZVglRWiss 84 (1985) 325 (328). 
7 Lorenz, RIW 1987, 569 (578). 
8 Schurig, RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217 (228). 
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the legislative intent of a rule to define it as a mandatory rule despite the fact that 
mandatory rules reflect a legislative intent of legislator regarding its mandatory 
application. 
 
C.  T H E  I N T E R E S T S  S E R V E D  B Y  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  
 
The most meritous distinction is to be made by focusing on the interests which a rule 
serves. The essence of this criterion is that a mandatory rule serves over-individual 
public purposes of national or economical policies. 9  
 
Many rules from which parties cannot derogate arguably serve over-individual policies. 
Social policies protecting weaker parties may be reflected in norms of labour law, 
tenancy law or the like. However, not all of these rules are internationally mandatory 
rules. The distinction is blurred by rules that merely serve the regeneration of a 
contractual equilibrium that has gone lost due to commercial reality and the effective 
weaker bargaining position of specific parties and therefore effectively serve private 
parties.  Several approaches have been made to point out the line between the two 
groups of rules.  
 
Basedow divides the rules that protect state interests into rules that protect groups (such 
as consumers, tenants, etc.) and rules that protect institutions (such as the national 
economy).10 While the group interests always are opposed to the interests of other 
concerned groups in one national setting, the state is left to enact mandatory rules that 
apply merely in domestic cases, as the interests of foreign groups were not considered 
by the national legislator.11 In the case of the rules protecting institutions however, there 
is a necessity to protect these values in international cases.12 Thus, rules protecting 
institutions are what are to be considered mandatory rules in the sense used by the 
                                                 
9 Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 Art 34, no 13; Radtke, ZVglRWiss 84 (1985) 325 
(328); Neumeyer, RabelsZ 25 (1960) 649 (653); Stellungnahme Max-Planck-Institut, 
RabelsZ 47 (1983) 595 (669); Sumampouw, RabelsZ 30 (1966) 334 (342). 
10 Basedow, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8 (17f). 
11 Basedow, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8 (27). 
12 Basedow, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8 (29). 
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author. Rules protecting specific group interests are merely national ius cogens and only 
applicable as part of the lex fori or lex causae. 
 
Kreuzer divides the two groups into rules with an economic macro- and a 
microfunction. A rule with an economic macrofunction is aimed at protecting the 
economy as a whole while rules with microfunctions protect the balancing of interests 
of individuals. Only rules of the former group qualify as mandatory rules.13 
 
Of course, all these approaches necessarily generalize. When faced with an individual 
rule the judge or the arbitrator will have to interpret the rule and seek to establish the 
legislative intent and the direction of impact (“Stossrichtung”) 14 to decide to which of 
the two groups a rule pertains.  
 
Numerous rules may also serve both individual and over-individual policies. In this 
case, it seems the most purposeful approach to treat only those rules as mandatory rules 
which to a larger extent protect over-individual interests.15 As set out below, in doubt a 
rule should not be treated as a mandatory rule (infra section III.E.). 
 
Some authors nevertheless expand the goals potentially to be furthered by mandatory 
rules to such rules that that protect social values, e.g. rules of consumer protection and 
labour law.16 This is justified by the argument that also in these areas states are not 
concerned so much with the contractual relationships of parties, but are implementing 
certain social-political goals. This argument, however, does not hold water: The 
stabilization of contractual equilibria, which is the goal of these rules, is best achieved 
by the rules of the lex causae. 
 
                                                 
13 Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht 83; along these lines also Junker, IPRax 
2000, 65 (70). 
14 Hess. LAG 16.11.1999, IPRax 2001, 461 (467); to this judgement: Benecke, IPRax 
2001, 449 (452); Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 Art 34, no 13. 
15 v.Bar/Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht I² § 4 no 95. 
16 v.Hoffmann, RabelsZ 38 (1974) 396 (408). 
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D.  T H E  D E F I N I T I O N  I N  EC  R E G U L A T I O N  N O  5 9 3 / 2 0 0 8 17 
 
Art 7(1) Rome Convention does not contain a definition of the term “mandatory rule”. It 
merely refers to the mandatory character of the rules which is used, however, as a 
connecting factor and not as an element of the definition of the rule. 
 
Art 9 EC Regulation No 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(Rome I), which supersede the Rome Convention in December 2009 seeks to eliminate 
the uncertainties caused by the lack of the definition of mandatory rules. According to 
Art 9 EC Regulation No 593/2008 a mandatory rules are defined as  
 
provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its 
public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent 
that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the 
law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.  
 
This definition is obviously based on the judgement of the ECJ in Arblade18 in which 
the ECJ had already referred to the character of such norms as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization. 
The definition in Art 9(1) therefore has two elements: The first refers to the interests 
protected by mandatory rules. The second refers to their mandatory character and the 
fact that they are to be applied regardless of the otherwise applicable law. 
 
The first of these two criteria is the more important. As mentioned above, a distinction 
has been made between rules that protect over-individual policies and rules that re-
establish a contractual equilibrium that has been distorted by commercial reality. Art 
9(1) refers to the public interests of a state. This has been interpreted to exclude all rules 
of the second category.19 This is a legitimate interpretation, especially as the article 
                                                 
17 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, OJ L 177/6. 
18 ECJ, Judgement 23 November 1999, C-369/9 and C-376/96, ECR 1999, I-8453, para 
30. 
19 Heiss, JBl 2006, 750; Beulker, Eingriffsnormenproblematik 43. 
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refers to the political, social or economic organization of a state. However, it is not 
impossible to interpret the definition in a broader manner arguing that also rules that 
protect individuals can serve public purposes.20 It will remain to be seen which of the 
two approaches is taken by national courts and the ECJ. It must, however, be borne in 
mind that the ECJ interpreted Art 17 of the Council Directive on Commercial Agents, 
which deals with the compensation of agents, to be a rule which accordingly protects 
the undistorted competition in the internal market and is therefore a mandatory rule.21 
This interpretation is excessive. It may be true that the compensation of commercial 
agents also and indirectly protects commercial agents. Nevertheless, it primarily serves 
the interest of the individual commercial agent and his (allegedly) commercially inferior 
position towards the principal, which is why its classification as mandatory rule is at 
least doubtful.22 
 
The second criterion for the definition of a mandatory rule is that the enacting state 
requires that it applies irrespective of the otherwise applicable law. Therefore, a rule in 
question must also be examined as to its legislative intent. Also in this aspect the 
judgment of the ECJ in Ingmar is relevant.23 In that case, the ECJ following the 
Advocate General Léger justified the mandatory nature of Art 17 of the Directive on 
Commercial Agents by reference to Art 19 of the Directive which states that parties 
cannot derogate from the application of Art 17. However, Léger and the ECJ seem to 
ignore the distinction between internal and internationally mandatory rules and, even 
worse, seem to deduce from the internally mandatory character of a rule that it is also 
internationally mandatory.24 
 
It is to be welcomed that finally a definition, although in broad terms, has been found 
for mandatory rules. However, before this definition will finally suffice to eliminate all 
ambiguities, it will be necessary for the ECJ to rule on the issue. 
 
                                                 
20 Bonomi, YbPrivIntL 2008, 285 (293ss). 
21 ECJ, Judgement 9 November 2000, C-381/98, paras. 23ss. 
22 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 62. 
23 ECJ, Judgement 9 November 2000, C-381/98. 
24 Schwarz, ZVglRWiss 101 (2002) 45. 
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E.  I N  D O U B T ,  A  R U L E  I S  N O T  M A N D A T O R Y  
 
As detailed above, the treatment of mandatory rules as a set of rules distinct from the 
otherwise applicable law is an exception. This exceptional character must be regarded 
when attempting to determine the mandatory character of a rule. A state may further its 
political goals by enacting mandatory rules but it must be clear that a rule is mandatory 
as both the parties and the judges or arbitrators must be able to ascertain without doubt 
whether a rule is applicable to their contract or not. It may not be overlooked that 
mandatory rules will usually have a very grave impact on a contractual relationship – 
more often than not invalidating it – so that a rule claiming application must do so 
clearly.25  
 
F.  T H E  L E X  F O R I  A S  T H E  R E L E V A N T  L A W  F O R  D E T E R M I N I N G  
 T H E  M A N D A T O R Y  C H A R A C T E R  O F  A  R U L E  
 
In accordance with the above criteria it is possible to determine whether a rule is 
mandatory or not.  No uniform answer has, however, been given to whether the 
mandatory character of rule is determined by the lex fori or by the law of the enacting 
state. 
 
Some authors leave it to the law of the enacting state to determine whether a rule should 
be a mandatory rule. Lorenz argues that the enacting state determines whether a rule is 
mandatory or not. This is a distinct matter from determining whether a law can be 
applied abroad which is a matter for the conflict of laws rules of the lex fori.26 This 
approach ignores that the foreign law may not know the concept of mandatory rules or 
may define mandatory rules very much differently than the lex fori.27 If a foreign judge 
is to lend his authority to implement the ends of a foreign legislator, it should also be 
left to the lex fori whether a rule is to be considered mandatory or not. 
 
                                                 
25 Lorenz, RIW 1987, 569 (579); Siehr, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41 (92). 
26 Lorenz, RIW 1987, 569 (578). 
27 Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 § 34 BGB, no 10. 
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G .  I N T E R N A L  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  A N D  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
 M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  
 
As will be described below, international mandatory rules (which are referred to in the 
following merely as mandatory rules) apply under certain circumstances to any legal 
relationship. An international mandatory rule is equipped with legislative intent and 
binding force which goes beyond that of the other rules of law of a state. For an 
international mandatory rule to apply, it is no prerequisite that the parties chose the 
national law of the state which enacted the mandatory rule. An international mandatory 
rule can apply regardless of the parties’ choice of law. The reason for this is that when 
enacting an international mandatory rule, a state is seeking to realize public and 
collective interests which would be hampered if parties could simply opt-out by 
choosing a different system of law. The enacting state puts its interests above the 
freedom of the parties and the law of other states.  
 
An internal mandatory rule, on the other hand, is a rule which the parties cannot opt out 
of once they have chosen a system of law. However, parties can opt out of internal 
mandatory rules by choosing the law of a different state. These rules mostly are inherent 
to the system of private law which cannot be changed by the parties. Examples of such 
rules are form requirements for contracts and general clauses such as the prohibition of 
contracts which contravene bonos mores. 
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IV .  THE AP PLICATION OF MANDATORY RULES  
 
Above, the qualitative features of mandatory rules have been described. These features 
distinguish mandatory rules from the otherwise applicable law to the contract. The next 
question that therefore must be answered is when and how to apply such mandatory 
rules.  
 
In the following the doctrine on the application of foreign internationally mandatory 
rules will be examined. Thereafter, the approaches taken in the jurisprudence of the 
examined legal systems will be analyzed. This section will deal only with the 
application of foreign mandatory rules before national courts. Their application by 
arbitral tribunals will be dealt with in a later section (infra section VI.). 
 
 
A.  T H E  “S O N D E R A N K N Ü P F U N G S T H E O R I E ”  
 
Except for the few proponents of the “Schuldstatutstheorie”28 according to which all 
mandatory rules of the lex causae and only those are applicable, there is consensus that 
the qualitative differences of mandatory rules and the policies they implement make a 
distinct conflict of laws treatment of mandatory rules necessary.  
 
There is, however, no uniform opinion on the form of the application of foreign 
mandatory rules. There is a stronger – though not complete – consensus on various 
connecting factors which are put into relationship to one another differently depending 
on the point of view of the various authors.  
 
The following connecting factors have been suggested: 
 
                                                 
28 The „Schuldstatut“ is the German term for the lex causae. 
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The rule must have been enacted with the specific legislative intent of extraterritorial 
application (“Geltungungswille”).29  
 
There must be a close connection between the enacting state and the case before the 
court faced with the possible application of a foreign mandatory rule.30  
 
The policy enforced by the mandatory rule must be compatible with the interests of the 
forum. 
 
In the following, the elements mentioned above will be scrutinized and the theories as a 
whole will be judged by their practicability, especially with regard to the 
implementation of mandatory rules by arbitrators. 
 
1. The legislative intent of extraterritorial application of the    
 mandatory rule  
 
The roots of the “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie” go back to the 1940’s when this theory 
was developed in Germany by Wengler and refined by Zweigert and Neumayer.31 
According to these authors, the only connecting factor for the application of foreign 
mandatory rules was the legislative intent of the rule to find application before foreign 
courts.32  
 
This approach was radical. It departed from the theory that the conflict of laws rules set 
out at the facts of the case and the applicable law is determined by conflict of laws rules 
which provide for the application of the law with the closest connection to the facts. It 
                                                 
29 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (183); Siehr, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41 (92). 
30 Art 19 Swiss Law on Private International Law; Vischer in ZürchKomm IPRG² Art 
19, nos, 205, 212. 
31 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (183); Zweigert, RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283; 
Neumeyer, BerGesVR 2 (1958) 35; see generally, Coester ZVglRWiss 82 (1983) 1 
(8ss). 
32 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (181); Zweigert, RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283. 
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declares the unilateral intent of the rule to be applied in certain circumstances to be the 
sole factor for the application of the rule. The forum state is to apply foreign rules due 
to notions of international comity and reciprocity.33 
 
The “will” of the enacting State that its rule should be applied by foreign courts may be 
explicitly stated in the rule itself, though this seems to be a rare occurrence. Otherwise, 
the intention of the enacting state must be found by interpretation of the rule or by 
recourse to the jurisprudence of that state.34  
 
The use of the legislative intent of foreign rules as a connecting factor for their 
application abroad without the use of other connecting factors as supposed by Wengler 
must find its limits in international law.35 Also Kreuzer has suggested that it would be 
sufficient that a rule has been enacted by a state within its jurisdiction to legislate for it 
to be applied. As international law, however, does not (yet) have sufficiently precise 
rules on jurisdiction to legislate, Kreuzer introduces the criterion of identity of interests 
between the enacting state and the forum state.36 
 
The intent of extraterritorial application that a national legislator may “charge” a rule 
with finds a barrier in the national sovereignty of every state which prohibits other 
states from enacting legislation by which it expands its territorial jurisdiction to the 
territory of foreign states.37 How strong the impact of national legislation with the 
legislative intent to be applied extraterritorially can be, was shown by the implications 
of the enactment of the U.S. Export Administration Act amending the Sections 376.12, 
                                                 
33 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (181). 
34 v.Hoffmann, RabelsZ 38 (1974) 396 (408); Zweigert, RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283 (288); 
Siehr, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41 (92); Benzenberg, 152. . 
35 Wengler did not consider the close connection between the case and the enacting state 
to be a connecting factor but merely a filter to sift out rules which were only remotely 
connected to the case and for which a state did not have jurisdiction to legislate, 
Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (185); see also Zweigert, RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283 
(290ss).  
36 Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht 90ss. 
37 Drobnig, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1 (3). 
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379.8 and 385.2 of the Export Administration Regulations38 by President Reagan. The 
Act prohibited persons under U.S. jurisdiction, including all companies owned or 
controlled by U.S. firms irrespective of their place of incorporation, from re-exporting 
machinery of U.S. origin without the permission of the U.S. government. The European 
Communities contented themselves with accusing the U.S. of a breach of international 
law,39 while the U.K. took countermeasures as it considered its trading interests 
damaged40 and France even confiscated the goods to be exported and shipped them to 
the U.S.S.R.. The application of this Act was also subject to legal discussion before the 
Dutch Arrondissementrechbank Den Haag in the “Sensor” case.41 The Dutch court 
decided that it could not take the U.S. Act into consideration, reasoning that the U.S. 
Act was manifestly contrary to international law. 
 
However, even within the ill-defined limits of international law, the sole reference to the 
legislative intent of the rule would potentially lead to the application of a multitude of 
rules or states only distantly connected to a case.42 The use of the legislative intent as a 
connecting factor for itself would therefore not be practical. Secondly, the legislative 
intent is a connecting factor. It is for itself never the reason for the application of a 
foreign rule.43 The forum judge does not apply foreign mandatory rules because the 
foreign legislator wishes him to do so. He does so because a conflict of laws rule of the 
forum permits him to respect the foreign legislative intent under certain circumstances 
and to apply the foreign rule. This conflict of laws rule uses the foreign legislative intent 
as a connecting factor for the application of the foreign rule.44  
 
Also Art. 19 Swiss PILA and Art 9 (1) of Regulation 593/2008 both refer to the 
legislative intent of the foreign legislator. Art 19 Swiss PILA, however, explicitly sets 
                                                 
38  ILM 21 (1982) 864ss. 
39 European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with 
the U.S.S.R., reprinted in ILM 21 (1982) 891, 893. 
40  ILM 21 (1982) 840. 
41 Discussed supra section IV.D.(2)(b). 
42 Vischer, RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438 (451); Zweigert, RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283 (288). 
43 Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 § 34 no 135; Lorenz, RIW 1987, 569; Drobnig in 
FS Neumeyer 159. 
44 Coester, ZVglRWiss 82 (1983) 1 (10). 
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out at the legislative intent of the foreign rule. This element is the first the judge is to 
assess when contemplating whether or not to apply a foreign mandatory rule. The 
recognition of the foreign legislator’s intent that a rule be applied extraterritorially must 
be justified by a close connection between the facts of the case and the state enacting 
the rule.45 Further, Art 19 Swiss PILA  limits the application of foreign mandatory rules 
to those rules in the application of which one party has a legitimate and preponderant 
interest. This limitation refers especially to the situation of distress a party may be put in 
if a mandatory rule which can be enforced against it by a foreign state is not applied.46 
 
2. The necessity of a close connection between the case and the 
 enacting state  
 
The necessity of a close connection between the facts of the case and the state which 
enacted the mandatory rule is commonly cited, however, does not find a uniform place 
in the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie. In the works of Wengler and Zweigert, this element is 
not a connecting factor for the application of foreign mandatory rules, but is a measure 
that restricts the applicability of foreign rules.47 Accordingly, foreign mandatory rules 
are applied due to their legislative intent but as this would favour states which enact 
laws with an excessive scope of application, a corrective measure in the form of the 
close connection was necessary. The element of the close connection also serves to 
ensure that the state enacting the mandatory rule has a legitimate interest in its 
application to a specific case.48 This legitimate interest, however, requires a closer 
connection than merely the respect for the limits of legislative jurisdiction granted to 
states under international law, though this is deemed sufficient by some authors.49 
 
                                                 
45 Vischer, RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438 (451). 
46 Vischer in ZürchKomm IPRG² Art 19 no 23. 
47 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168; see also Zweigert, RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283 
(290ss). 
48 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (185). 
49 Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht 91ss, considers the limits set out by 
international law to be sufficient. 
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From a systematic point of view, the close connection must not be considered a limiting 
factor reduced only to control excessive grasps for jurisdiction but as a connecting 
factor.50 The forum state can decide autonomously how close the connection between 
the facts of a case and the enacting state must be and can require a closer connection 
than merely legitimacy under international law.51 
 
There is, however, no universal rule on when a close connection between the facts of 
the case and the foreign mandatory rule is given. This evaluation will have to be divided 
into numerous rules which will be different depending strongly on the type of contract 
and the type of the mandatory rule and needs development by doctrine and 
jurisprudence.52 
 
Article 7 Rome Convention requires a “close connection” between the “situation” and 
“the mandatory rules of the law of another country”. This close connection is to be 
understood as a connection between the contract as a whole and not merely single 
provisions of it in order to prevent the “dismemberment of the contract”.53 Furthermore, 
this connection must be a genuine one, a criterion which is fulfilled “when the contract 
is to be performed in that other country or when one party is resident or has his main 
place of business in that other country.”54 
 
Regulation 593/2008 has replaced the element of a close connection used in the Rome 
Convention and now limits the application of mandatory rules to those of the law of the 
country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been 
performed. This, accordingly, was necessary as the UK, which had made a reservation 
to Art 7(1) Rome Convention, was afraid that the element of a close connection would 
                                                 
50 Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 § 34 no 135; Lorenz, RIW (1987), 569 (582). 
51 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (189ss); Lorenz, RIW (1987), 569 (582). 
52 See on this Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 § 34 no 141ss listing several categories 
of contracts and the criteria for the close connection; Schnyder, 
Wirtschaftskollisionrecht, no 334.  
53 Giuliano/Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, O.J. C 282, 31.10.1980, 1-50, Commentary to Article 7; Czernich/Heiss, 
EVÜ 175 (188). 
54 Giuliano/Largarde Report, Commentary to Article 7. 
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create uncertainty and would distort business in the financial markets.55 This solution 
reflects the U.K. approach to the problem of supervening illegality under the law of the 
place of performance taken in Ralli Brothers (described below section IV.D.2.b). The 
U.K. approach and its “counterpart” in Art 9(1) is, however, are far narrower than the 
approach taken in Art 7(1) Rome Convention. There is no good reason why the lex loci 
solutionis should be the only law which can contain mandatory rules.56 Undoubtedly, 
mandatory rules of this law will often be relevant, as performance takes place in this 
state and the performing party may therefore be factually subjected by the enacting state 
to its mandatory rules.57 However, it unnecessarily restricts the application of 
mandatory rules of other states which may have a genuine and legitimate interest in the 
application of their mandatory rules. It may also burden a party which is factually 
subjected to rules of its state of domicile which will be enforced against it in a situation 
in which a foreign court is prevented from applying these rules as the performance takes 
place outside the state of domicile. The element of the close connection in Art 7(1) of 
the Rome Convention was a more flexible criterion which would have enabled the judge 
to take such situations into account. It may be true that this was a less foreseeable 
criterion for the parties, but it may not be forgotten that the application of mandatory 
rules protects over-individual interests that stand above the interest of the parties and is 
a not often used exemption to the system provided for in Regulation 593/2008. A more 
elaborate body of jurisprudence to the term “close connection” would have sufficed to 
enhance legal certainty for the parties without sacrificing dogmatic clarity. 
 
3. The necessity that the rule must be compatible with the interests 
 of the forum state 
 
In addition to the two elements set out immediately above, a foreign mandatory rule 
must also to some extent be compatible with the interests of the forum state. The reason 
for this requirement is that the foreign mandatory rule stands out of the system of inter-
                                                 
55 Legal assessment of the conversion of the Rome Convention to a Community 
instrument and the provisions of the proposed Rome I Regulations of the Financial 
Markets Law Committee, retrievable at www.fmlc.org. 
56 Bonomi, YbPrivIntL 2008, 285 (293ss). 
57 Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 Art 34 EGBGB, no 141. 
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changeability of systems of civil law and usually reflects selfish interests of the enacting 
state. The forum judge, however, has no interest in the enforcement of foreign 
interests.58 Therefore, the foreign rule must to a specific extent also be compatible with 
the interests of the forum or even further them. It is disputed to what extent the interests 
must be compatible and whether the compatibility is a connecting factor or merely a 
barrier against the application of foreign rules that do not correspond to the interests of 
the forum state. 
 
Sonnenberger and Kreuzer both consider that the interests served by the mandatory rule 
must be identical to the forum state and further interests of the forum.59 Also other 
authors opine that if the values protected by the foreign rule are shared by the forum, the 
forum judge has no or less reason not to apply the foreign rule.60 Both consider that this 
identity of interests is the primary connecting factor for the application of foreign 
mandatory rules.61 A close connection and the legislative intent of the rule are of 
subordinate importance. Accordingly, the forum judge has no interest in applying 
foreign mandatory rules which protect values of foreign states. The only reason for the 
application of foreign mandatory rules can be that the interests of the foreign state they 
protect are also considered worthy of protection by the forum state.62 Such interests may 
also lie in the coordination of international economic policies or in the safeguarding of 
reciprocity in the application of the forum’s mandatory rules.63 These authors therefore 
start the examination of foreign mandatory rules not with the legislative intent with 
which the rules are charged, but with the merits of the rule and the interest of the forum 
state in their application.  Only if this criterion is fulfilled may the others be examined. 
 
                                                 
58 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 76. 
59 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 80; Kreuzer, 
AusländischesWirtschaftsrecht 91ss. 
60 Grossfeld/Rogers, ICLQ 32 (1983) 931 (943).  
61 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 82; Kreuzer, 
AusländischesWirtschaftsrecht 91ss. 
62 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 80; Kreuzer, 
AusländischesWirtschaftsrecht 91ss. 
63 Kreuzer, AusländischesWirtschaftsrecht 95ss. 
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Other authors also include an examination of the substance of the rule into their conflict 
of laws analysis. However, this is done in a last step of analysis after the legislative 
intent and the close connection have been determined.64 To what extent the foreign rule 
must be compatible with the values of the forum is a matter of dispute. 
 
Other authors do not consider the identity of interests to be an element of the conflict of 
laws rule but consider an examination of the substance of the foreign mandatory rules 
against the yardstick of the ordre public to be sufficient. 65 
 
The difference in method between the above approaches may make little difference in 
practice. Whether a rule is not applied in the first place as it does not fulfil the conflict 
of laws requirements or whether its application is prevented by the safety-net of the 
ordre public makes little difference. The more relevant point is the extent to which the 
foreign rule must be compatible with or even further domestic interests or whether it 
must merely not violate the ordre public.  
 
Clearly, a foreign mandatory rule cannot be applied if it violates the ordre public. For 
the reasons laid out in the introductory paragraph of this chapter, this is however not 
enough. Beyond that it can legitimately be required that the foreign rule is compatible 
with the interests of the forum even though this requirement ought to be applied 
narrowly and with care.66 If the foreign rule protects values of a foreign state which are 
not protected by the forum’s laws, there is still no necessity of denying application of 
the foreign rule if the foreign value is not incompatible with the forum’s values.67 There 
is no necessity of a corresponding rule of the forum’s law protecting this value. Before a 
foreign rule is denied application a certain measure of incompatibility must be 
reached.68  
                                                 
64 Hentzen, RIW 1988, 508 (510). 
65 See e.g., Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (197ss); Lorenz, RIW 1987, 569 (582), 
Schnyder, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, no 232ss, 283,ss; Zeppenfeld, 128. 
66 Bär, 316ss; Vischer, RdC (1974-II), 24. 
67 Hentzen, RIW 1988, 508 (510). 
68 Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 § 34 no 160; Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 
(197ss). 
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4. Summary 
 
Foreign mandatory rules may be applied under the following circumstances: 
 
1. The foreign mandatory rule was enacted with the legislative intent to govern a 
specific case and to be applied before foreign courts. 
2. The facts of the case must show a close connection to the enacting state. 
3. The interests served by the foreign mandatory rule must be compatible with the 
values of the forum state. 
 
These requirements are elements of a conflict of laws rule of the forum. It is therefore 
left to the forum judge to decide whether the requirements are fulfilled and a foreign 
law therefore can be applied. The order in which the judge examines the requirements is 
practically of lesser importance as foreign mandatory rules cannot be applied if any of 
the requirements is not met. However, from a dogmatic point of view it seems most 
stringent to set out at the legislative intent of the rule as this criterion. Even if the 
unilateral conflict of laws rule included in the foreign mandatory rule is irrelevant for 
the forum judge, the legislative intent to be applied is the most distinctive factor which 
is relevant for the application before the forum. The legislative intent that a rule be 
applied to a specific case will be justified by a close connection between the facts of the 
case and the enacting state. Before a rule can be applied, however, its merits must be 
examined. This latter criterion is vital as there is no harmony between the states of the 
international community on the regulation of the issues governed by mandatory rules 
and the interests pursued by their enactment. Therefore it is also not possible to 
establish an all-sided conflict of laws rule including only the first to criteria, despite the 
facts that this would enhance predictability for the parties to a contract.69 A judge will 
therefore have to examine the substance of a rule and will have to compare it to the 
interests protected by the forum’s legal system. 
 
                                                 
69 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 81. 
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B.  A P P L I C A T I O N  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  S O L E L Y  O F  T H E  L E X  
 C A U S A E  ( “ S C H U L D S T A T U T S T H E O R I E ” )  
 
One concern that has been raised against the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie lies in the 
dépeçage, the splitting of the applicable law into the lex causae and into specific 
mandatory rules of third states that are applied only to specific aspects of the case which 
bears the danger of “denaturalization” of the legal relationship.70 
The Schuldstatutstheorie is based on the notion that the lex causae includes not only the 
rules of private law which would be applicable under the conflict of laws rules of the 
forum but includes the entire legal order of that state including its mandatory rules.71 
This approach assumes no difference between rules of public and private law.72 
Accordingly, therefore, the lex causae governs every aspect of the contractual 
relationship, leaving no room to apply any mandatory rules of any other countries.73 
Mandatory rules of third states will not be applied but merely may be respected by the 
legal instruments of the lex causae concerning impossibility, hardship or suchlike e.g. 
para. 134 of the German BGB.74 
 
As Kegel has correctly stated, the mandatory rules of the lex causae should not be 
applied to a contract just because they are part of the lex causae.75 This criticism is 
supported by a number of reasons: Firstly, the theory is too blunt as it renders all 
mandatory rules of the lex causae applicable without distinction, thereby also applying 
those which did not have the will to be applied to a case with no connection to the 
enacting state.76 Thus, if the parties have chosen a specific national legal order to 
govern their relationship for reason of neutrality, this approach will lead to unwanted 
consequences. 
                                                 
70 Serick, RabelsZ 18 (1953) 633 (649). 
71 Reithmann/Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht5 no 446. 
72 Mann in FS Wahl 139 (145). 
73 Mann in FS Wahl 139 (146); Stoll in FS Kegel 623 (629) who however limits the 
application of this theory to norms that directly influence the contract without serving 
the state purposes mentioned above at section III.B. 
74 Mann in FS Wahl 139 (148).  
75 Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht9 155. 
76 Schubert, RIW 1987, 729 (731, 732ss). 
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Secondly, conflict of laws rules were created to serve the interests of the private parties, 
i.e. to serve the balancing of private interests. The application of mandatory rules must 
follow different rules, as they do not serve the balancing of interests of the parties, but 
the enforcement of vital interests of states. Thus, the application of mandatory rules and 
the ascertainment of the applicable private law cannot be adjudged according to the 
same criteria.77 
 
Thirdly, this theory may allow parties to evade mandatory rules which would otherwise 
be applicable to the case by simply choosing a legal order that does not contain such 
rules.78  
 
C.  T O  A P P L Y  O R  T O  G I V E  E F F E C T  T O  T H E  F O R E I G N  R U L E  
 
The form in which a judge of forum is to take note of the foreign mandatory rule is 
subject to dispute. This dispute – in a nutshell – is on whether the rule should be applied 
as it would be by the courts of the enacting state or whether the forum judge should 
merely give it effect and apply it as a fact, e.g. as an impediment to the performance of a 
contract. 
 
The first of these approaches would entail the application of a foreign mandatory rule 
including its legal consequences.79 If a rule is to be applied by a forum judge due to a 
conflict of laws rule of the forum, then logically also the legal sanctions which this rule 
provides for must be applied. Of course, the application of the foreign rule must not be 
misunderstood to mean the sovereign enforcement of a law but only its enforcement 
against a contractual relationship.80 Even when so applying foreign mandatory rules, the 
forum judge will not enforce penal sanctions or the like against one party but will only 
enforce it to the extent that the rule has civil law sanctions. Therefore, if the foreign 
                                                 
77 Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht 82. 
78 Kegel in Soergel, BGB § 34 no 83. 
79 Wengler, ZVglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 (212).  
80 Drobnig in FS Neumeyer 159 (175). 
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mandatory rule declares a contract null and void, the forum judge is to apply this rule 
and declare a contact void according to the provision of the lex causae which provides 
for the nullity of contracts that violate statutory law and not to use other legal figures 
such as an impediment to performance of a contract. The foreign mandatory rule is 
considered to be a rule of the lex causae.81 This is the only stringent consequence of the 
application of foreign mandatory rules via a conflict of laws rule of the forum.  
 
A second approach refuses to apply foreign mandatory rules directly and only to take 
account of the effects of such rules. In this case, the legal consequences of the 
mandatory rule are not applied, but the forum judge decides how best to take foreign 
mandatory rules into consideration.82 The language of Art 7(1) Rome Convention 
(“effect may be given”) suggests that a forum judge need not necessarily apply the legal 
sanctions of a rule. The Giulano Lagarde Report mentions that this problem is 
“delicate” and is therefore not a helpful source for interpretation. Obviously, this 
instrument leaves the judge a measure of appreciation when deciding how best to 
incorporate foreign mandatory rues. He could, e.g., consider a foreign mandatory rule 
which declares a contract null and void merely as a fact and determine other legal 
consequences than nullity if the lex causae so provides. The German Supreme Court, as 
will be seen below, refuses to apply foreign mandatory rules. However, this does not 
mean that it merely takes the effects the rule has on the contractual relationship of the 
parties. The German Supreme Court takes a middle path and – while stating that it 
refuses to apply foreign mandatory rules – considers the substance of the foreign rule 
and the interests of the foreign state it protects. If these coincide with German interest, 
the Supreme Court will take the rule into account within the lex causae and declare the 
contract contrary to good morals. This is obviously more than merely taking the 
consequences of the existence of the rule into consideration as a fact. The German 
                                                 
81 Busse, ZVglRWiss 95 (1996) 386 (391); Radtke, ZVglRWiss 84 (1985) 325 (339). 
82 v.Westphalen, NJW 1994, 2113 (2118), who argues that the principle of territoriality 
prevents states from applying foreign mandatory rules: Vischer in ZürchKomm IPRG² 
Art 19 no. 38. 
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Supreme Court is analysing the substance of the foreign rule and thereby taking a 
conflict of laws approach to the applicability of foreign rules.83 
 
The results reached by following either of the two approaches may in many cases not be 
that different. Nevertheless, as a matter of dogmatic clarity the first of the two is more 
convincing. The second approach has its merit in cases in which foreign mandatory 
rules cannot be applied as they do not fulfil the conflict of laws rules but still need to be 
applied as a matter of fairness between the parties.84 If a foreign rule factually prevents 
a party from performing a judge cannot be blind to this. In such circumstances it is 
justified to consider the foreign rule as a fact despite the fact that it cannot be applied. 
However, this should only be done, if an application of a foreign rule fails and the rule 
factually intervenes in the legal relationship of the parties, e.g. if one party is subject to 
a foreign mandatory rule which the enacting state can enforce against that party. 
 
D.  T H E  A P P R O A C H E S  O F  I N  J U R I S P R U D E N C E  
 
1. Mandatory Rules in Continental European Case Law 
 
a) Case law of the German Supreme Court  
 
Just as the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, Germany made use of its right of 
reservation under Art 22 (1) (a) of the Rome Convention and therefore has not 
implemented Art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention.  
 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that German courts are prevented from 
considering foreign mandatory rules. The German legislator deliberately created a legal 
gap (“gewollte, offene Regelungslücke”) that jurisprudence is to close.85 
                                                 
83 Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht9 156. 
84 Radtke, ZVglRWiss 84 (1985) 325 (340); Martiny in MünchKomm BGB X4 § 34 no 
68. 
85 Reithmann/Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht5 no 442 with further references.  
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The German Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to apply foreign rules which it 
considers to be part of the public law of that country.86 The German Supreme Court, 
however, does not entirely disregard foreign mandatory rules but has developed an 
approach which allows it to prevent hardship to the parties, while (at least at face value) 
upholding the dogma of the inapplicability of foreign public laws.  
 
(1) The postulate of non-applicability of foreign 
 public laws. 
 
17.12.1959 (Russian Currency Laws) 87 
In its decision of the 17.12.1959, the German Supreme Court decided on a case 
concerning the applicability of Russian currency laws. The German Supreme Court held 
that they could not be applicable before German courts, reasoning that public law is 
strictly territorial and therefore bound to the territory of the enacting state. Only if the 
enacting state had the actual physical power to enforce its rules, would the German 
Supreme Court apply them.88 Also if the rules merely balance the interest of parties, 
even those appertaining to public law, the German Supreme Court considered it possible 
that it may recognize their influence on a contractual relationship.89 
 
16.4.1975 (Solchenizyn)90 
In this case, the Russian author Solchenizyn had granted a German publisher the 
exclusive right to publish a book. Subsequently, he published it himself and the German 
publisher filed an action to prevent him from doing so. Solchenizyn claimed that the 
Russian monopoly on foreign trade forestalled any transfer of his rights to the German 
publisher.  
                                                 
86 See the examples immediately below; to the jurisprudence of the German Supreme 
Court see generally: Meng, Extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion 663; Junker, IPRax 2000, 65 
(72). 
87 BGH, 17 December 1959, RabelsZ 25 (1960) 645. 
88 BGH, 17 December 1959, RabelsZ 25 (1960) 645 (648). 
89 BGH, 17 December 1959, RabelsZ 25 (1960) 645 (648). 
90 BGH, 16 April 1975, BGHZ 64, 183 (189). 
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The German Supreme Court held that the contract was valid as the Russian law could 
not be taken into consideration as it was limited to Russian territory.91 The situs of the 
copyright could however not be limited to Russian territory. 
 
In these decisions the German Supreme Court refused to apply or even to consider 
foreign mandatory rules due to its approach that foreign “public” laws only are 
applicable in the territory of the enacting state. The court found only two exceptions 
from this principle. Firstly, rules of foreign “public” law which served the balancing of 
the interests of parties. The German Supreme Court did not detail this exception any 
further. It is hard to consider public laws which balance the interests of private parties, 
which may be the reason why this exception has never been implemented in practice 
yet.92 The second exception made refers to cases in which the enacting state has the 
actual power to enforce its mandatory rules. The theory on which this exception is based 
considers all mandatory rules applicable which the foreign state can actually enforce so 
that the forum judge cannot be blind towards them. 
 
The refusal of the German Supreme Court to consider foreign mandatory rules based on 
the principle of territoriality has been criticized. The tenor of the criticism is that it may 
be correct that foreign mandatory rules only have territorial effect and could only be 
enforced in the territory of the enacting state but that German courts would not be 
enforcing foreign rules but only considering them and their effects on contractual 
relationships.93 This principle has therefore been rejected by scholarship.94 
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(2) Foreign mandatory rules considered under 
 the lex causae 
 
In other judgments the German Supreme Court – still refusing to apply foreign law 
directly – was willing to declare contracts as void pursuant to clauses included in the 
German civil code intended for cases of impossibility of performance pursuant to sec 
275 German Civil Code or for immorality pursuant to sec 138 of the German Civil Code 
or due to the doctrine of frustration under sec 242 of the German Civil Code. 
 
German Supreme Court 17.11.1994 (GDR Foreign Trade Monopoly)95 
In this case the German Supreme Court decided a dispute between a consultant to the 
Technical University Ilmenau and that university deriving from the consultancy 
agreement concluded between these two parties in early 1990. The university argued - 
inter alia - that the consultancy agreement was void as the foreign trade regulations of 
the GDR prohibited universities from concluding agreements with foreign parties. The 
German Supreme Court held that the foreign trade regulations were to be considered 
mandatory rules. It further established that such rules could only be applied if they 
required application in the specific case, which it denied due to the fact that shortly after 
conclusion of the contract the foreign trade regulations of the GDR were repealed. In 
then held obiter that even if this had not been the case, the rules could only have been 
considered as a fact and perhaps rendered the contract void due to the impossibility of 
performance. 
 
German Supreme Court 8.2.1984 (Delivery of beer to Iran)96 
An Iranian and a German party agreed to export beer from Germany to Iran. The Iranian 
party claimed that it was unable to fulfil its obligations to the German party, as, after the 
revolution in Iran, trading with alcoholic drinks had been prohibited on pain of the death 
penalty. The German Supreme Court refused to apply the Iranian law or subject it to a 
                                                 
95 BGH, 17 January 1994, BGHZ 128, 41. 
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conflict of laws – analysis, but held that the commercial basis of the agreement between 
the parties (“Geschäftsgrundlage”) was frustrated and therefore adapted the agreement.  
 
German Supreme Court 21.12.1960 (Borax) 97 
In the well known Borax-decision, the German Supreme Court had to decide on the 
claim of a West German seller who had sold 100 tons of Borax (a chemical also used 
for weapons) to a West German buyer. Both parties knew that the chemical was 
destined for the Eastern block.  
 
Under U.S. law, Borax that was exported from the U.S. was not allowed to be sold to 
the state parties of the Warsaw Pact. The final destination, however, was Rostock/East 
Germany. The buyer refused to oblige himself not to re-export the chemicals to Warsaw 
Pact states. Consequently, the seller would not deliver the chemical and  the buyer sued.  
The German Supreme Court ruled that the contract was void for immorality pursuant to 
para 138 of the Civil Code. The interesting point, however, may be seen in the 
considerations of the German Supreme Court towards the reasoning of why the contract 
was immoral.  
 
The German Supreme Court stated first that Germany had not enacted any laws that 
adopted the U.S. embargo laws. It went on to hold that even so the contract was 
immoral as the U.S. embargo had been put in place to protect all western states, 
including West Germany, from increasing the armament of the East Block. Thus, 
immorality was founded in the violation of the interests of the all western states and 
therefore also of Germany. 
 
German Supreme Court 8.5.198598 
In this case, the plaintiff had acted as an intermediary for the defendant and had bribed 
local authorities to obtain a contract. The intermediary was to be reimbursed for the 
bribes by his commission payments. Such bribes were prohibited by local law. The 
contract contained a choice of German law. 
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The German Supreme Court decided for defendant, holding that the agreement to 
reimburse bribes was immoral and therefore void pursuant to sec 138 German Civil 
Code. It decided that the German legal order was not endangered through the contract 
and the bribery, but that also German law disapproves of bribery, thus showing that 
there existed a common interest of both states in the fight against bribery.99 
 
German Supreme Court 22.6.1972100 (Nigerian cultural heritage) 
In this case, the German Supreme Court had to decide a case in which a Nigerian 
company had insured the transport to Germany of masks and figures that formed part of 
the Nigerian cultural heritage with a German insurer. This transport of cultural objects 
had been declared illegal by the Nigerian legislator. After arrival in Germany, some 
objects were missing and the exporter sued the German insurer who claimed that the 
insurance contract was void due to immorality. 
 
The German Supreme Court held at first – and in this point this case can be contrasted 
to the aforementioned – that the Nigerian export prohibition did not touch German 
interests.101 It only protected Nigeria from being plundered by foreign collectors. Then 
it stated that laws such as the Nigerian one protected the interests of all states (citing a 
UNESCO treaty that was not in force in Germany at the time) in the preservation of 
their cultural heritage. Thus, the insurance contract was void, even though in this case 
the German Supreme Court expressly stated that German interests were not touched. 
The immorality was based on the interests of all states that cultural heritage should not 
be brought out of the country, which made the insurance contract objectionable enough 
to be declared immoral. 
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(3) Conclusion 
 
The German Supreme Court maintains until present its dogma of the inapplicability of 
foreign mandatory rules. This dogma is of course correct. However, its application by 
the German Supreme Court is not. The application of a foreign mandatory rule does not 
entail the enforcement of rules of foreign public law, but merely their consequences on 
a private legal relationship. Even if the German Supreme Court would apply the 
Sonderanknüpfungstheorie, it would not need to enforce foreign penal, fiscal or other 
public laws but merely apply them to the extent they have consequences on the private 
legal relationship102 
 
The above cases which declare contracts null and void for immorality are seen by some 
as an approximation towards the already mentioned “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie” as the 
Court explicitly compared the interests of the foreign legislator reflected in the rule and 
the interests of the German state.103 This is different in cases in which the German 
Supreme Court decided on the impossibility of performance or frustration of the 
contract which entailed no substantive analysis of the foreign law.  
 
How strong these tendencies really are may be doubted. After all, the German Supreme 
Court is not clearly taking a conflict of laws approach when deciding on their 
application.104  It is merely considering the substance of the foreign rules without 
detailing whether it considers the foreign rule applicable or not. Of course, if the 
German Supreme Court considers the substance of foreign rules, it must – in some way 
or another – consider these rules applicable and must have taken a conflict of laws 
approach to decide whether the foreign rule is applicable.105 To this extent the German 
Supreme Court is actually taking a conflict of laws analysis. The German Supreme 
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Court, however, is creating an approach of its own.106 Its approach is to fill out a general 
clause of its national law with values of a foreign legislator that it has adopted as its 
own.107 This adoption can be considered to include a conflict of laws approach. This 
application is however not a pure one, as the application of foreign rules is not executed 
by their direct application and also not via the rule of para 134 BGB, which would at 
least show the acceptance of the foreign rule as a rule of law and not merely as a fact as 
the consideration via para 138 shows.108 
 
b) Dutch Case Law  
 
Tough the present thesis does not include Dutch law in its scope, there is some 
jurisprudence of Dutch courts which is of relevance so that it should not be left out in 
this context.  
 
The first case was decided in 1966 by the Hoge Raad in the Alnati-case,109 which 
evolved from the following facts: In 1954, a time at which the Netherlands had not 
adopted the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
relating to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), a bill of lading was delivered by a Dutch 
company to its own agents as shippers in Antwerpen, Belgium, which had at that time 
ratified the Hague Rules, which accordingly were part of their ordre public. The bill of 
lading referred to a shipment of potatoes from France to Brazil, a part of which was 
damaged during transport. This damage was refunded by Dutch insurers, one of which 
lodged a claim against a carrier. The Bill contained a choice of Dutch law. The Hoge 
Raad eventually had to decide the matter, especially the applicability of the Belgian 
mandatory rules. The Hoge Raad held that a foreign state may have such an interest in 
the application of its rules to a case in a foreign court that a foreign court should take 
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them into account, even if the parties have chosen other law to be applicable. It then 
went on to hold that the Belgian rules were not of such character. 
 
The Dutch Hoge Raad did not analyse in detail the circumstances under which a foreign 
mandatory rule should be taken into account. It obviously considered that shared 
interests would be a prerequisite for the application of foreign mandatory rules, which 
shows a parallel to the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie. 
 
This doctrine was further developed by to the so-called Sensor case,110 where the 
application of an American export control act required written authorization by the 
Office of Export Administration for export or re-export to the U.S.S.R. of any oil and 
gas exploration, production, transmission of refinement goods of U.S. origin. The Dutch 
Supreme Court, after a lengthy elaboration on the various bases for jurisdiction under 
public international law and the denial of the applicability of any, adjudged that the 
American mandatory rule could not be applied as it was not in conformity with 
international law. It went on to hold, that Dutch courts – as a matter of principle – 
would apply foreign mandatory rules, if they had a sufficiently close connection to the 
Netherland. The precise methodology of the Dutch court is not quite clear. It denied the 
applicability of the U.S. rule a priori due to a violation of public international law. It did 
not consider any elements of the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie. It held obiter that a close 
connection would be a prerequisite of the application of a foreign mandatory rule. The 
Hoge Raad, therefore, refined its approach in this case as it held that foreign mandatory 
rules with a close connection to the forum state could be applied, though this connection 
was not existent in the case at hand. This case clearly shows a conflict of laws approach 
to the application of foreign mandatory rules.  
c) Austrian Case Law 
 
Early decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court dealing with the possibility of reviewing 
expropriations deny the power of Austria courts to re-examine a foreign act of 
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expropriation111 even when the expropriated goods had been removed from the territory 
of the expropriating state after expropriation.112  
 
In a decision of 1961, the Austrian Supreme Court had to deal with a case concerning 
the applicability of Austrian currency law.113 The Austrian Supreme Court held that if a 
contract was to be executed in Austria this rendered Austrian currency law applicable. It 
has been generalized to the rule that Austrian exchange control laws will always be 
applied by Austrian courts. 
 
Concerning the application of foreign exchange control laws, the Austrian Supreme 
Court has held in various decisions that the application of foreign mandatory rules is 
possible, if the transfer of assets and thus the execution of the contract took place on the 
territory of the enacting state and if the assets were not located in Austria.114 Bydlinski 
criticized these judgments as early as 1961 and suggested the use of the 
Sonderanknüpfungstheorie.115 
 
On the 1.1.1979 the Austrian Private International Law Act came into force.116 In its sec 
1, it states that the law of the state with the closest connection to the case shall be 
applicable, thus creating the legal basis for the “Sonderanknupfüngstheorie” of Austrian 
national mandatory rules.117 The Austrian Private International Law Act does not 
include a provision on mandatory rules. Therefore, its sec 1 and the application of the 
law of the closest connection can be implemented as a basis for the application of 
mandatory rules. The requirement of the application of the law with the closest 
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connection must be interpreted to mean that if a mandatory rule has an interest to be 
applied to a certain case, this interest creates the closest connection.118 
 
Already in 1986 the Austrian Supreme Court held in a case concerning the applicability 
of an Austrian regulation on the maximum fees to be charged by real estate agents that 
sec 1 of the Private International Law Act provides for the application of the 
Sonderanknüpfungstheorie as described in the preceding paragraph.119 It defined 
mandatory rules as rules by which the state directs its public interests and which 
intervene in private legal relationships to protect those public interests. It further held 
that the public interests justify that mandatory rules are applied regardless of the 
otherwise applicable law as the latter is determined serving the interests of the parties. It 
explicitly held that mandatory rules (in this case of the lex fori) are to be applied due to 
their legislative intent, which is to be read from the text of the rule or to be interpreted 
from it. In that case it held that the rule in question did not have the legislative intent to 
apply. This judgement clearly showed the application of the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie. 
Of course, this judgment is not relevant for the position of the Austrian Supreme Court 
on the application of mandatory rules of third states. 
 
In its judgement of the 14.7.1993, the Austrian Supreme Court had to decide a case 
concerning the liquidation of an off-shore bank with its headquarters in St. Vincent that 
had subsidiaries in Austria and Liechtenstein.120 As the bank did not have the necessary 
permission to carry out banking activities in Liechtenstein, the authorities in 
Liechtenstein ordered the liquidation of the bank. At the same time, the bank decided to 
liquidate itself. The Liechtenstein authorities had installed a liquidator as did the bank 
itself. Both liquidators claimed to represent the bank regarding the liquidation of assets 
located in Austria. The Austrian Supreme Court had to decide which of the two 
liquidators could legally represent the bank in proceedings in Austria. 
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The Austrian Supreme Court declared that according to Austrian law the headquarters 
of the bank must either be in Liechtenstein or Austria, not however on St. Vincent, as 
these were the places where the actual business took place. The court of 2nd instance 
would thus have to determine which of the two places should determine the applicable 
law (§§ 12, 10 Austrian PILA). 
 
It went on to hold that, if the headquarters were in Austria and Austrian law were 
applicable, the representative appointed by the bank was to represent the bank in 
Austrian proceedings.  
 
If however, the headquarters were determined to be in Liechtenstein and its law were 
applicable, the question arose as to whether the appointment of the Liechtenstein 
representatives was valid. This act of appointment was a consequence of a mandatory 
rule of Liechtenstein banking law, designed to protect the banking trade and creditors. 
Just as before the Supreme Court determined whether the rule was a mandatory rule by 
reference to purpose and the interests it served. The Supreme Court decided that the rule 
in question fulfilled this prerequisite. It also held that the application of mandatory rules 
follows the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie and that the application of mandatory rules 
depends on their legislative intent and the close connection they have to the facts of the 
case. It held that the legislative intent of the rule creates the closest connection between 
the rule and the facts of the case. This reasoning presumably was chosen, as Austria had 
at the time of judgement not yet acceded to the Rome Convention. Therefore, there was 
no provision explicitly dealing with mandatory rules and the court referred to sec 1(1) 
Austrian PILA, which generally states that the law with the closest connection must be 
applied. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the foreign mandatory rule must no violate 
the Austrian ordre public. Further, the Supreme Court held that the rule must be capable 
of being “internationalized”, without  defining this term further. However, the Supreme 
Court cites Reichelt who uses this term to describe merely that the foreign legislator 
wanted the rule to apply also before foreign courts;121 this term therefore does not differ 
from the legislative intent required.  
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In that case, the Austrian Supreme Court only decided on mandatory rules of the lex 
causae and specifically stated that the application of mandatory rules of other third 
states is a question more difficult to answer.122 However, as the Supreme Court 
explicitly held that mandatory rules are to be applied due to their legislative intent and 
their close connection to the facts of the case, there is no reason to suspect that the 
Supreme Court would decide differently if the mandatory rule had pertained neither to 
the lex causae or the lex fori.123 Until the present date no case is known in which the 
Austrian Supreme Court would have done so. Since 1998 Austria is a party to the Rome 
Convention. A judgment based on article 7 (1) Rome Convention has not been rendered 
yet. 
d) Swiss Case-Law 
 
In early jurisprudence dating from the period before the enactment of the Swiss PILA 
Swiss courts essentially followed the same approach taken by the German Supreme 
Court and declared that application of foreign mandatory rules was limited by the 
principle of territoriality and that they therefore could not be applied by Swiss courts. 
Foreign mandatory rules would only be taken into account as facts and treated as such 
under the relevant provisions of the applicable law.124 
 
Art 19 of the Swiss PILA, which allows for the implementation of the 
Sonderanknüpfungstheorie, brought a change to this approach. Swiss courts have 
repeatedly made use of this provision. 
 
In 2001 the Swiss Supreme Court had to decide on the argued misapplication of EU 
competition law to an exclusive distribution agreement for Belgium, the Netherlands 
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and Luxemburg.125 The lower instances had denied a violation of EU competition law. 
The applicant argued that the lower courts had, however, omitted to examine Dutch and 
Belgian (domestic) competition law. The Supreme Court held that foreign mandatory 
rules could be applied in accordance with Art 19 Swiss PILA if they have a close 
connection with the facts of the case, which, in the case of competition law rules, is 
existent if the effects of a contract are felt on a market. As the lower instances had 
correctly defined the market not as an individual national market, but as a market 
consisting of various EU member states, it had correctly applied EU competition law 
and not national competition law.  
 
This decision shows that Swiss courts, other than most states which enacted Art 7 Rome 
Convention, are willing to apply Art 19 Swiss PILA and to apply foreign mandatory 
rules. 
 
In a more recent decision, the Swiss Supreme Court decided on the applicability of U.S. 
insolvency laws before Swiss courts and their impact on a contract subject to Swiss law. 
The Swiss Supreme Court confirmed that the relevant U.S. law had the legislative intent 
to be applied extraterritorially. The wife opened an account with a Swiss bank, which 
was active in both Switzerland and the U.S. Her husband was entitled to access the 
account. The husband than went bankrupt and his estate was subject to U.S. bankruptcy 
laws. According to these, the Swiss bank was ordered to provide certain information 
about the bank account to the U.S. authorities, which it could not do without violating 
Swiss regulations on banking confidentiality. The wife sued the bank for payment of the 
amounts on the account. The bank resisted the claim arguing that it would be subject to 
penalties under U.S. law (which could be enforced, as it was active also in the U.S.) if it 
made the payment. The court of first instance decided to modify the contract between 
the bank and the wife to the effect that the bank’s payment obligation was suspended. 
The Supreme Court in detail examined whether the court’s interpretation of Art 19 
Swiss PILA was correct. It first scrutinized at length what requirements the connection 
between the facts of the case and the U.S. must fulfil to qualify as a close connection for 
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the area of bankruptcy law. It held that the fact that the wife, who was not subject to 
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings, was domiciled in the U.S. was for itself not sufficient. 
Further, as the husband was not party to the contract between the wife and the bank, his 
domicile in the U.S. was also not sufficient. It then held that the claim of the wife 
against the bank was possibly part of the husband’s estate. However, the Supreme Court 
held that this was not relevant, as the Swiss PILA contains explicit regulations on 
bankruptcy of persons domiciled abroad with assets located in Switzerland. The Swiss 
legislator had in Arts 166ss Swiss PILA already issued rules which account for the 
interests pursued by utilizing Art 19 to apply the foreign mandatory rule. As there were 
more special rules for the case, the application of Art 19 Swiss PILA by the court of 
first instance was superfluous and did not respect the exceptional character of Art 19 
Swiss PILA.  
 
Swiss case law shows that Swiss courts are willing to implement Art 19 Swiss PILA, 
and to take a conflict of laws – approach to foreign mandatory rules. Art 19 is a clear 
example of the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie set out above, which has also been 
emphasized explicitly by the Swiss Supreme Court.   
 
2. The U.K. approach 
 
The United Kingdom has opted to use its right under Art 22 para 1 of the Rome 
Convention and thus does not apply Art 7 para 1 of this instrument. English courts have 
repeatedly stated that they will only apply mandatory rules of English law or of the lex 
causae if this happens not to be English law.126 The approach taken bears resemblance 
to the “Schuldstatutstheorie” developed under German law described above.127 
 
However, this does not mean that English courts ignore all rules of law that are neither 
part of the lex fori or the lex causae. It will be shown in the following that English 
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courts have nevertheless given effect to foreign mandatory rules. English courts do not 
address this issue as an application of foreign mandatory rules. As will be set out here 
below, English courts will instrumentalize the concept of public policy or will consider 
rules of the lex loci solutionis.  
a)  Illegality as a violation of the English ordre public 
 
English courts have repeatedly decided cases in which a contract violated foreign law. 
In these cases, English courts did not apply the foreign rule. They did not adopt any 
conflict of laws analysis. To the contrary, they based their decisions on a very broad 
notion of the English ordre public.  
 
In Foster v. Driscoll, a group of people in Great Britain formed a partnership with the 
sole purpose of smuggling whisky from Great Britain into the United States, which was 
illegal according to US law at the time of prohibition.128 The Court of Appeal held that 
the partnership was illegal; however it reasoned that this was so by recourse to British 
public policy (“public morality”). Accordingly, English public policy would prevent 
English courts from recognizing a partnership which had been formed to violate foreign 
law, as this would justly give the United States a reason to complain to the English 
government and thus be in violation of England’s obligations arising from international 
comity.129 It seems that, in that case, the Court had no intention of applying US law, but 
merely took it into account while nullifying the contract due to English public policy. 
 
In Regazzoni v. Sethia,130 the House of Lords held a contract between an English 
company which agreed to sell 500,000 jute bags to a Swiss resident to be shipped from 
India to Italy to be illegal. While nothing in the contract was illegal by English law at 
first sight, both parties knew that the bags were to be re-exported to South Africa. At the 
time, however, India operated an embargo against South Africa due to its Apartheid 
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regime and it was thus illegal under Indian law to export jute from India if the final 
destination was South Africa. The House of Lords held that it was contrary to English 
public policy to enforce a contract that violated the laws of foreign and friendly 
countries. The reason for the House of Lords giving effect to the law of India was 
international comity.131 The distinction that can be made between Foster v. Driscoll and 
Regazzoni v. Sethia is that in the second case the purpose of the contract (the sale of jute 
bags from India to Italy) was not illegal and the parties had not concluded the contract 
with the intent of violating the Indian embargo regulation, while in Foster v. Driscoll 
the whole point of the contract was the smuggling of whisky. Nevertheless, the House 
of Lords decided that the contract would violate public policy.  
 
A third case shows the technique of implementation of foreign mandatory rules by 
English courts. In Lemenda Trading Co. v. Afrian Middle East Petroleum Co.132 the 
English Court of Appeal held that a lobbying contract that was in violation of the 
internal public policy of Qatar, without however violating a specific rule of law, could 
not be enforced in England. The reasoning was following: If a contract is in breach of 
foreign internal public policy, it can be enforced in England. It will, however, not be 
enforced in England if internal English public policy contained a rule to the same effect, 
as in this case international comity “combines” with English domestic public policy.133 
As the conclusion of contracts for the lobbying of English State-owned companies 
would be contrary to English domestic public policy, the Court decided that the contract 
was unenforceable. 
 
In the above cases, English courts have utilized the English notion of ordre public in 
broader approach than the one foreseen under Art 16 Rome Convention. In essence, the 
rule established by Foster and Regazzoni is that contracts that have been concluded with 
the intent to violate mandatory rules of foreign law violate English public policy.134 In 
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Lemenda Trading the court expanded this rule to a certain extent, as also contracts 
which did not violate a specific rule of law but only the domestic public policy of a 
foreign country could be unenforceable. The concept or ordre public used by the 
English courts does not exclude a rule of foreign law because its application is 
considered repugnant from the point of view of the English judge. Both in Foster and in 
Regazzoni, English courts “imported” foreign mandatory rules into English law and in 
effect applied them to contracts. This utilization of the concept of ordre public includes 
a conflict of laws element. English courts declare contracts void for the reason of 
comity with other states, the rules of which are violated by contracts. By doing so they 
are recognizing foreign rules as rules of law and not only as facts.135 Further, in 
Lemenda Trading, English courts decided according to the values protected by the rules 
of foreign states and compared them to those protected under English law.  
 
b) Illegality under the lex loci solutionis 
 
In addition to the rule set out in Foster, Regazzoni and Lemenda, English courts have 
treated contracts as illegal which violated a rule of the lex loci solutionis. This was 
decided in 1920 by the English Court of Appeal in Ralli Bros. v. Compañia Naviera 
Sota y Aznar,136 a case that yet again concerned the chartering of jute, this time from 
India to Spain. The contract, legal at the time of conclusion, provided for half the freight 
to be payable at the time the ship left India and the other half when it arrived in Spain. 
After the contract had been concluded, Spanish law changed and rendered the payment 
of the full second half of the freight illegal due to Spanish price-control legislation that 
imposed a limit on the freight. The English company refused to pay more than the price 
legal according to the Spanish law; the Spanish company sued in England. The English 
                                                 
135 Contra Collier, Conflict of Laws 217 arguing that English public policy is in fact not 
including a rule of foreign law but excluding the rule of the lex causae which declares 
the contract enforceable. This argumentation seems artificial. If the foreign rule has no 
influence on the contractual relationship, there is no reason to exclude any rule of the 
lex causae. In fact it is the policy of the foreign state which English courts are 
recognizing. 
136 Judgement of the Court of Appeal, 17 December 1919, 2 KB (1920) 287 (CA). 
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Court of Appeal held that the proper law of the contract was English but, due to the 
Spanish price limitation, the English company was only to pay the limited freight.  
 
The reasoning of this case is not quite clear. Warrington J. held that it was an “implied 
condition of the obligation” that the payment must be legal in the place where it should 
take place, an opinion obviously also approved by Scrutton J., who however added that 
England will not assist or sanction the breach of laws of other independent states. 
 
While, on the one hand, it seems that the contract had partially been invalidated by a 
rule of English contract law, Scrutton J, also considers notions of international comity to 
be applicable and thus the invalidity does not arise solely from a rule of English law. 
The academic views divide on the question of whether it is a rule of English contract 
law due to which a contract is unenforceable if illegal at the place of performance or of 
whether it is a conflict of laws rule though the predominant view suggested by 
Warrington J. and other commentators is that the court applied English internal 
contracts law rather than a conflict of laws rule that rendered the contract unenforceable 
due to frustration.137 If it is in fact merely a contract law rule, it will only apply if 
English law governs the contract. Thus, an English court would not declare a contract 
unenforceable or contrary to English public policy if it is governed by foreign law. 
 
This discussion has become rather moot by Art 9(3) Regulation 583/2008. As stated 
above, this provision allows a judge to give effect to mandatory rules of the lex loci 
solutionis if they render the performance of a contract illegal.138 This provision is a 
conflict of laws provision and therefore allows English judges to give effect to 
mandatory rules of the lex loci solutionis regardless of the law applicable to the 
contract. 
                                                 
137 Which is the conclusion Hartley, RdC 266 (1997) 337 (393) comes to; 
Cheshire/North, Private International Law 759; Jackson, Comparative Study 49 (62) 
Collier, CambridgeLJ 1988, 169 (171); Dicey/Morris, The Conflict of Laws II, 1248 are 
not so decisive and essentially leave the question open.  
138 Cheshire/North, Private International Law 761. 
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c) Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it can by remarked that English law does not acknowledge a form of 
application of foreign mandatory rules similar to the ones exercised in continental 
European jurisdictions. The tool used by English courts is English public policy, which 
essentially can “incorporate” foreign rules. However, the breach of these rules must 
apply on a very high level, such as the formation of a partnership solely for the violation 
of foreign law. 
 
English public policy thus is not only a negative tool that prevents the application of 
foreign law which is incompatible with English notions of justice; it also has a positive 
side and partially fulfils the role of the theories of continental European law that seek to 
apply mandatory rules of third states. Of course, this instrument is blunter and may not 
lead to the legal certainty that was sought to be reached by the reservation to Art 7(1) of 
the Rome Convention. Mandatory rules need not necessarily form part of the public 
policy, though they often may. Hence, there will be mandatory rules of third states that 
fall short of the category and thus will not be enforced in England, though perhaps they 
would in continental Europe. 
 
3. An obligation to apply mandatory rules of EC member states in 
 the European legal space? 
 
a) A stronger impact of mandatory rules in the European Union? 
 
In the European Union, many legislative powers that usually form the integral part of a 
state’s sovereignty have been passed over to the organs of the European Union. The 
question may be posed here as to whether or not a member state of the Union has a 
solidarity obligation towards other member states that obliges it to enforce its 
mandatory rules.139 In any event, it ought to be considered whether member states are 
                                                 
139 Drobnig, RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1 (3). 
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under an obligation to apply mandatory rules of other member states if these rules were 
enacted to implement the goals of the EC Treaty.140  
 
As Sonnenberger formulated, it would be illogical to draw the exclusive competence to 
enact rules to the organs of the European Union, thus preventing the member states 
from enacting their own rules, and then not to oblige each member state to apply the 
rules then enacted by the respective competent state.141 He further argues that the rule 
formulated in Art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention is exceeded by such rules and an 
obligation for the member states exists to apply these rules, regardless of whether they 
have implemented Art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention or not.142 For the European legal 
space, this extensive approach may be justified, as this is surely the most effective way 
to grant individuals the benefits of the EC Treaty.143  
 
The European Court of Justice has not decided on exactly that matter yet, it has 
however decided on the applicability of EC directives in international cases. To grant 
the individual the benefits of EC law and to effectively establish a common market, the 
ECJ held that certain EC directives may have the character of mandatory rules. In the 
Ingmar Case,144 the ECJ decided a case dealing with the application of Council 
Directive 86/653/EC on the co-ordination of the laws of the Member States relating to 
self-employed commercial agents145 on the termination of an agency agreement 
between an English agent and a US principal, to which Californian law was applicable 
due to the choice of the parties. The ECJ held that the application of the Directive could 
not be set aside by the choice of a foreign law, but had to be applied where “the 
situation is closely linked to the Community”.146 It did not explicitly refer to Art 7 (1) of 
                                                 
140 Sonnenberger in MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 183. 
141 Sonnenberger, IPRax 2003, 104 (114). 
142 Sonnenberger, IPRax 2003, 104 (114); see also Fetsch, Eingriffsnormen 381. 
143 Roth, RabelsZ 55 (1991) 623 (665). 
144 Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., Case C-381/98, ECR I-9305 
(2000). 
145 OJ L 382/17 (1986). 
146 Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., Case C-381/98, ECR I-9305, 
para 23-4 (2000). 
  51
the Rome Convention though it used the same methodology when deciding the case.147 
Thus, also Directives of the European Union can be mandatory rules in the sense 
usually used for national laws.148 
b) The Influence of the European Law of Civil Procedure on the 
 Application of Mandatory Rules 
 
The only safe way for a state to ensure the application of its mandatory rules is to 
combine substantive rule with the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to its national courts. If 
another state does not respect this exclusive jurisdiction, the enacting state still has the 
possibility of denying the recognition of the foreign judgment. 
This is fundamentally different in the realm of ‘European civil procedure law’.149 
Firstly, in the area of application of these instruments, the member states have 
abandoned their rights to enact rules of exclusive jurisdiction outside the limits set by 
these instruments. Secondly, member states have strongly limited their rights not to 
recognize foreign judgments when these are contrary to national ordre public. 
As a consequence of this constellation, it is obvious that the member states must be able 
to rely on the courts of the other member states to implement their mandatory rules, as 
they have very limited means to do so themselves by granting themselves exclusive 
jurisdiction or by reviewing the judgments before enforcing them.150  
                                                 
147 Verhagen, ICLQ 51 (2002) 135 (140). 
148 See also Grünbuch der Kommission über die Umwandlung des Übereinkommens von 
Rom aus dem Jahr 1980 über das auf vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende 
Recht in ein Gemeinschaftsinstrument sowie über seine Aktualisierung, reprinted in Das 
Gruenbuch zum Internationalen Vertragsrecht (2004) 255 (295) (page 41 of the 
document) which suggests specifically stating this in a possible revision of the Rome 
Convention. 
149 Which is formed by Directive 44/2001, which supersedes the Brussels Convention of 
1968 for all member States of the European Union except for Denmark and the Lugano 
Convention of 1988 which is open to member states of the European Union and the 
European Free Trading Association: for the influence of these instruments on 
mandatory rules see generally Freitag in Das Grünbuch zum Internationalen 
Vertragsrecht 166 (184). 
150 Reithmann/Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht5 no 469. 
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It has thus been argued that, in the realm of these conventions, all member states have 
an obligation to implement the mandatory rules of the other member states.151 Art7 (1) 
Rome Convention can therefore form, if it is read – as is suggested in this context – as 
providing for an obligation of judges to apply foreign mandatory rules, the substantial 
counterpart of the European instruments on civil procedure. 
 
4. The U.S. approach 
 
The U.S. approach to conflicts of laws in general seems diffuse at the first glance. There 
are numerous scholarly approaches to conflict of laws. Every state has enacted its own 
conflict of laws system and they are by no means all identical. Therefore, there is no 
such thing as a uniform “U.S. approach” to conflict of laws and therefore also not to the 
application of foreign mandatory rules. The approach taken for the sake of this thesis is 
therefore to analyze the underlying principles regarding the concept of mandatory rules. 
It is not submitted that the following outline of U.S. theories is exhaustive. U.S. case 
law shows that often various theories are not applied by courts purely but are 
intermingled with one another. It will therefore have to suffice to outline the theories 
here. The most interesting approach in the present context is Brainerd Currie’s theory 
of “interest analysis”. Some relevant further modern methodologies which partially 
build on the theory of interest analysis will also be analysed, especially the approach of 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 
 
At the outset one notices that there are fundamental differences between continental 
European and U.S. conflict of laws theories. Only a short outline of the development of 
U.S. theories will be given here. The relevant modern theories will be discussed in more 
detail thereafter.  
 
The teachings of Savigny and the development of a coherent system of conflict of laws 
rules which determined the applicable law by reference to the facts of the case did not 
                                                 
151 Reithmann/Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht5  no 445; Freitag in Das Grünbuch 
zum Internationalen Vertragsrecht 166 (185). 
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have influence in the U.S.. Beale, the reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflict of 
Laws (1934), based his theory on the notion that if a right is validly acquired under 
foreign law it is to be recognized everywhere if the foreign law is appropriate.152 This 
approach was subject to severe criticism. Cook argued in his “local law theory” that 
foreign law cannot apply extraterritorially (as under Beale’s theory). Local substantive 
law, however, may grant a remedy and therefore adapt the local law if a right has been 
acquired abroad. Cavers developed a methodology based solely on the interpretation of 
the substantive law. The application of a substantive law, accordingly, depended not on 
the contacts it had with the case, but  on the underlying policies, the peculiarities of the 
case and the need for a just decision.153 Thereafter, the most influential approaches and 
the ones considered most important for the subject of this thesis where taken by Currie, 
von Mehren and Trautmann and by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 
 
a) Brainerd Currie’s “Interest Analysis” 
 
Currie developed an approach which is based fundamentally on the policies of a state 
reflected in its laws and in the application of laws based on these policies. He based his 
theory on the analysis of the decision of Millikin v. Pratt,154 a case decided in 
Massachusetts in 1878. In that case Mrs. Pratt, who was resident in Massachusetts, 
agreed with a supplier resident in Maine to stand surety for her husband. Her husband 
defaulted and Mrs. Pratt was sued in Massachusetts. Under Massachusetts law, a 
woman could not stand surety for her husband, under Maine law she could. The 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the lex loci contractus, thus Maine law, was 
to be applied and the contract was thus valid. 
 
This is the lynchpin for Currie’s theory. He follows from the fact that Massachusetts 
had rejected a bill shortly before the judgment was rendered allowing women to stand 
                                                 
152 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws3 21; Sonnenberger in 
MünchKomm BGB X4 Einl IPR, no 22. 
153 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws3 21; Kegel/Schurig, 
Internationales Privatrecht9 200. 
154 Seth M. Milliken & others v. Sarah A. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374; 1878 Mass. 
LEXIS 80. 
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surety for their husbands. Therefore, Massachusetts had subjected the security of 
commercial transactions to the protection of married women. Maine, on the other hand, 
had done exactly the opposite.155 
 
The question Currie deduced from the case was: Did Massachusetts want to protect only 
the women of Massachusetts or did it want to protect all women? This is where Currie 
reaches the crux of his argument. He follows that Massachusetts wanted to protect 
merely its own women and not those of Maine.156 Thus the decision of the court was 
wrong, as the court should have applied the Massachusetts law, as Mrs. Pratt was 
resident in Massachusetts. However, the Massachusetts law should not apply it if the 
woman is resident anywhere other than Massachusetts. But the theory of interest 
analysis logically requires also a second interest to be weighed. In this case, it was 
Maine’s interest in the upholding of commercial contracts whenever the creditor was 
resident in Maine.  
 
According to Currie, a court may come to three conclusions at this stage of its analysis: 
(1) only one of the states has an interest in applying its law (“false conflict”); (2) both 
states have an interest in the application of their rules (“true conflict”); (3) neither state 
has an interest in the application of their rules (“unprovided-for case”).  
 
In the first case the law of the interested state, which may also be a foreign state, is to be 
applied.  
 
Currie however comes to the conclusion that in cases (2) and (3) the lex fori is also to 
be applied without weighing the interests of the affected states.157 He justifies the 
application of the lex fori in cases of true conflicts by the idea that no state need 
subordinate its interests to those of another state. Accordingly, judges do not have the 
constitutional power to weigh governmental interests. In the last category of conflicts, 
the “unprovided-for cases”, the law of the forum is to be applied as “no good purpose 
                                                 
155 Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, U.Chi.L.R. 25 (1958) 227 (230). 
156 Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, U.Chi.L.R. 25 (1958) 227 (234). 
157 Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, U.Chi.L.R. 25 (1958) 227 (234). 
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will be served by putting the parties to the expense and the court to the trouble of 
ascertaining the foreign law”.158 Though this assertion seems practical and convincing 
at first, it has been criticized for the following reason: To find out if the other state is not 
interested, it is necessary to analyse the content of the foreign law and the underlying 
policies and to decide whether it has an interest in the application of its law or not.159  
 
Currie’s governmental interest analysis has met substantial critique throughout 
international scholarship for a multitude of reasons. For the field of the application of 
mandatory rules, not all are relevant.  
 
However, to single out the relevant points of critique: Currie’s approach is incapable of 
determining the policies that underlie the conflicting rules of law and in fact it will in 
many cases not be possible to determine the policy which underlies a rule.160 Even if the 
underlying policies can be ascertained, it is not possible to delineate the law’s intended 
territorial reach.161 Thirdly, it may be doubted if the states that enacted the conflicting 
rules have an interest in the outcome of the case.162 
 
The first point of criticism undoubtedly has its merits in cases in which a judge is to 
interpret the laws of foreign states. It may be noted at this point that also European 
conflict of laws require a national judge to interpret foreign laws and to ascertain the 
intent of foreign legislators.163 Leaving this interpretation to a national judge has been 
subject to substantial critique also in Europe. However it is necessary to distinguish 
between the European approach, which requires the judge to detect merely the will of 
the foreign legislator in the extraterritorial application of its law, and the task of a judge 
applying Currie’s interest analysis. In the latter case, the judge is to ascertain the spatial 
applicability of the rule and the “governmental interest”, which consists of the 
                                                 
158 Currie, Stanford Law Rev. 10 (1957-58) 205 (232). 
159 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 3 33. 
160 Juenger, AJCL 32 (1984) 1 (35-36); Brilmayer, MichLR 78 (1980) 392 (393, 464).  
161 Juenger, AJCL 32 (1984) 1 (35); Brilmayer, MichLR 78 (1980) 392 (393, 464). 
162 Kegel, RdC 112 (1964-II) 91 (95,184), limiting this proposition to cases in which 
matters of public law are not at stake. 
163 Supra, section III.B (the extraterritorial “Geltungswille” of the mandatory rule).  
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evaluation of (1) the reasonableness of the unilateral wish of the state, that its rule is 
applied taking into account the elements of the case and (2) the intent of the foreign 
legislator.164  
 
The second point, concerning the impossibility of interpreting the rule to pinpoint the 
spatial applicability of the respective rule, criticism is less substantial. If the underlying 
policy has been established it is an – admittedly difficult – matter of teleological 
interpretation to determine the spatial reach of a rule, which accordingly may not 
always depend on legislative intent.165 At least for the cases usually envisaged by 
mandatory rules, Brilmayer’s statement that “legislators have no actual intent on 
territorial reach” seems to go too far.166 The teleological interpretation of a rule is basic 
to the judicial process. If a judge is capable of detecting the foreign policy underlying a 
rule, there is no reason why he should not also be capable of delineating its spatial 
reach.  
 
The third point of criticism may be relevant for “normal” conflict of laws, not including 
norms charged with legislative intent that a rule be applied extraterritorially, and 
economic and social policies of the legislator. However, the mandatory rules that are the 
basic issue of this thesis are rules, the application of which is of fundamental 
importance to the enacting state, as their non-application may have detrimental effects. 
According to the mentioned continental “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie”, a mandatory rule 
may be applied only if it protects specific values of the enacting state (supra section 
III.C). Thus, this point of criticism can find no justification for the rules that are of 
interest in the framework of this thesis. 
b)  The Functional Analysis 
 
                                                 
164 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 3 27. 
165 Symeonides, Ohio State LJ 1985, 549 (556). 
166 Brilmayer, MichLR 78 (1980) 392 (393). 
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The Functional Analysis shares many elements of Currie’s governmental interest 
analysis.167 Unlike Currie’s approach however – and this seems to be the most 
significant difference – the Functional Analysis recommends the weighing of interests 
to then apply the rule of the state with the stronger policy.168 If cases however cannot be 
resolved by analysing and weighing the conflicting policies of both ‘concerned 
jurisdictions’ the judge can amalgamate the two rules and create a multistate rule169 or 
can – if the weighing of interests leads to no result – apply the lex fori if it is a 
concerned jurisdiction.170   
 
The implementation of this theory is doubtlessly intellectually stimulating for a judge. 
Whether it is practical for every conflict of laws situation may be doubted, as the 
establishment of governmental interests for every conflict situation.171. This theory has 
not found significant judicial acceptance.172  
 
c) The approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws. 
 
§ 187 of the Restatement deals with cases in which a court considers applying laws of a 
state other than that chosen by the parties and accordingly reflects an accepted principle 
in the United States.173 According to this provision, courts will apply the law of the state 
chosen by the parties to all issues which the parties could have resolved by an explicit 
provision in their contract. Further, according § 187(2), courts will also apply the law of 
the state chosen by the parties to issues which the parties could not have resolved by a 
provision in their contract. To the latter rule, however, there are two exceptions. The 
first is that the parties chose a law with no substantial relationship to the case. Of special 
relevance in this context is the second exception in § 187(2)(b), which allows a court to 
                                                 
167 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 3 43. 
168 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 3 43. 
169 v.Mehren, HarvLRev 88 (1974) 347 (365ff). 
170 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 3 44. 
171 Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 3 46. 
172 Petersen, AJCL 46 (1998) 197 (215). 
173 Borchers, AJCL 42 (1994) 125 (136). 
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apply rules of states, which have a materially greater interest in the application of their 
rules than the state, the law of which the parties had chosen. Subsection 2 applies when 
two or more states have an interest in the application of their laws. It will not be applied 
if the contract is locate in only a single state.174 If in such a case a legal order other than 
the one chosen by the parties represents a fundamental interest of another state, the 
forum court may consider applying it for this reason. Thus, while the Restatement 
recognizes that the legitimate expectations of the parties are of great value, it also 
acknowledges “regard also must be had for ‘fundamental interests’ of states and for 
state regulation”.175  
 
The wording of § 187(2)(b) provides for a three-prong test to determine the applicability 
of a rule: firstly it is necessary to ascertain whether the rule represents a ‘fundamental 
policy’ of a state other than the state the law of which was chosen by the parties and 
whether the state has the interest to apply this policy to the case. This determination 
requires an analysis of the interests of the affected state suggested by the above 
explained theories.176 It is, however, determined by the legal principles of the forum 
whether a foreign policy if a fundamental one.177 If this requirement is fulfilled, the 
judge must weigh the interests of the affected states in order to assess which state has 
the greater material interest, which - as mentioned above – is something that Currie 
regarded as impossible and which was the underlying principle of the proponents of the 
functional analysis.178 The Restatement finally requires that the law of the ‘other state’ 
be the one applicable due to § 188 of the Restatement had the parties not chosen any 
law. § 188 determines the otherwise applicable law by evaluating certain contacts 
between the case at hand and facts of the case. The Comments to the Restatement, while 
                                                 
174 ALI, Restatement 564. 
175 ALI, Restatement 567. 
176 Hartley, RdC 266 (1997) 337 (379). 
177 ALI, Restatement 568. 
178 See e.g. the decision of the Texas Court of Appeal of 21 November 2002 in 
Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., in which the court delivers a 
very detailed example of the implementation of section § 187 of the Restatement, 
retrievable at:  
http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/htmlopinion.asp?OpinionId=77602. 
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not detailing what the contents of such policies may have, name consumer protection or 
rules rendering contracts illegal as examples.179  
 
5.  Introduction of U.S. elements to Continental European Theories 
 
From the above outline of U.S. conflict of laws approaches some parallels can be seen 
in the continental European approaches to dealing with mandatory rules.  
 
Both the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie and the above described approach of Currie, the 
functional analysis and the Restatement do not determine the applicable law by 
applying the law which is designated by an all-sided conflict of laws rule. To the 
contrary, the starting point of the U.S. theories is the policy of the rule. Also in the 
Sonderanknüpfungstheorie, the first step that a judge is to take is to ascertain the 
legislative intent of the foreign mandatory rules. He will then determine whether a close 
connection exists and examine the substance of the rule and its compatibility with the 
interests of the forum.  
 
Both theories demand the ascertainment of a policy and the interest of the state in the 
application of the rule and imply that the spatial reach of a rule is identifiable by 
interpretation of the underlying policies.180 Both approaches are therefore functional as 
they determine the applicability of rules by their content. It has been rightly recognized 
by a number of the authors of the Rome Convention, that article 7(1) in fact entails a 
                                                 
179 ALI, Restatement 568; Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distributing Co., 
814 F.2d 1120, for the qualification of equal bargaining power as ‘fundamental 
interest’;. Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 666 
(673f); Headquarters Dodge v. General Motors Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20197, 
both showing that the protection of franchisees may be a fundamental interest; North 
American Bank, Ltd. v. Schulman, 123 Misc. 2d 516 qualifies usury laws a laws of a 
‘fundamental interest’; for the qualification of the prohibition of noncompetition 
covenants see Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773. 
180 v.Hecke in FS Mann (1977) 183 (185); Guedj, AJCL 1991, 661 (683). 
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measure of governmental interest analysis.181 Drobnig has stated that Currie’s 
governmental interest analysis is a useful tool when it comes to dealing with competing 
state interests reflected in mandatory rules,182 though he considers that this theory does 
not appropriately take into account the interests of the parties.183 
 
The element of the close connection between the facts of the case and the state which 
enacted the rule are no so clearly stated in U.S. doctrine. However, it is clear that also 
under U.S. law the close connection between a case and the enacting state is a necessary 
element to justify the policy of the state.184 
 
When a rule is found to be applicable, the Restatement and the Functional Analysis 
indicate that a weighing of the policy is to take place to determine the applicability of 
the rule. The Sonderanknüpfungstheorie does not. If a mandatory rule of the forum 
governs the case due to its scope of application, the judge will apply it and disregard the 
foreign rule. This essentially is Currie’s approach to the “true conflicts” case. In this 
case, both approaches depart from a truly functional approach and give way to the 
prerogatives of the forum.185 This difference can be explained by the fact that the U.S. 
theories do not distinguish between mandatory rules and otherwise applicable rules. The 
policies of foreign sovereigns are taken into account in the normal process of 
determining the applicable law. Therefore, the policies considered by the Functional 
Analysists and by the Restatement may not always be of such vital importance as those 
protected by mandatory rules.  
                                                 
181 Lagarde, VirginaJIL 22 (1981-82) 91 (103); Delaume, VirginiaJIL 22 (1981) 105 
(113, 119); Audit, AJCL 27 (1979) 589 (602, 603); Juenger, The Problem with Private 
International Law (1999) 20. 
182 Drobnig in FS Neumeyer 159 (163). 
183 Drobnig in FS Neumeyer 159 (165). 
184 ALI, Restatement 568. 
185 Guedj, AJCL 1991, 661 (684). 
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V.  TH E  I N F L U E N C E  O F  MA N D A T O R Y  RU L E S  O N  
IN T E R N A T I O N A L  C O M M E R C I A L  AR B I T R A T I O N 
A.  T H E  A R B I T R A B I L I T Y  O F  I S S U E S  G O V E R N E D  B Y  M A N D A T O R Y  
 R U L E S .  
 
National legislators may seek not only to regulate the substance of a dispute by issuing 
mandatory rules, they may also seek to limit the fora in which disputes involving these 
rules may be decided in order to ensure that their mandatory rules are applied. In such a 
case, the matter may not be arbitrable.  
 
The term arbitrability used in the context of this thesis means objective arbitrability and 
thus refers only to restrictions on the subject matters that can be subjected to arbitration 
under national laws. Such restrictions on the subject matter are mostly imposed for 
reasons of public policy, as states consider some matters too sensitive to be resolved by 
arbitrators. Of specific interest in the context of this thesis is the impact of mandatory 
rules on the arbitrability of disputes, specifically whether disputes in which mandatory 
rules play a role are arbitrable at all and under which circumstances states can and will 
restrict the arbitrability of disputes by issuing mandatory rules. 
 
The first step to answer the above posed questions is to determine which law governs 
the issue of arbitrability. In a second step it must then be determined whether and how 
mandatory rules of that or a third legal orders influence the arbitrability of a dispute. 
 
The law determining the arbitrability of a dispute may be a different one depending on 
whether a judge or an arbitrator is faced with answering the question which law to 
apply. 
 
Then a brief overview will show which sets of rules have been proposed to govern the 
question of arbitrability (see immediately below) both from the perspective of a national 
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judge and from that of an arbitrator. Thereafter, the question of the arbitrability of issues 
connected to mandatory rules will be examined (infra 2.). 
 
1.  The Law Governing the Issue of Arbitrability. 
 
The question of arbitrability may arise before national courts at two stages in the arbitral 
process. It may be raised as an objection to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal as 
justification of the jurisdiction of a national court to which claims have been submitted. 
Secondly, it may be raised after the arbitral proceedings in a setting aside procedure or 
as an objection to the enforcement of an award. Before arbitral tribunals, the question 
will usually arise at the beginning of the proceedings, probably in a challenge of the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over a certain subject matter. 
 
According to which law the court or tribunal is to turn to answer the question of 
arbitrability is subject to debate. As a distinguished scholar commented, “agreement on 
the conclusion that there is disagreement seems to be the only common denominator 
that one can find between arbitrators, courts and publicists…”. 186  
 
In the following, the various approaches will be outlined both from the view of national 
courts and from that of arbitral tribunals. 
a) Conflict of Law Approaches 
 
In civil law countries, two legislative approaches in national arbitration laws to the 
designation of the law applicable to arbitrability can be distinguished.187 The first is the 
determination of the arbitrability by reference to the disposability of the rights involved 
in the dispute. If the parties have the legal capacity to settle the dispute, they can also 
submit such disputes to arbitration. Whether or not parties can dispose of their rights 
regularly necessitates a conflict of law analysis to determine the law which governs this 
                                                 
186 Böckstiegel, Public Policy and Arbitrability 177 (184). 
187 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 194. 
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question. The second approach determines the arbitrability of a dispute by a substantive 
rule of the lex fori which is applicable to any questions of arbitrability (see infra section 
b).  
 
(1)  Application of the lex fori or the law of the 
 seat of arbitration. 
 
The application of the lex fori to the determination of the arbitrability of disputes is 
provided for by Art V(2)(a) NYC and 36(1)(b)(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
These provisions, however, only refer to the enforcement of the award. Therefore, at 
least in the realm of the New York Convention and in those countries which base their 
arbitration law on the Model Law, the lex fori is decisive for deciding on the 
arbitrability of the dispute underlying the award in the enforcement stage. 
 
For the situation in which a judge has to decide on an objection to the jurisdiction of a 
tribunal based on the lack of arbitrability of the dispute, the NYC provides no such 
guidance. Art II(1) NYC obliges judges to refer parties to arbitration unless the dispute 
is not capable of settlement by arbitration, but does not define the law which is to 
determine whether a dispute can be settled by arbitration. It has been proposed to apply 
the lex fori to both situations nevertheless.188 In a noteworthy article, Arfazadeh also 
concludes that the lex fori is decisive for the arbitrability of a dispute. However, he 
reaches this conclusion by viewing arbitrability merely as a jurisdictional issue and 
arguing that if a court is faced with an objection to its jurisdiction based on the 
existence of an arbitration clause, it can only find that a dispute is inarbitrable if the 
court itself has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the dispute which also excludes 
arbitration. In this case, the court can only apply the lex fori as this is the only decisive 
law for its jurisdiction. A further approach leading to the sole application of the lex fori 
                                                 
188 Epping, Die Schiedsvereinbarung im internationalen privaten Rechtsverkehr nach 
der Reform des deutschen Schiedsrechts (1999) 207 with further references; Schlosser 
in FS Fasching (1988) 405.  
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is to see the arbitration agreement solely as a procedural issue which therefore can only 
be governed by the (procedural) law of the forum.189 
 
Also various courts have applied the lex fori to the question of arbitrability:  
 
The Italian Supreme Court recognized that article II(3) and article V(2)(a) of the NYC 
referred to the two distinct situation just mentioned, but then went on to hold that “as 
Article V expressly refers to the law of the forum, the same should apply to Article II, 
para. 3. Here too, the judge shall apply his own law when deciding whether the dispute 
is capable of settlement by arbitration and whether parties will be referred to 
arbitration”190  
 
The Belgian Court of First Instance held that, due to “a consistent interpretation of the 
Convention”, the law referred to in article V(2)(a) and article II(3) shall be the same, 
namely that of the forum.191 Belgian courts have however also decided differently, so 
that a clear line of jurisprudence cannot be ascertained in Belgium. 
 
Also the U.S. Supreme Court has regularly applied U.S. law to the question of 
arbitrability without dealing with a conflict of laws – analysis.192 In Mitsubishi v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth it addressed the arbitrability of U.S. antitrust claims solely from the 
perspective of the U.S. Sherman Act despite the fact that the place of arbitration was 
Japan.193 
 
English doctrine and jurisprudence have not (yet) established a coherent approach to 
arbitrability. The matter is not addressed in the U.K. Arbitration Act.194 English courts 
                                                 
189 This is the situation in Austria, which has, however, enacted a substantive rule on 
arbitrability, see Hausmaninger in Fasching, Kommentar ZPO² IV/2 § 582 no 62; 
Zeiler, Schiedsverfahren § 582 no 5. 
190 Corte di Cassazione, (Judgement 27 April 1979), YBCA 6 (1981) 229 (230). 
191 Tribunal de Commerce (Judgement 20 September 1999) YBCA 25 (2000) 673 (675). 
192 Yu, IntALR 1999, 1ss providing an overview of U.S. jurisprudence. 
193 472 U.S. 614. 
194 Veeder in Paulson, International Handbook of Commercial Arbitration (1997) Suppl. 
23, 20ss. 
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have established that certain types of illegal contracts cannot be arbitrated under English 
law.195 Further, matters involving “interests of the state” may not be arbitrable if they 
are intended to be enforced by specific organs operating under the auspices of the 
state.196 English courts would presumably apply English law to determine whether a 
specific matter is arbitrable, though jurisprudence on this point is lacking.197 
 
The lex fori approach has been criticized as the consistency that the decisions just 
mentioned see between article II and V of the NYC, is illusory, because the court ruling 
on the question of arbitrability according to article II need not necessarily also be the 
court ruling on the enforcement of the award.198 Further, if the seat of arbitration is in a 
country other than the one in which the court deciding on the objection is, the 
application of the lex fori cannot decide whether the arbitration clause is valid for an 
arbitration according to the lex arbitri. This may lead to a negative or a positive conflict 
as either both the court and the arbitral tribunal may reach different conclusions on the 
arbitrability of the dispute and assume jurisdiction.199 Therefore, it may be more 
efficient to apply the lex arbitri when a court is faced with the arbitrability of a dispute 
which is to be arbitrated abroad.200 
 
An arbitrator, when faced with one party invoking the non-arbitrability of the dispute, 
has however no lex fori to apply. In numerous examples, arbitrators have nonetheless 
applied the law of the seat of the tribunal to ascertain the arbitrability of the dispute.201 
The seat of the tribunal may however have no inner connection to the case and may 
have been chosen for reasons of neutrality and thus be a poor choice for ascertaining the 
arbitrability of the dispute.202 The only significance for the arbitrator can be deduced 
                                                 
195 Mustill/Boyd, Commercial Arbitration 74. 
196 Mustill/Boyd, Commercial Arbitration 74. 
197 Mustill/Boyd, Commercial Arbitration 75. 
198 Hanotiau, ArbInt 12 (1996) 391 (399). 
199 Poudret/Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration² 288. 
200 Poudret/Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration² 288. 
201 ICC Case No. 6162, YBCA 17 (1992) 153 (158); ICC Case No. 8910, JDI 127 
(2000) 1085 (1086).  
202 Schwarz, ICSID Rev. 9 (1994) 17 (26). 
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from his obligation to render a valid award and thus must respect rules of the lex arbitri 
that restrict arbitrability and would finally lead to the setting aside of the award.203 
 
(2) The Law Governing the Arbitration 
 Agreement  
 
Another approach considers the law governing the arbitration agreement to be the law 
also governing the question of validity of the arbitration agreement.204 It is of course not 
easy to define to which law the arbitration agreement is subject to. In the absence of an 
explicit choice, it will usually be the law applicable to the substantive contract205 or the 
lex fori206. This approach, accordingly, respects the will of the parties to the largest 
extent possible as they could choose to subject their arbitration agreement to a liberal 
law which declares the dispute arbitrable.  
 
In a case before the Brussels Court of Appeal, it distinguished between the law 
applicable at the enforcement stage, according to article V(2)(a) NYC, and the situation 
covered by article II (3) NYC.207 While during the former, the lex fori was to be applied 
the latter was to be decided on the law governing the arbitration agreement.  
 
This view was not adopted by the Belgian Supreme Court in its most recent judgment of 
2004 in which it held that article II(3) NYC not necessarily refers to the lex contractus 
and does not entail a determination of the applicable law, while Art V(1)(a) and V(2)(a) 
refer to the lex fori.208 It went on to state that a court may decide the arbitrability of a 
dispute according to the lex fori, especially when Belgian public policy may be violated 
                                                 
203 Cf. Hanotiau, ArbInt 12 (1996) 391 (396). 
204 Hanotiau, ArbInt 12 (1996) 391 (401) with further references; Company M. v. 
M.S.A., Cour d.appel Brussels (Judgememt 4 October 1985) YBCA 14 (1989) 618 
(620). 
205 Redfern/Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration4 
(2004) 148. 
206 Zeiler, Schiedsverfahren § 581 no 125. 
207 Brussels Court of Appeal (Judgement 4 October 1985) YBCA 14 (1989) 618 (620). 
208 Verbist, JIA 22 (2005) 427 (430) with reference to the decision of the Belgian 
Supreme Court of 15 October 2004, Niwue Juridisch Weekblad 2005, 643 (644). 
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otherwise, which could be the case if the arbitral tribunal would be to apply foreign 
law.209 
b) Substantive Law approach 
 
The above approaches following the conflict of laws methods offer solutions to the 
problem of identifying the law governing the question of arbitrability but also suffer 
some inadequacies.  
 
Some legal systems in Continental Europe have adopted an approach that offers 
substantive rules defining which subject matters are arbitrable. These rules are 
applicable to any matter before the court, with no regard to any foreign law.  
 
This approach was initiated by Switzerland with the adoption of the Private 
International Law Act of 1988.210 article 177 leg. cit. declares all disputes on proprietary  
claims (“vermögensrechtlicher Anspruch”) arbitrable. The question of arbitrability is to 
be decided by Swiss law by both tribunals with their seat in Switzerland and Swiss 
courts even if other laws, such as that of the lex contractus or that of the enforcement 
jurisdiction, are stricter.211 
 
This approach was also incorporated in the German (s.1030 German CCP) and Austrian 
(s.582 Austrian CCP) arbitration laws, which declare all proprietary claims arbitrable. 
According to both pieces of legislation, arbitrability is determined by the lex fori / lex 
arbitri to the exclusion of any other law. 
 
Perhaps one step further was taken by the U.S. District court for the Eastern District of 
New York. In 1992, it decided the question of arbitrability solely based on an 
“international scale, with reference to the laws of the countries party to the 
                                                 
209 Verbist, JIA 22 (2005) 427 (430). 
210 For an English translation: International Business Law Journal 6 (1989) 805. 
211 Swiss Supreme Court (Judgement 28 April 1992) YBCA 18 (1993) 143 (146); 
Poudret/Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration² 284. 
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Convention”.212 Also this approach applies a substantive rule to decide the issue of 
arbitrability, however, while the states mentioned above applied certain national rules, 
the U.S. district court applied an international rule of substantive law.213 In practice, 
however, it is doubtful whether the rule as formulated by the U.S. Court is precise 
enough to enable the parties to foresee whether their dispute is arbitral or not.  
 
2. The impact of mandatory rules on the question of arbitrability 
 
a) Mandatory rules of the forum 
 
Above it has been argued that courts should apply – in specific circumstances –
mandatory rules to the merits of a case and below it will be submitted that arbitrators 
should do so also. However, there is no guarantee for a national legislator that the 
mandatory rules it issues will in fact be applied by bodies not under its direct 
supervision such as foreign courts or tribunals with their seats abroad. It can therefore 
correctly be deduced that the only guarantee for the application of mandatory rules is 
the combination of mandatory rules with the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts to 
the exclusion of arbitration which will apply the mandatory rules of the forum.214 Only 
then will a national court be in a position to hear cases brought before it despite the 
existence of an arbitration agreement and will be able to enforce the forum’s mandatory 
rule.  
 
National laws often provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of a specific national court for 
categories of disputes, such as the exclusive jurisdiction of the court in the area of 
competence of which real estate is situated for disputes regarding property rights. When 
faced with a rule granting a certain national court exclusive jurisdiction, it is necessary 
to establish whether the national legislator also wanted to also exclude the possibility of 
                                                 
212 Meadows Indemnity v. Baccala & Shoop Insurance Services, 760 F Supp. 1036-
1045, YBCA 17 (1992) 686 (691). 
213 Hanotiau, ArbInt 12 (1996) 391 (402). 
214 Vischer in Giuffrè, Collisio Legum 577 (578). 
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arbitration. Art 22 of Council Regulation 44/2001 and Art 16 of the Lugano Convention 
both grant exclusive jurisdiction to a specific court with a relationship to the types of 
disputes listed there. According to Art 23(5) of Council Regulation 44/2001 and Art 
17(3) of the Lugano Convention explicitly exclude the possibility of concluding forum 
selection clauses granting jurisdiction to another national court. However, these 
provisions do not exclude the possibility of concluding arbitration agreements on the 
disputes listed.215 Also provisions found in Austrian and German regarding jurisdiction 
in domestic matters, do not exclude the conclusion of arbitration agreements.216 
Provisions in national laws, therefore, should carefully be examined as to whether the 
exclusive jurisdiction of courts also excludes arbitration. 
 
The uncertainty about the application of mandatory rules has lead courts to declare 
disputes inarbitrable if they sensed the danger that arbitral tribunals with their seat 
outside their area of influence would not apply their mandatory rules. 
 
The Belgian Supreme Court had held in 1979 and 1988 that with regard to a Belgian 
law that granted every distributor in a distribution agreement the right to sue for 
compensation before Belgian courts in the case of termination by the licensor, a dispute 
is not arbitrable and an award thus not enforceable in Belgium if the arbitrators did not 
apply Belgian law to the dispute.217 This shows that courts are reluctant to grant 
arbitrability when they are unsure whether or not their law will be applied to a dispute. 
As the non-application of such rules may not always amount to a violation of public 
policy it may seem securer not to grant arbitrability in the first place. 
 
Also the German Supreme Court held in early – and in the meantime altered 
jurisprudence – that arbitration agreements in contracts for futures trading to which a 
private investor was party and which did not guarantee the application of German law 
                                                 
215 Kropholler, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht7 Art 1 EuGVVO, no 41; 
Geimer/Schütze, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht3 Art 1 EuGVÜ, no 98. 
216 Fasching, Schiedsgericht und Schiedsverfahren 19; Schlosser, 
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due the combination of the place of arbitration and the choice of foreign law were not 
“to be recognized”, which effectively meant that the German Supreme Court declared 
disputes in this constellation inarbitrable.218  The reason for this decision was that the 
Supreme Court feared the inherent danger that arbitral tribunals would not apply 
German mandatory rules on trading in futures. 219 It also held that the second look 
doctrine would not suffice for the granting of arbitrability as the German mandatory rule 
would not be sufficiently enforced even if the award would not be enforced in 
Germany.220 
 
This approach was also taken from the Upper Regional Court of Munich (OLG 
München) in its decision of 17 May 2006.221 In this decision the court held that the 
combination of arbitration abroad and the choice of foreign law would lead to the 
inarbitrability of the dispute if there is a risk that the arbitral tribunal may not apply 
German mandatory law on the compensation of agents. 
 
As can be seen from the above decisions, courts are unreserved when declaring disputes 
inarbitral in order to protect the forum’s mandatory rules. The reason for this is the lack 
of trust in arbitral tribunals abroad which function outside their legal system and cannot 
be controlled by their courts. However, the approach of the German courts lacks a 
dogmatic basis and is not compatible with German arbitration law. German arbitration 
law before its reform made the arbitrability of a dispute dependant on whether it could 
be settled by the parties. The new German arbitration law, as described above, declares 
all proprietary claims arbitrable. Both the securities claims and the claim of the agent 
were therefore arbitrable at the time the dispute arose according to the relevant sections 
of the arbitration law.222 German statutory law did not provide for the exclusive 
jurisdiction of German courts. The decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Munich 
                                                 
218 Judgement of the BGH, 6 June 1991, NJW 44 (1991-II) 2215; Judgement of the 
BGH, 15 June 1987, 40 NJW 3193 (1987-II). 
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Upper Regional Court therefore fail to provide a reasoning why the disputes were 
inarbitrable. With regard to the jurisprudence on futures trading, the German Supreme 
Court has in the meanwhile accepted the arbitrability of disputes in this area.223  
 
The more stringent approach is to limit the supervision of the court to the setting aside 
or exequatur situation and to deny recognition and enforcement of the subsequent award 
if the arbitrators have failed to apply German mandatory law and the recognition of the 
award would therefore result in the violation of the German ordre public.224 This 
approach, of course, entails the risk that the tribunal fails to apply German mandatory 
rules to the dispute but that the award has to be enforced nevertheless as the mere non-
application of mandatory rules does not automatically amount to a violation of the ordre 
public or is enforced outside Germany. 
 
This is the approach taken in the well known and commented case of Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc. decided by the Supreme Court in 1985.225  In that 
case the Supreme Court gave up its resentments against the arbitration of antitrust 
matters stated in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.226 in which 
it held that antitrust matters were not capable of resolution by arbitration as arbitrators – 
especially those from (foreign) business communities – are not capable of 
comprehending U.S. antitrust law and that antitrust law is per se too sensitive a matter 
to be placed in the hands of private judges.227 The Supreme Court was confident that 
arbitrators would apply U.S. antitrust law and found the possibility of refusing 
recognition of the award was sufficient at least in international cases.228 This approach 
found both approval and criticism. It influenced the subsequent jurisprudence of the 
                                                 
223 Decision of the BGH, 21 September 1993, XI ZR 52/92. 
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United States229 and triggered the discussion of arbitrability of competition law disputes 
in other jurisdictions. The possible flaws of this approach are evident: The extent of 
review under the NYC is very limited and does not allow for a review of the merits of 
the case.230 Therefore, under the New York Convention, courts cannot ascertain to a full 
extent whether U.S. antitrust laws have been applied correctly. Also the “second look” 
doctrine is flawed when U.S. antitrust law is not applied or not applied correctly by the 
tribunal and enforcement of the award is not sought in the United States. Lastly, it can 
be doubted that arbitrators are competent to award treble damages as foreseen by U.S. 
antitrust law.231 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, showed an increase in trust in the 
capability of arbitrators to handle antitrust matters and to arbitration as a suitable tool 
for the resolution of disputes including antitrust matters. 
 
Also the ECJ implicitly declared antitrust claims arbitrable in Eco Swiss China Time 
Ltd. v. Benetton International NV.232 In that case the ECJ found that article 81 EC 
Treaty in toto constitutes rules of public policy233 and that therefore national courts are 
precluded from enforcing arbitral awards which are contrary to EC competition law.234 
According to the ECJ, community public policy is integrated into the notion of national 
public policy of every member state.235 Due to their mandatory character each member 
state is to take these rules into account. It is thus evident that the ECJ considers EC 
competition law (at least Arts. 81(1) and 81(2)) as capable of settlement by arbitration. 
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However, according to the ECJ, the fact that competition law issues may be arbitrated 
bears the inherent danger of misinterpretation of the law by arbitrators who are barred 
from requesting preliminary decisions from the ECJ236 so that it is the obligation of the 
member states to ensure the uniform application of EC law.  
 
b) Mandatory rules of third states 
 
Disputes may not only be declared inarbitrable by a rule of the lex fori / lex arbitri. Also 
rules from states other than the one in which the arbitral tribunal has its seat may seek to 
limit the arbitrability of the dispute. In this situation the question arises whether the 
arbitrator or the judge faced with a challenge of an award or an application for the 
recognition of an award must respect a foreign mandatory rule restricting the 
arbitrability of the dispute. 
 
At least for Switzerland there has been a ruling on this point by the Swiss Supreme 
Court which held in Fincantieri v. Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA237 that foreign 
mandatory rules do not prevent a dispute from being arbitrable even if these rules would 
declare the contract null and void. The Supreme Court would only deny arbitrability of 
a dispute due to a foreign mandatory rule, if this rule requires a dispute to be heard 
exclusively by the courts of that state and this rule would have to be taken into 
consideration for reasons of public policy.238 Swiss literature supports the approach 
taken by the Swiss Supreme Court, though there is some disagreement on whether 
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arbitrability should only be denied if it violates the Swiss ordre public239, the 
international ordre public240 or also if it violates the foreign ordre public.241  
 
The limitations of the arbitrability of disputes based on the violation of the Swiss 
(international) public policy can be based on article 190(2)(e) Swiss PILA. However, 
Bucher and Wenger suggest to base the limitation of arbitrability based on foreign ordre 
public not on article 190(2)(e) Swiss PILA, but on an Art 19 Swiss PILA, which similar 
to Art 7(1) Rome Convention allows for the application of foreign mandatory rules.242 
Also Naón argues that arbitrators cannot be indifferent to foreign mandatory rules 
restricting arbitrability and has suggested taking foreign mandatory rules restricting 
arbitrability into consideration if (1) they have a close connection to the dispute, (2) the 
mandatory rules have a clear and strong interest in application, (3) the application does 
not violate international public policy and (4) the assertion of jurisdiction of a state 
reflected in the relevant mandatory rule is not excessive under public international 
law.243 Also Mayer agrees that foreign mandatory rules granting a foreign court 
exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute are inarbitrable.244 
 
Also arbitral tribunals have taken this approach. In ICC case no 6379, the tribunal was 
faced with a dispute between an Italian principal and a Belgian distributor arising out of 
a distribution agreement which the claimant (principal) had terminated prematurely.245 
The defendant argued that the arbitration clause was invalid due to Belgian mandatory 
legislation which allowed every commercial agent active in Belgium to bring claims 
before Belgian courts which would then have to apply Belgian law. Defendant claimed 
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that this piece of Belgian legislation was applicable due to article 7 of the Rome 
Convention and that the arbitration clause was therefore invalid.246 The arbitrator found 
the Rome Convention inapplicable as it was not in force at the time and, secondly, as 
arbitration agreements were specifically exempted from its scope of application.247 He 
then went on to find that there was no rule of Italian law (as the law applicable to the 
arbitral clause) that could be found to connect the Belgian mandatory rule to the present 
case. He concluded that the Belgian rule was actually not internationally mandatory (in 
the sense that it demanded extraterritorial application). What is left is that the arbitrators 
sought to apply the Belgian legislation by a conflict of laws rule, perhaps analogous to 
article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention, but could not find one in Italian law.  
 
This approach, however, entails an irregular application of conflict of laws provisions. 
Art 7(1) Rome Convention and Art 19 Swiss PILA are provisions which allow for the 
application of foreign mandatory rules. However, they both provide for the application 
of foreign substantive rules only. The Rome Convention is a convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations. Art 19 Swiss PILA is part of the section on the 
applicable substantive law. Both provisions therefore were not intended for the 
application of rules of foreign procedural law, such as the exclusive jurisdiction of 
courts and are no basis for the application or even consideration of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of foreign courts. Regard for such foreign rules could only be had if there 
was a rule in the lex fori / lex arbitri allowing for this.248 Clearly, neither Art 177 Swiss 
PILA nor any other of the examined legal orders entail such a provision.249 Until such a 
rule exists, any discussion on the application of foreign mandatory rules providing for 
the inarbitrability of a dispute is moot (except for the case that the ordre public of the 
forum orders the application of the foreign rule).250 Therefore, it is also of no further 
relevance that – as has been pointed out - Art 19 Swiss PILA is not (directly) applicable 
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to procedures before arbitrators but only before national courts.251 Even if it were, it 
would be of no avail to render foreign mandatory rules granting foreign courts exclusive 
jurisdiction applicable. 
 
                                                 
251 Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, Le droit de l'arbitrage interne et international en Suisse 
305–308. 
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VI.  TH E  I N F L U E N C E  O F  MA N D A T O R Y  RU L E S  O N  T H E  
CH O I C E  O F  LA W  B Y  T H E  AR B I T R A T O R S  
 
In an arbitration, it will often be one of the first tasks of an arbitrator to select the 
system of rules according to which he is going to resolve the dispute before him. Before 
determining the applicable law, the arbitrator must determine the rule or set of rules 
which will guide him to the applicable law. Once this has been determined, the 
arbitrator can decide which law to apply. He must then also decide whether and on 
which basis to apply mandatory rules of the various legal systems connected to the 
arbitration.  
 
In the following, the applicable conflict of laws systems for arbitrators and the 
consequently applicable legal system will be analysed. Then it will be analyzed whether 
these underlying conflict of laws systems can serve as a basis for the application of 
mandatory rules. 
 
A.  T H E  C O N F L I C T  O F  L A W S  S Y S T E M  D E T E R M I N I N G  T H E  
 S U B S T A N T I V E  A P P L I C A B L E  L A W  
 
1. The denationalized approach 
 
The autonomy of the parties to determine the applicable procedure and the law 
applicable to their dispute is a fundamental pillar of international commercial 
arbitration. Some authors consider that the autonomy of the parties and their contract is 
sufficient to establish and maintain the entire system of international commercial 
arbitration. The tenor of their arguments is that the arbitral tribunal draws its 
competences not from a national set of laws, but from the contract of the parties which 
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established the arbitral tribunal.252 Thus, the will of the parties manifested in the 
contract as the origin of the tribunals existence and competence is decisive for the 
applicable law and does not require the award of legal force by a national state.253 Some 
scholars even go a step further and argue that the fact that party autonomy is recognized 
by all legal orders transcends the national order forming a sphere of “transnational 
conflict of laws rule” completely detached from any national legal order.254 
 
This approach has a dogmatic lacuna as it remains unclear how a contract can have any 
legal force if it is not founded in any legal order, but is floating detached from any legal 
order somewhere in the legal ether. Only a legal order can make the piece of paper to a 
legally binding contract. Thus the choice of law of the parties needs more than a 
“transnational conflict of laws rule” namely some conflict of law rule to become 
effective. 
 
2. The traditional approach 
 
Mann has argued that the system the arbitrator derives his competences from the lex 
arbitri of the state of the seat of the tribunal.255 Thus, an arbitrator is bound to the 
conflict of laws system of the lex arbitri and must determine the applicable law 
following its rules. Only if the conflict of law system of the lex arbitri allows a choice 
of law by the parties, is an arbitrator to respect it and the legal force of the choice of the 
parties is derived from the lex arbitri. 256  
 
As Mann stressed, all powers of the arbitrator are inexorably conferred by or derived 
from a system of municipal law, namely the lex fori.257 Accordingly, the arbitrator is 
                                                 
252 Paulsson, ICLQ 30 (1981) 358 (360). 
253 Fouchard, L’Arbitrage Commercial International 356-357. 
254 Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration 81-82. 
255 Mann, Lex facit arbitrum 157; coming to the same conclusion Sauser-Hall, Annuaire 
de l’institut de droit international (1957-II) 394. 
256 Mann, Lex facit arbitrum 157; coming to the same conclusion Sauser-Hall, Annuaire 
de l’institut de droit international (1957-II) 394. 
257 Mann, Lex facit arbitrum 159, 160. 
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only a substitute for the national judge when resolving the dispute, especially as there is 
no reason to exempt arbitrators from the system of national law.258 
 
This approach was also adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 1957 in article 
11 of its Resolution on ‘Arbitration and Private International Law’, which stated that 
conflict of laws rules of the forum were decisive for the arbitrator and only within these 
rules was he allowed to choose a foreign law or to give heed to the choice of law of the 
parties.259 
 
Also the 1955 ICC Rules stated that in absence of a choice of law by the parties, the 
arbitrator was to apply the law of the place of arbitration.  
 
The dogmatic basis for this approach is the analogy of the arbitrator with the state 
judge.260 It is true that the arbitrator is bound by the procedural rules of the lex arbitri. A 
violation of these rules may lead to the successful challenge of an award. However, it is 
not convincing to extend the binding force of the lex arbitri to the conflict of laws 
system of the forum. The arbitrator is a product of a contractual bond between two 
parties, as their arbitration agreement excludes the jurisdiction of a national court and 
establishes the arbitral tribunal. Only if a state enacts conflict of laws rules that are 
mandatory for arbitrators in that state, the arbitrator is obliged to adhere to such rules.261  
 
Further practical arguments have also been invoked against the binding force of the 
conflict of laws rules of the lex fori for the arbitrator. One main argument is that the 
parties may have chosen the place of arbitration for reasons of neutrality or it may have 
                                                 
258 Wortmann, Choice of Law, ArbInt 1999, 97 (106); Craig/Park/Paulsson, ICC 
Arbitration 324; Heiskanen, FinnishYIL 4 (1993) 98 (100). 
259 L'arbitrage en droit international privé, 47 II Annuaire de Institut de Droit 
International (1957) 491, 496 also available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1957_amst_03_fr.pdf. 
260 Voit, JZ 52 (1997) 120. 
261 Bucher in FS Moser 214 (Bucher, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 88; cf. Lew, Applicable 
Law in International Commercial Arbitration 253. 
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been chosen by an arbitral institution for them. If this is the case, it may be totally 
unforeseeable for them which law will be applied to their contract.262 
 
It has also been shown that the application of the conflicts of law rules of the seat may 
vary strongly from the legitimate expectations of the parties, as the conflict of laws rules 
they expected to be applied may point towards a completely different law to the conflict 
of laws rules at the seat of the arbitration.263 
 
Also international instruments on international arbitration reject the notion of the 
binding force of the conflict of laws system of the lex fori.264 
 
3. The modern approach 
 
a) Party autonomy 
 
Party autonomy is widely regarded as one of the pillars of international commercial 
arbitration. Most modern arbitration laws respect a choice of law by the parties and 
oblige the arbitrator to honour this choice. Only in the absence of a choice of law of the 
parties the arbitrator must determine the applicable law. 
 
b) Choice of a conflict of laws rule 
 
Both Art VII(2) European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration and 
Art28(2) UNCITRAL Model Law depart from the idea of the binding force of the 
                                                 
262 Böckstiegel in FS Beitzke 443, 447; Croff, International Lawyer 1982, 613 (625). 
263 Sandrock, RIW 38 (1992) 785 (788, 789); Croff, International Lawyer 1982, 613 
(626); both with practical examples; see also Böckstiegel, FS Beitzke, 443ss, Berger, 
Internationale Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit 340 and Martiny, FS Schütze 529 (539) 
all rejecting the traditional approach. 
264 Article VII (1) of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
1961; Art 28 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration. 
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conflict of laws systems of the forum. According to these instruments, which have also 
found reflection in national laws, such as the 1996 Arbitration Act in the UK, the 
arbitrator is to apply the conflict of laws rule, which he considers appropriate.265  The 
drafting history of the Model Law shows that at the time the widespread view was that 
an arbitrator was not bound by the conflict of laws rule of the seat but must either 
choose a conflict of laws rule he considers appropriate or must directly choose the law 
he considers applicable to the substance.266 In the end, the less progressive approach 
was opted for.267  
 
The arbitrator is therefore not to directly determine the applicable law, but (at least in 
the first step) to determine the applicable conflict of laws rule. While the arbitrator is 
therefore freed from the constraints of the domestic conflict of laws system, he is bound 
by a specific conflict of laws rule designed for arbitration requiring him to determine a 
choice of law rule.268. This conflict of conflict of laws systems which is referred to a as 
a conflit au deuxième degré269 has been solved in various ways in practice and doctrine. 
Accordingly, either the conflict of laws rules of the forum can be applied or a general 
principle of private international law or any conflict of laws rule which seems 
appropriate or the conflict of laws rule which has the closest connection with the 
case.270 
 
                                                 
265 which has found wide acceptance in doctrine, see Böckstiegel, FS Beitzke 443ss;  
Berger, Internationale Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit 340ss; Martiny, FS Schütze, 
539ss. 
266 Holtzmann/Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1989) 769-770; Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 147. 
267 Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration 147. 
268 Sandrock, RIW 38 (1992) 785 (791). 
269 Lalive, Revue De l’Arbitrage 3 (1976) 155 (156); see also Kegel/Schurig, 
Internationales Privatrecht9 50. 
270 Poudret/Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration² 583ss examining 
various approaches taken in practice; see also ICC Award 4237 YBCA 10 (1985) 52 in 
which the criterion of the closest connection was used to determine the conflict of laws 
system applicable. 
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UK law adopted this approach in s 46(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. According to this 
provision, the tribunal is to determine the applicable law by applying the conflict of 
laws rule it considers applicable in the absence of a choice of law by the parties. It is 
clear that arbitrators sitting in England are therefore free to apply any conflict of laws 
rule they deem appropriate and are not bound by English conflict of laws rules.271 
 
c) A specific conflict of laws rule for arbitrators 
 
Another alternative to release the arbitrators from the conflict of laws system of the 
forum is not to grant the arbitrator total freedom to decide which conflict of laws rule to 
apply, but to include in the lex arbitri a rather rudimentary conflict of laws rule 
applicable specifically to arbitrations within the scope of application of the lex arbitri. 
 
This is the approach made by section 1051 of the German CCP which was introduced in 
1998. There has been much discussion in connection with this provision. Section 1051 
(2) provides that, in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, an arbitrator is to 
apply the law of the state with the closest connection to the subject of the dispute. This 
rule applies to all arbitrations taking place on German territory.272 The German 
legislator considered that section 1051 (2) German CCP would establish a binding (even 
if indirect) effect for arbitral tribunals of Arts 3ss Rome Convention.273 The German 
legislator obviously wanted to provide a legal basis for the traditional approach of the 
binding force of (at least a part) of the conflict of laws rules of the forum. A 
consequence would be that Art 3ss of the Rome Convention and their interpretation by 
German courts would have to be respected by arbitrators seated in Germany when 
deciding on which legal order had the closest connection to the case at hand. Neither the 
wording of section 1051 (2) German CCP nor the overwhelming opinion in literature 
support this restrictive interpretation of the provision. German scholars tend to the 
approach that the arbitrator has to interpret the element of the “close connection” 
                                                 
271 Merkin, The Arbitration Act 19964 (2008) 118. 
272 § 1025 dZPO; Reithmann/Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht5 no 3511. 
273 Regierungsentwurf zu § 1051 ZPO reprinted in Berger, Das neue Recht der 
Internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit The New German Arbitration Law (1998) 260. 
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autonomously and is not restricted to the provisions of the Rome Convention or German 
jurisprudence.274 However, this also means that an arbitrator cannot simply reason his 
choice of a law by reference to the rules enshrined in the Rome Convention but must 
detail why a legal relationship has the closest connection to a specific country though he 
may use the German rules as guidance.275 Thus  section 1051 (2) German CCP 
establishes a specific conflict of laws rule for arbitrators (a “Sonderkollisionsrecht”) 
which by and for itself is the only conflict of laws rule the arbitrators are to apply to 
determine the applicable substantive law. 
 
Also article 187 of the Swiss PILA provides that, in absence of a choice of law of the 
parties, an arbitrator is to apply the law with the closest connection with the case. Also 
this provision creates a specific conflict of laws rule for arbitrators (a 
“Sonderkollisionsrecht”) and does not oblige the arbitrator to have reference to the 
provisions of the other chapters of the Swiss PILA containing the conflict of laws rules 
for national courts.276  
 
d) Voie Directe 
 
The direct choice of the applicable law without necessitating a conflict of laws analysis 
is reflected by various national legislations such as s 603 (2) Austrian CCP.277 However, 
this does not mean that the arbitrator in practice does not apply a conflict of laws 
analysis. It is doubtful that the arbitrator will apply substantive rules at random. To the 
contrary, he will choose some legal system and in arriving at his choice he will also 
                                                 
274 Martiny in FS Schütze 529 (540); Kronke, RIW 44 (1998) 257 (262); Schlosser, 
RIW 40 (1994) 723 (727); Blase, Die Grundregeln des Europäischen Vertragsrechts als 
Recht grenzüberschreitender Verträge 161ss; Junke in FS Sandrock 443; Solomon, RIW 
1997 981ss; contra: Sandrock, RIW 46 (2000) 321 (323); Junker, RIW 1998 741 (745) 
275 Kronke, RIW 44 (1998) 257 (263); Martiny in FS Schütze 529 (541). 
276 Bucher, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 90; Karrer in International Arbitration in 
Switzerland, Art 187 no 5; Heini in ZürchKomm IPRG² Art 187 no 2. 
277 See also the similar approach taken in France, article 1496 of the French Nouveau 
Code de Procédure Civile and the Netherlands article 1054 (2) of the Dutch Code on 
Civil Procedure. 
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carry out some sort of conflict of laws analysis.278 The main difference to the above 
approaches is that he is under no obligation to do so and need not necessarily reason 
(though in practice he mostly will) why he applied a specific legal system. 
 
This approach allows an arbitrator to take into account values that may not be respected 
by conflict of laws rules.279 Thus, the arbitrator will be able to choose a law that may 
suit the dispute better, e.g. if it is more modern or has a specific provision relevant to 
the dispute. In this case, he may not be guided by hard and fast conflict of laws 
principles but may only be applying the more suitable law. This is the true measure of 
liberty granted by this approach. 
 
e) The cumulative application of several conflict of laws systems. 
 
One way to minimize the disappointment of the parties’ expectations of the law 
applicable to their contract is to apply not one rule of a specific conflict of laws system, 
but to apply cumulatively the relevant rules of all “interested” conflict of laws 
systems.280 Accordingly, this method serves the interest of the parties effectively.281 It is 
based on the presumption that the conflict of laws rules of all “interested” systems 
should point towards the same law.282 This approach could be taken in legal systems 
which provide for the application of a conflict of laws rule which the arbitrator 
considers appropriate or in situations in which the arbitrator is free to apply such rules 
of law he considers appropriate. It seems not to have found explicit reception in national 
legal system. 
 
                                                 
278 See also Sandrock, RIW 38 (1992) 785 (789 Fn 34), arguing that a direct choice 
cannot exist, as implicitly an arbitrator will always use some conflict of law rule to 
determine the applicable law; Gaillard, ICSID Rev 2 (1987) 424 (433). 
279 Fouchard, L’Arbitrage Commercial International 876; Croff, International Lawyer 
1982, 613 (632). 
280 Derains, Revue Arb. 1972, 99. 
281 Derains, Revue Arb. 1972, 121; Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldmann on International 
Arbitration (Gaillard/Savage eds., 1999) 872. 
282 Croff, International Lawyer 1982, 613 (630); Fouchard, L’Arbitrage Commercial 
International 872. 
  85
Undoubtedly this method has its merits and has been applied in many cases.283 It may 
especially serve as a good reasoning for the application of a specific set of national law 
when the arbitrator is free to determine the applicable law. However it will be flawed in 
cases in which the conflict of laws rules do not point towards the same law.284 It also 
must be noted, that the question which conflict of laws rule is “interested” in the case 
will not always be easily solved. As there is no “meta conflict of laws rule”285 that will 
help the arbitrator to find out, which rules are interested, this approach may fail in cases 
in which exactly this point is subject to a dispute. As an substitute it has been suggested 
to take into account “the choice of law rules of legal systems which had a connection 
with the case at a time when the parties were required to act in a certain way, under the 
contract or otherwise”,286 which seems to be the only logical approach to take. 
 
f) The Application of general principles of private international 
 law 
 
This approach is similar to the one above, which also compares various conflict of laws 
systems. In this case, however, the connection between the case and the laws analyzed 
will be more distant or even not existent.287 This method bears strong resemblance to 
the method of searching for general principles of substantive law, such as the lex 
mercatoria.288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
283 See the numerous decisions cited by Fouchard, L’Arbitrage Commercial 
International 872 Fn 35. 
284 De Ly, NorthwesternJILandBusiness 12 (1991) 48 (63). 
285 cf. Schlosser, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit² 726. 
286 Fouchard, L’Arbitrage Commercial International 872. 
287 Craig/Park/Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 327. 
288 Fouchard, L’Arbitrage Commercial International 873. 
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B.   T H E  A P P L I C A T I O N  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  B Y  
 A R B I T R A T O R S  
 
 
1. Interests involved in the application of mandatory rules 
 
a) The Interests of the Parties 
 
 
The national legal systems examined in this thesis show a large margin of autonomy for 
the parties of an international arbitration to design the proceedings and the method for 
the resolution of their disputes. It is the parties that appoint the arbitrator and grant him 
the power to render a binding decision on their dispute. The arbitrator must therefore 
adhere to the instructions given to him by the parties to a far larger extent than a 
national judge. The arbitration agreement is the source from which the arbitrator derives 
his powers. With this arbitration agreement the parties can also oblige the arbitrator to 
decide their dispute in accordance with a specific set of rules. Consequently, they can 
also instruct the arbitrator not to apply specific rules. As the arbitrator unlike a judge 
owes no allegiance to a specific state and the mandate of the parties is his primary 
source of obligations and powers, he generally must follow the instructions given to 
him. For the application of mandatory rules this means that the parties may have an 
interest in being able to have their dispute decided without the application of mandatory 
rules solely in accordance with a specific set of rules determined by them. This may 
even be a reason for opting for arbitration in the first place. Whether or not the arbitrator 
must adhere to this will in all situations will depend on the nature of the mandatory rule 
(see below c)). 
 
However, the parties (or at least one party) will in most cases have an interest in the 
application of a mandatory rule. One party may be obliged to follow a mandatory rule 
by an enacting state that can factually enforce this rule. Further, the foremost will of the 
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parties is to have an award that will end their dispute once and for all. In order to obtain 
such an award, the arbitrator will have to apply at least those mandatory rules, the non-
application of which would be sanctioned by the setting aside of the award or the non-
enforcement.289  
 
b) Interests of national legislators 
 
As stated above, states enact mandatory rules to protect values they consider vital for 
the political, social or economic order of the state. They consider the protection of these 
values to rank higher than the autonomy of the parties and therefore oblige their judges 
to apply these rules regardless of the law chosen by the parties.  
 
Nevertheless, states and national courts have decided to confer the competence to apply 
these mandatory rules and therefore to contribute to the safeguarding to the protection 
of their interests to private arbitrators and no longer insist on the inarbitrability of 
disputes involving mandatory rules.  States have invited arbitrators to support them in 
adjudicating commercial matters with transborder aspects, as they have recognized the 
positive aspects of arbitration. They have done so by declaring subject matters arbitrable 
that pertain to very sensitive areas of their public policy (supra V.A.2).290 In doing so 
they relied on the capability and willingness of arbitrators not to disregard the tasks and 
the trust given to them.291 They have however not abandoned their interests in the 
application of the mandatory rules they enacted. It has been recognized that arbitrators 
thus owe a responsibility not only to the parties, but in some cases also to the 
international (commercial) community as a whole.292 
 
 
                                                 
289 Naón, RdC 289 (2001) 9 (71); Lazareff, ArbInt 11 (1995) 137 (140), who correctly 
states that the application of mandatory rules of the lex arbitri and the place of 
enforcement is only a pragmatic, but no dogmatic approach. 
290 Naón, RdC 289 (2001) 9 (94). 
291 Jarvin, JIA 2/3 (1985) 69 (80); Mayer, ArbInt (1986) 274 (285). 
292 Lando in FS Zweigert 157 (172). 
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c) The application of mandatory rules ex officio? 
 
Above, the criteria for the application of mandatory rules have been set out. The 
problem that may arise in practice is that the arbitrator may consider a mandatory rule 
applicable, even when this issue has not been raised by a party. 
What is an arbitrator to do in such a situation? 
 
Article 7 (1) Rome Convention and § 187 (2) (b) of the Restatement do not by their 
wording require the invocation of a mandatory rule by a party for a judge to consider it. 
Far more, he has the discretion do so from his own motion. It has been held that 
arbitrators too in fact have the capacity to apply mandatory rules due to their own 
motion.293 This capacity has however been limited by some authors to mandatory rules, 
the application of which was foreseeable for the parties,294 while others doubt that 
parties in fact cannot foresee the application of mandatory rules closely connected to 
their contract.295  
 
If none of the parties invokes the mandatory rule, they will probably be doing so 
because they simply do not want the mandatory rule to influence (and perhaps 
invalidate) their contract.  
 
Does the arbitrator in such a case have the power or the duty to apply the mandatory 
rule? An arbitrator is on the one hand obliged by the mandate given to him by the 
parties. On the other, however, he is bound also to the state he draws his authority from 
and the international legal and commercial community as a whole. The arbitrator is thus 
in a dilemma as, if he observes the mandatory rule, he is not serving the parties 
according to his mandate and his award may be set aside as it may be ultra petita. But 
this may also happen if he does not observe a mandatory rule which forms part of public 
                                                 
293 Brulard/Quintin, JIA 18 (2001) 533 (535) with further references. 
294 Derains in International Commercial Arbitration ICCA Congress Series No. 2 
(1984) 169 (190). 
295 Naón, Choice-of-Law Problems 68. 
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policy (see infra section VII).296 In such a case, it has been suggested that the arbitrators 
raise the question of the application of the mandatory rules and deliberate with the 
parties.297 If the parties then still refuse to deliberate on the question, it has been 
suggested that the arbitrator should either apply it if he considers it applicable or declare 
himself incompetent.298 The reason for this is that the parties should not be able to 
evade the application of mandatory rules by resorting to arbitration. If the arbitrator 
considers that the rules are legitimately applicable he need not be complicit in the 
parties’ attempt to evade applicable rules. Therefore, parties could, e.g., not resort to 
arbitration to decide a dispute within a pricing cartel.  
 
Courts both in Europe and in the U.S. seem to consider the application of mandatory 
rule – be it their own or those of third states – to be an arbitrators’ duty. 
 
The ECJ held in the well-reported Eco-Swiss case that the mandatory rules of European 
competition law were to be applied by the arbitrator ex officio.299 It must however be 
noted that this judgment is only partially decisive for the ex officio application of 
mandatory rules. Firstly, the ECJ held that article 81 of the EC Treaty is in toto 
European Community public policy, which has been criticized.300 Secondly, in that 
case, Dutch law was applicable to the contract so that the mandatory rule in fact formed 
part of the lex contractus (as according to European doctrine European law forms part 
of the national laws). It can be inferred from that case that the ECJ requires the 
application ex officio of mandatory rules forming part of the ordre public.301 Whether or 
not the ECJ would have rendered the same decision had, for example Swiss law been 
applicable to the contract and the mandatory rule thus not been part of the lex 
contractus, remains open. It however seems likely that the judgment would have been 
                                                 
296 v.Mehren, ArbInt 19 (2003) 465 (468). 
297 Blessing, EG / U.S. Kartellrecht in internationalen Schiedsverfahren – 77 aktuelle 
Fragen aus der Praxis 46; v.Mehren, ArbInt 19 (2003) 465 (469); de Groot, JIA 20 
(2003) 365 (372). 
298 Blessing, EG / U.S. Kartellrecht in internationalen Schiedsverfahren – 77 aktuelle 
Fragen aus der Praxis 46; Mayer, ArbInt (1986) 274 (280ss). 
299 Brulard/Quintin, JIA 18 (2001) 533 (536). 
300 Liebscher, Am. Rev. Int. Arb. 10 (1999) 81 (85, 86).  
301 Zobel, wbl 2001, 300 (301). 
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the same as the ECJ did not specifically state the applicability of European competition 
law as it was part of the lex contractus. 
 
The ex officio application of EC competition law was also subject to scrutiny of the 
Swiss Supreme Court. The Swiss Supreme Court decided on a case concerning a 
complaint against an award rendered in a dispute between a Belgian and an Italian 
company.302 During the course of the arbitral proceedings, matters of EC competition 
law had been raised and the arbitrator had declared that he had no jurisdiction to 
examine the validity of the contract according to EC competition law and assumed its 
validity. The Supreme Court in a setting-aside procedure commenced by both parties, 
held that the arbitrator had incorrectly denied his jurisdiction to examine the matter, 
which constitutes a ground for setting aside under Swiss law (article 190 para 2 lit. b 
SLPIL).303  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court in the Mitsubishi304 judgment did not explicitly state the duty 
of arbitrators to apply U.S. antitrust law. It did however mention that an award would 
not be enforced in the U.S. if it was not in compliance with the U.S. law. It has been 
deduced from this, that the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly wanted the arbitrators to 
apply U.S. law.305  
 
From the above-mentioned, two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, an arbitrator cannot 
disregard mandatory rules that reflect a notion of international public policy, either of 
the lex contractus or of a third state, merely because they have not been invoked by one 
of the parties. An arbitrator may not be the servant of some states public policy; he may 
however not disregard legitimate regulations of states. If he does so, the detriment to 
national economies may seriously jeopardize the whole system of international 
commercial arbitration, as it may not become a safe haven for contracts breaching 
public policy.  
                                                 
302 Judgement BGE, 28 April 1992, 118 II 193. 
303 Schnyder, IPRax 1994, 465 (466). 
304 Schnyder, IPRax 1994, 465 (466) 
305 Brulard/Quintin, JIA 18 (2001) 533 (535). 
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Secondly, if he may not disregard such mandatory rules, the question arises whether or 
not he is under an obligation to apply such rules ex officio. His position in the system of 
dispute resolution, especially his obligations towards the parties, distinguishes him from 
a national judge. He is thus under no obligation to apply such rules. In such a situation, 
he can declare himself incompetent especially is the parties explicitly request the 
mandatory rule not to be applied. The only thing he may not do is disregard mandatory 
rules reflecting public policy, as thereby he neither serves the parties as the award may 
be set aside or be unenforceable, nor the states which are deprived from enforcing the 
values they seek to protect.  
 
This may be different for rules that do not pertain to public policy. In these cases, the 
danger of setting aside or of unenforceability will be limited (see infra section VII.). In 
such cases, an arbitrator is not violating the most fundamental interests of a state. In 
such a case, his obligations to the parties may override the interests of a state and the 
non-application may be acceptable. 
 
 
2. Mandatory Rules of the lex causae 
 
a) In the case, the applicable law has been chosen by the parties 
 
As examined above, an arbitrator first and foremost owes allegiance to the parties will 
when determining the applicable law. If the parties have chosen the applicable law in 
their contract, they will in nearly all cases refer to a national law using language such as 
“… this contract shall be governed by Swiss law.” The question that arises from this 
language is: Did the parties, when choosing a specific national law to govern their 
contract also chose its mandatory rules?  
 
Clearly, if the parties have explicitly chosen also the (or certain) mandatory rules of the 
lex causae, these mandatory rules are applicable prima facie. Nevertheless, the facts of 
the case must fulfil the prerequisites set out in the mandatory rules for their application. 
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If, e.g. the parties to a contract with no connection to Germany subject their contract to 
German currency export law, it does not necessarily follow that these rules apply. Only 
if the prerequisites formulated by the German legislator are fulfilled, can these laws be 
applied.  
 
If the parties have not expressly opted for the application of the mandatory rules of the 
lex causae, which will mostly be the case, a far spread opinion in arbitral literature 
nevertheless considers them applicable. Several notable authors consider it to be a 
matter of course that the mandatory rules of the lex voluntatis apply.306 The reason put 
forward to support this is that the arbitrator is bound to apply the law chosen by the 
parties, which, obviously is considered to entail also the application of its mandatory 
rules. Consequently, however, the parties must also have the possibility to exclude the 
applicability of certain mandatory rules of the lex voluntatis, though this must be done 
explicitly.307 Also arbitral awards reflect this opinion.308 
 
This approach has found reception in the jurisprudence of the Swiss Supreme Court, 
which has stated that the mandatory rules of the law the parties have chosen are 
included in the choice-of-law of the parties.309 The Swiss Supreme Court seems to 
follow the “Schuldsstatutstheorie” elaborated on above, when it comes to the 
                                                 
306 Derains, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 (1987) 227 (244); Lazareff, ArbInt 11 (1995) 
137 (138); Lörcher, BB 1993, IV 12, 4; Juenger, FS Rittner, 242. 
307 Derains, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 (1987) 227 (244); Mayer, ArbInt 1986, 274 
(280). 
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the arbitral tribunal held that the an American mandatory rule (in that case the RICO 
Act) could be applicable only due to the choice of New York Law by the Parties. It 
considered however that the choice of law of the parties did not include the mandatory 
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application of mandatory rules of the lex voluntatis by arbitrators.310 Several Swiss 
scholars share the opinion of the Supreme Court.311 
 
It is submitted that in the case the parties have not expressly included the mandatory 
rules of the lex voluntatis in their choice of law the arbitrators must interpret the 
contract and determine whether or not the parties could have intended to include the 
mandatory rules and must not apply them automatically.312 The arbitrators will have to 
examine carefully, whether the parties actually had any intent to include the mandatory 
rules of the lex causae or even had any knowledge of them.313 In doubt, it is submitted 
that the parties will usually not have wanted to include the mandatory rules of the lex 
causae in their choice of law. Mandatory rules intervene in the contractual relationship 
of the parties; they may modify the parties’ obligations or may even render the contract 
void. Therefore it will hardly have been the intent of the parties to include these rules in 
their choice of law. It can hardly be expected that the parties would have subjected their 
contract to a legal order under which it is not valid or not valid as concluded.314 To the 
contrary, the parties to international contracts will invariably have chosen a law 
applicable to their contract for reasons of neutrality that has no connection with their 
contract at all. There is no legitimate reason to apply the mandatory rules of a legal 
order that is only applicable because it has no connection to the case. Firstly, the parties 
will hardly have conceived that these rules would apply. Secondly, the mandatory rules 
of the lex voluntatis will by their legislative intent hardly apply to a case which has no 
connection to the case. The enacting state will regularly have no interest in their 
application. 
 
                                                 
310 Schnyder, RabelsZ 59 (1995) 292 (298); Karrer in Kommentar zum 
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The reason for the application of mandatory rules of the lex causae is therefore not 
respect for the autonomy of the parties. It is also not respect for the interests of the 
states enacting the mandatory rules.  
 
b)  In the case the lex causae is determined by the arbitrator 
 
 
If the parties leave the determination of the applicable law to the arbitrators, the basis 
for the application of the mandatory rules of the lex causae cannot be found in the will 
of the parties. Therefore, even if one would agree that the choice of a specific legal 
system includes its mandatory rules, the lex causae determined by an arbitral tribunal 
cannot include these rules. 315 
 
The reason for this is, as detailed above, that the conflict of laws rules, be it those 
applicable before a national court or rudimentary rules applicable before arbitral 
tribunals (such as s.1051(2) German CCP) designed for the determination of the lex 
contractus are inadequate for determining the applicability of mandatory rules. These 
rules fall outside the law designated by the classic conflict of laws rules and therefore 
are not included in the law to which they point.  
 
It is submitted that in the case the parties have not chosen the applicable law, the 
mandatory rules of the lex contractus do not take priority over mandatory rules of any 
other legal order and are not automatically applicable. Regarding the mandatory rules of 
the lex causae, the arbitrators must follow the same approach (detailed below) that is 
taken to the application of third states mandatory rules. 316 
 
 
                                                 
315 Derains, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 (1987) 227 (245); Beulker, 
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3.  The mandatory rules of third states 
 
a) The Relevance of Party Autonomy 
 
It has been shown above that the application of mandatory rules of the lex causae is 
justified by some authors by reference to the autonomy of the parties and the alleged 
choice of these rules by the parties. The application of the mandatory rules of third 
states cannot be based on the choice of law of the parties. Following this approach 
several tribunals have refused to apply mandatory rules not belonging to the lex causae 
(see below section VI.B.4.g). In some cases this argument has been augmented by 
reference to the public character of the rule and its territorial limitation. 
 
The party autonomy referred to in these awards is a very important aspect. In fact many 
parties may have opted for arbitration for the very reason that their autonomy will be 
given higher esteem by an arbitral tribunal than by a national court.  By opting out of 
the framework of national courts, the parties have also lost a measure of legal certainty. 
Therefore, the arbitral tribunal must firstly and foremost adhere to the will of the 
parties. As has been stated above, an arbitrator who is explicitly instructed by the parties 
not to apply certain mandatory rules should therefore adhere to their will. However, as 
he should also not further the circumvention of (perhaps very legitimate) interests of 
states by agreement of the parties, he should consider refusing to arbitrate their dispute 
if he considers that the agreement of the parties would lead to the enforcement of a 
contract which violates mandatory rules which he considers legitimately applicable.  
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ICC Award No. 1512317 and 1664318 
Both cases arose out of Pakistani emergency legislation that had been enacted due to the 
outbreak of armed hostilities between the Pakistan and India, which prohibited 
payments to made from Pakistani to Indian parties. 
 
In the first case the arbitrator sitting in Switzerland refused to apply a Pakistani law, 
which prohibited any payment from any Pakistani party to an Indian party for reasons of 
hostilities. The arbitrator reasoned that as Indian law applied to the contract, the 
Pakistani legislation could not be considered and release the Pakistani debtor from his 
debts. The arbitrator reasoned with a conflict of laws analysis, namely that the law of 
the contract governed the question, whether or not the contract was invalid and that the 
lex loci solutionis rule was controversial. He thus held that the Pakistani rule could not 
be applied to the case. 
 
In the second the arbitrator the arbitrator examined the emergency legislation itself and 
made an assessment whether in the case in front of him the terms “enemy” and 
“illegality” which had been used in the legislation were fulfilled. He held that such 
legislation could not bind him as an arbitrator in a foreign and neutral country but could 
only bind the courts of the country that had enacted it. Further the parties had chosen 
Indian law so only Indian law could be applied to the contract and the Pakistani rule 
would not be applied. 
 
ICC Award 1803319 
The award rendered to solve this dispute shows how arbitrators have disregarded 
mandatory rules of states that seek to intervene into a treaty for political reasons. In this 
case, a state-owned company in East Pakistan had concluded a contract for the 
construction of a pipeline for the transport of gas in the Eastern part of Pakistan. The 
contract was to be governed by Pakistani law and provided for arbitration under the ICC 
Rules in Geneva. After East Pakistan became Bangladesh on March 26, 1971, the new 
                                                 
317 Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1975-1985 (Jarvin ed.) 3. 
318 Reported by Lew, Applicable Law 545ss. 
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Bangladeshi government established a state owned Bangladeshi company, which was 
the legal successor of the Pakistani company. The Bangladeshi government however 
also enacted two decrees which exonerated the new Bangladeshi company from all 
liabilities of its legal predecessor.  
 
After determining his jurisdiction over the new company and the Bangladeshi 
government due to a rule of succession taken from Swiss law, the arbitrator went on to 
examine the Bangladeshi decrees. He held that they were in clear violation of Swiss 
ordre public and also international ordre public and in any case were not applicable as 
they did not form part of the lex contractus, i.e. Pakistani law.320 
 
This award was subsequently set aside by the Swiss courts for a number of reasons.321 
Firstly, it held that the arbitrator had had no jurisdiction over the Bangladeshi 
government. Secondly, the Swiss Supreme Court reasoned, Swiss ordre public could 
not be affected by the Bangladeshi decrees, as the case had no territorial connection to 
Switzerland and the Swiss Supreme Court did not acknowledge any notion as 
international ordre public. In any event, the legal status of an entity is governed by the 
law of the State in which it has its seat. The expropriation of foreigners abroad, which 
had taken place in this case, could not be judged by Swiss courts, which had to 
recognize the seizure of goods abroad. 
 
ICC Case 7047322 
Two parties entered into a contract in which the claimant undertook to assist the 
defendant in promoting and selling military products in state X. For this assistance a fee 
was to be paid. State X agreed to a contract with the defendant, however not without 
first issuing a writ in which it declared to the defendant that all the costs for all 
deliveries must be calculated without fees for agents or intermediaries. The defendant 
subsequently sought to terminate the contract with the claimant and declared that their 
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services were no longer needed. The claimant initiated arbitration in Switzerland 
applying Swiss law. The defendant contended that the contract with the claimant was 
void, as the circular was an expression of mandatory law of state X. The tribunal 
crushed this argument, holding that this writ was merely a contractual provision 
between the defendant and state X. 
 
The defendant then invoked a provision of law of state X which prohibited the activity 
of commercial agents in state X who were not nationals of state X.  
 
The tribunal held that it was “disputed in arbitration whether article 19, belonging to 
Chap. 1 of the LDIP [Swiss Law on Private International Law], is applicable if the 
parties have contractually agreed on a specific law”. It then went on to hold that, if the 
parties have not chosen a law to apply to their contract, the arbitral tribunal is bound by 
this choice unless the rule in question forms part of the ordre public international.  
 
In this case the arbitrators specifically held that only provisions of the law that has been 
chosen by the parties can be applied by the arbitrators. The reasoning follows the 
approach strictly following the parties choice of law. However, an exception is to be 
made in the merits of the rule. If it reflects ordre public international it is applicable, 
obviously without any further prerequisites. 
 
  
ICC Award 2977,2978,3033323 
In a case between a Swedish shipyard Götaverken and the Libyan General Maritime 
Transport Organization a dispute arose as to the payment of the agreed price as 
Götaverken had accordingly used Israeli parts in violation of Libyan boycott legislation 
and not met all technical specifications required by the contract. The arbitrators held 
that Swedish law was applicable and thus the Libyan boycott legislation could only be 
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respected as far as it had been made part of the contract but not due to the legislative 
will of the law.324 
 
b) The Relevance of the Choice of Law and the Ordre Public 
 
It has been laid down above that provisions such as Art 7(1) Rome Convention or Art 
19 Swiss PILA are not applicable in arbitration. Therefore, the arbitrator cannot apply 
these provisions (directly) to justify the application of foreign mandatory rules of 
mandatory rules of a legal order not chosen by the parties. If the parties have chosen the 
applicable law, the wording of the lex arbitri of the examined legal orders (with the 
exception of the USA and the FAA which contains no provision on the applicable law) 
indicates that the dispute is governed solely by this law. 
 
However, it has been demonstrated above that mandatory rules can be applied 
regardless of the choice of law of the parties. Their application lies not in the discretion 
of the parties.325 Therefore, the choice of law does not render internationally mandatory 
rules inapplicable. If the parties’ choice of law does not have an influence on the 
application of mandatory rules, the question remains what the legal basis for the 
application of mandatory rules in the absence of an explicit provision to this effect in 
the lex arbitri could be. 
 
The first basis that may serve to render mandatory rules applicable is the ordre public. 
The term ordre public used here refers to the standard of ordre public used by national 
courts when deciding on the setting aside of an award. The ordre public forms the limits 
within which states have granted private parties the right and the freedom to have their 
dispute decided by arbitrators. A violation of the ordre public will justify the setting 
aside of an award (see below section VII.) and will bar its enforceability. Therefore 
there is an obligation of arbitrators to consider mandatory rules if their non-application 
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would result in a violation of the ordre public. The obligation to consider the 
application of these rules derives from the fact that arbitration may not be abused as a 
method to violate the ordre public of a state without sanctions. States in their national 
legislations have made it clear that such an abuse of arbitration would not be tolerated. 
By taking an increasingly liberal attitude towards the arbitrability of disputes involving 
rules which form the ordre public, states have transferred the obligation to respect the 
ordre public into arbitration. 326 
 
In such a situation, therefore, the arbitrator is entitled and in fact obliged to ignore the 
choice of law of the parties. Often, it is then argued from this premise and also follows 
logically that arbitrators are entitled to apply or take into consideration such mandatory 
rules that pertain to public policy and the non-application of which would endanger the 
sustainability of the award. The wording of the lex arbitri of the examined legal orders 
(with the exception of the United States), however, indicates that the arbitrator is to 
follow the choice of law of the parties and in the absence of such a choice is to either 
apply a conflict of laws rule, a legal system the arbitrator considers appropriate or the 
law with the closest connection to the case. It does not mention that the arbitrator is to 
disregard a choice of law the effect of which violates the ordre public. It must be 
supposed and it is submitted that in the case the choice of law of the parties would lead 
to a result contrary to the ordre public, the choice of law is irrelevant for the 
arbitrator327 and the provisions of the lex arbitri designed for the case that no choice of 
law has been made are triggered. There are no other provisions relevant for the 
arbitrator to decide on the applicable law in the absence of a valid choice of law. It is 
therefore under these provisions that the arbitrator must decide which mandatory rules 
to apply. If he has the freedom to choose a conflict of laws rule or to apply a voie 
directe, he will be able to reason the application of a mandatory rule according to the 
methodology laid out below (section VI.B.4.) and can therefore render an award which 
is consistent with the ordre public. If the lex arbitri provides for the application of the 
law with the closest connection to the case, the arbitration could either adopt a 
reasoning similar to that of the Austrian Supreme Court, which states that the legislative 
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intent of a rule creates the closest connection to a case (supra section IV.D.(2)(c)).328 
Otherwise, the lex arbitri must be considered to have a gap which is to be filled by 
arbitrators (“schiedsrichterliche Rechtsfortbildung”) (similar to the gap created by the 
reservation made to Art 7(1) Rome Convention by Germany).329 This gap is evident as 
s.1051 German CCP does not explicitly allow the arbitrator to apply any law other than 
that chosen by the parties or with the closest connection but the award may be set aside 
if the arbitrator fails to apply the rule and thereby renders an award incompatible with 
the ordre public. Therefore, the arbitrator must be able to fill this gap by applying the 
mandatory rule despite the (incomplete) wording of the law. 
 
c) Mandatory Rules that Do Not Reflect the Ordre Public 
 
A number of mandatory rules may not reflect the ordre public of a state or even the 
transnational ordre public. Nevertheless, the state may consider their application 
important. Art 7 (1) Rome Convention, Art 9 (3) Regulation 593/2008 or Art 19 Swiss 
PILA grant judges the power to consider the application of such rules even if the parties 
have chosen a specific law to govern their contract. They, however, do not apply before 
arbitral tribunals.330 Does this then mean that arbitrators are prevented from applying 
them?  As stated above, numerous authors generally subscribe to the idea that 
mandatory rules other than those of the lex causae can be applied to the dispute.331 
 
It is submitted that mandatory rules that do not reflect the ordre public of the enacting 
state may under limited circumstances by applied. The reason for this is that – as stated 
above – mandatory rules generally are considered to apply regardless of a choice of law 
of the parties or the otherwise applicable law. Therefore, even if the parties have chosen 
a specific legal system to govern their dispute, the potential application of mandatory 
rules is not prevented by this. The arbitrator can therefore also in this case refer to the 
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lex arbitri which allows him to determine the applicable law in the absence of a choice 
of law. In this case there is an absence of a choice of law of the parties, as they simply 
cannot make a valid choice of law regarding the non-applicability of mandatory rules.332 
To the extent the lex arbitri allows him to choose a conflict of laws rule or to apply the 
law he deems applicable, the application of mandatory rules can be justified by 
reference to these provisions. The arbitrator may reason that he considered a conflict of 
laws rule such as the one described below (section VI.B.4.) to be applicable or - in the 
case of the voie directe – explain why he considers a mandatory rule to be applicable.333 
If the lex arbitri obliges the arbitrator to apply the law with the closest connection, he 
can adopt the same reasoning as suggested immediately above (supra b)). 
 
4. The Methodology for the Application of Mandatory Rules 
 
 
It has been established immediately above that arbitrators may, under specific 
circumstances, consider the application of mandatory rules. This, however, does not 
indicate under which circumstances arbitrators may apply mandatory rules. In the 
following it will therefore be attempted to establish a methodology for the application of 
mandatory rules by arbitral tribunals. For the methodology to have a basis as broad as 
possible and therefore to be as internationalizable as possible, it will include common 
elements from all examined national legal orders. As arbitrators enjoy a margin of 
remoteness from national courts and national law, the methodology will however not be 
a mere copy of the theories developed for the application of mandatory rules before 
national courts. It will be attempted to take the specific circumstances of arbitration and 
the imperative of party autonomy into account. 
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a) The extraterritorial intent of the mandatory rule. 
 
The legislative intent of the mandatory rule to be applied to a specific case is one of the 
most relevant criteria for the application of foreign mandatory rules before national 
courts. The essential function of this criterion is to ensure that only such mandatory 
rules can be applied that actually want to govern the situation. This criterion is relevant 
both in continental and in U.S. theories.334 
 
This criterion can be used as a starting point of the examination of whether or not to 
apply a mandatory rule to a case in arbitration too. It is an inevitable element if the 
arbitrator is to avoid considering the application of mandatory rules that do not even 
attempt to govern a case. If the legislative intent cannot be determined, the enacting 
state has no interest in the application of its rule and therefore there is no reason to 
apply it to a case.  
 
Most authors who are in favour of the application of mandatory rules by arbitral 
tribunals agree that only rules which have the legislative intent to be applied can be 
considered.335 
 
b)  The Element of a “close connection” 
 
The Sonderanknüpfungstheorie requires a “close connection” between the facts of the 
case and the enacting state. As stated above, there is no general test to determine 
whether a case has a connection close enough to an enacting state. Regulation 593/2008 
limits the application of mandatory rules to the mandatory rules of the lex loci 
solutionis. This regulation, however, is not applicable in arbitration. Therefore, there is 
no legal duty of the arbitrator to limit the scope of the possibly applicable rules to the 
lex loci solutionis. This regulation does not meet modern doctrinal standards. Further, 
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national courts have accepted to a certain extent that mandatory rules of legal orders 
other than the lex loci solutionis can be applied or respected. Therefore, it is submitted 
that arbitrators need not limit the application of mandatory rules to the rules of the lex 
loci solutionis.  
 
This can further be underlined by reference to the U.S. approaches. As has been detailed 
above, the influential Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws in section187(2)(b) 
entitles the judge to apply rules reflecting a policy of another state with an materially 
greater interest in the application of its rule. The interest of the enacting state is justified 
and becomes more relevant the closer the contacts are between the case and the enacting 
state.336 Therefore, also the U.S. approach requires a close connection between the facts 
of the case and the enacting state. The U.S. approach, however, does not limit the 
potentially applicable rules to those of the lex loci solutionis. 
 
English law requires no close connection between the enacting state and the facts of the 
case. Apart from the mandatory rules of the lex loci solutionis, no other rules will be 
applied. Also the rules of the lex loci solutionis will only be applied if the proper law of 
the contract is English law. Further, possibly the violation of foreign mandatory rules 
also constitutes a violation of the English ordre public, though this does not depend on 
the close connection between the case and the state which enacted the rule. It is, 
however, submitted that English law and its unwillingness to apply foreign mandatory 
rules does not reflect an internationalizable standard on this point.  
 
Also scholars agree that the application of mandatory rules requires a close connection 
between the facts of the case and the enacting state.337 Nevertheless, few of these 
authors explicitly state which standard of a close connection – if at all – they consider 
appropriate. There seem to be two approaches to this issue, which, however, do not 
differ as much as it may seem. The first requires that the mandatory rule in question has 
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been enacted by the state in accordance with international law. The second approach 
demands that a close connection must be established in the individual case, without, 
however, limiting this to rules which are in conformity with international law. 
 
Schiffer opines that the arbitrator is supposed to examine a close connection and not 
merely to examine whether a state has excessively claimed jurisdiction, as the limits set 
out by public international law are too vague and unnecessary if the arbitrator can 
determine a close connection.338 Further authors agree that the facts of the case must 
have a close connection with the enacting state339 or merely state that arbitrators can 
apply Art 7 Rome Convention in analogy.340  
 
Voser also suggests that a close connection must exist, but that this close connection 
exists even when it is the connection legitimizing the jurisdiction under public 
international law, e.g. when the anticompetitive effect of an agreement is felt in a 
state.341 It has been suggested to use of the limits set out by public international law as 
criterion when applying mandatory rules also before national courts.342 
 
Clearly even if the enacting state is make use of its jurisdiction to prescribe legitimately 
under public international law, it is still the prerogative of the forum state to enact 
legislation requiring a closer link than the one established by public international law 
and to define this close link as it likes for the foreign rule to be applicable.343 The 
question arises whether an arbitrator must search for a close connection under other 
criteria than those set out by public international law or whether the points of contact 
international law requires are sufficient. 
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To answer, however, whether the limits set out by public international law are at all 
useful to determine whether a rule can be applied or not it is purposeful to set out the 
limits of a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe. 
 
c) The limits of jurisdiction set out by public international law 
 
 
Public international law sets out limits of the right of each state to prescribe its laws to 
the conduct which takes place outside its territory.344 International law imposes limits 
on each state when to demand from other states to apply its laws. International law also 
requires a connection between the facts of the case and the forum state.345 This 
connection may be vaguer than the connection that states may require before they are 
willing to apply foreign mandatory rules, but it is still a pre-requisite. In international 
doctrine, these connections are often termed as principles, which allow the 
extraterritorial prescription of national law. Under international law the following 
principles have been established:346 
 
The territoriality principle, the nationality principle, the protection principle and the 
effects doctrine.347  
 
The territoriality principle gives each state the right to prescribe law applying to conduct 
on its territory. This approach is generally accepted, but may be difficult to apply in 
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certain cases due to the vagueness of the extent to which the conduct must take place on 
the territory to of a state to justify the application of its laws.348 In Branch v. Federal 
Trade Commission,349 a U.S. Court applied the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC) 
applied to a U.S. citizen, who sold correspondence study courses without having the 
authority or the education to do so according to U.S. laws, by mail to students in Latin 
America. Though the deceived students were all located in Latin America and thus the 
detrimental impact was only felt there, the U.S. Court held that territorial jurisdiction 
could be applied as Branch was sending the coursebooks and correcting the tests in 
Chicago, Illinois.350 
 
The nationality principle grants states the right to prescribe laws for their nationals even 
when these are abroad. This principle can gain practical usage for subsidiaries of 
foreign companies.351 The ECJ has taken a very extensive approach to this issue and has 
applied the so-called “economic entity doctrine” on parents of subsidies who had taken 
part in illegal price fixing outside the EC.352 Only because they had subsidiaries in the 
EC and formed an economic entity, did the ECJ hold that EC competition law was 
applicable to the parent companies.353 If a subsidiary has a sufficient amount of control 
over itself, without only being the long arm of its parent, the territoriality principle will 
override and the subsidiary will be subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the state in 
which it is located.354  
 
The protective principle allows for the prescription of laws which regulate conduct 
abroad that endangers the safety of a state. This principle has found acceptance in 
                                                 
348 Erne, 82. 
349 141 F.2.d 31 (7th Circuit. 1944). 
350 Atabaki, International Lawyer 2000 564 (566). 
351 to the conflicts arising out of the application of the control theory (which defines the 
nationality of a subsidiary according to the control exercised over it from a parent) for 
the application of the principle of nationality see Meng, ZaöRVR (1997) 269 (294ff). 
352 ICI v. Commission (Case 48/69) CMLR 557, para 130ss (1972) 
353 Ibid.  
354 Lowe, GYIL 1984 54 (60-62). 
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international criminal law,355 but could arguably also be used for economic issues. If a 
state deems it necessary to enact export control laws which are to be applied by third 
countries, as in the pipeline case described above (supra section IV.D.(2)(b)), one could 
discuss the justification of such measures with this principle. It has been argued that 
extraterritorial cartels have a detrimental impact on the national economy and that 
therefore the protective principle can be applied to justify the prescription of 
extraterritorial legislation.356 The principle was however not accepted by the 
Arrondismentrechtsbank Den Haag, which argued that it is permissible for a State to 
invoke the protective principle to prevent the jeopardy of its security or 
creditworthiness, but that the foreign policy interests set forth by the U.S. do not justify 
the applicability of the embargo before Dutch courts.357 
 
Of interest specifically here is the so-called effects doctrine. This doctrine is the most 
heavily-debated basis for jurisdiction. It was established by U.S. court practice and has 
lead to some controversies with European states. The Restatement declares the grasp for 
jurisdiction of U.S. law, especially of competition law to be legitimate, when the 
conduct takes place outside the U.S. but has substantial effects in the U.S.358 
 
The first notable decision endorsing this principle was rendered in 1945 in the case of 
United States v. Aluminium Co. of America (ALCOA) in which the Sherman Act was 
declared to apply extraterritorially as “any state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance for conduct outside its borders which the state 
reprehends”.359 This approach provoked the feeling in other states that their sovereignty 
was infringed by the grasp of jurisdiction over conduct taking place on their soil to such 
                                                 
355 American Law Institute, Restatement  (Third) of the Law on International Relations, 
Comment f to § 402. 
356 Haymann, 312; Stern, AFDI (1986) 7 (35); contra Seidl-Hohenveldern, AWD 1963 
73, who argues that the protective principle can only be invoked to protect the most 
fundamental and vital interests of a state; so also Meng, Extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion, 
517. 
357 Sensor Case discussed supra in section IV.D.(2)(b). 
358 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) to the Law of Foreign Relations, 
comment (d) to § 402. 
359 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
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an extent. In the 1970s, American courts acknowledged the resentments of the 
international community and developed a more sophisticated approach to the matter.360 
In the cases of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America361 and Mannington Mills 
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.362, two U.S. Courts had the opportunity of reconsidering the 
ALCOA judgment. They held that U.S. Antitrust law does apply extraterritorially, but 
they limited the unconditional approach taken in ALCOA. They introduced the test of 
reasonableness which is now included in § 403 of the Restatement, Third.363 This test 
introduced a catalogue of factors which a court is to follow when considering whether a 
law is to be applied to an international case.364 These factors include: the link of the 
activity to the territory of the regulating state, connections such as nationality, residence 
or economic activity between the regulating state and the person principally responsible 
for the activity to be regulated, the extent to which another state may have an interest in 
regulating the activity and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.365 
Section § 403 of the Restatement, Third therefore combines a list of connecting factors 
which establish the jurisdiction of a state to prescribe with a balancing test.366 The 
stronger the connecting factors link a case to a specific state the stronger the interest of 
that state is in the application of its law which should then be the law to be applied. The 
application of the rule of the state in favour of which the balancing test turns out, is not 
based on comity but is based on international law. According to the Restatement, this 
test of reasonableness is a rule of customary international law.367 This test was, 
however, reconsidered in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California368 in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court took a very extensive approach to its jurisdiction turning back on the 
                                                 
360 Demetriou/Robertson,  ECLR 1995 461 (462). 
361 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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road from Mannington Mills and Timberlane Lumber to its approach in ALCOA.369 The 
court in Laker Airways v. Sabena also refused to apply the balancing test.370 It is 
therefore doubtful whether the approach taken by the Restatement Third actually 
reflects international law.371 
 
Other approaches limit the grasp of states to regulate the extraterritorial conduct by 
utilizing the prohibition of abuse of rights or the principle of non-intervention.372 
 
From the above it is clear that international law requires a case to have a link to a state 
for that state to be able to justify its enactment of a rule that by its terms seeks to apply 
to the case. This link has been coined in a number of ways, e.g. “as a genuine link”373, 
“a substantial and bona fide connection”374, “a sufficiently close connection”375, a 
“relevant and reasonable connection”.376 Essentially, therefore the same question is 
asked both from the conflicts of law perspective and from the public international law 
perspective. As Mann eloquently formulated: 
 
If one realises the history of and the inter-relation between the conflict of 
laws and public international law in respect of the problem of the reach of 
legislation, i.e., of international jurisdiction, it becomes plausible, perhaps 
even obvious that today both continue to give rise to the same fundamental 
question: does there exist a sufficiently close connection between a given 
set of facts and, on the one hand, a particular legal system called upon to 
govern it or, on the other hand, a particular legislator qualified to 
                                                 
369 Hay, RabelsZ 1996 303 (316); Durack, 479 (480). 
370 Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F 2d. 909, 948ss (D.C. Cir 1984). 
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376 Mann, RdC (1984-III) 9 (28); citations taken from Meng, Extraterritoriale 
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regulate it? The former question belongs to private, the latter to public 
international law.377 
 
 
That an arbitrator is to establish a close connection between the facts of the case and the 
enacting state, can therefore be seen as an imperative either of conflicts of law or public 
international law. The requirement of a close connection formulated in approaches such 
as the “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie” essentially justifies the application of a foreign 
mandatory rule also under public international law even though it is a conflict of laws 
requirements. Of course every legislator and every court can require an even closer 
connection than the one required under public international law in its conflict of laws 
rules. It is, however, submitted that in a case that an arbitrator can determine a close 
connection between the facts of the case and the enacting state that justifies the 
application of the mandatory rule from a conflict of laws perspective, the requirements 
under public international law will be fulfilled also. Whether this holds true when 
reversed may be doubted. The reason for this is, as correctly observed by Schiffer,378that 
international law has yet to determine the borders of interntional jurisdiction and to 
offer more than general formulae.379 There also is no dogmatic reason to deviate from 
the element of close connection as required under national conflict of laws rules to the 
realm of public international law. 
 
An arbitrator must therefore establish a close connection between the facts of the case 
and the enacting state. It is not sufficient to merely refer to a principle of public 
international law which in most cases is ill-defined to justify the application of a 
mandatory rule.  
 
 
 
                                                 
377 Mann, RdC (1984-III) 9 (28). 
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d) The substance of the rule in question. 
 
According to the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie proposed above national continental 
European judges do not merely determine the spatial reach of a mandatory rule, but also 
examine its contents. Numerous approaches to this examination have been suggested, 
reaching from the conformity with the public policy of the forum state, over a shared 
value approach to the criterion of the furtherance of an interest of the forum state, were 
put forward. It was submitted above that the mandatory rule must be compatible with 
the interests of the forum state. Also the American approach analyses the contents of a 
rule when deciding on the policy behind the rule, though there is no requirement that is 
fosters the interests of the forum state.  
In the constellation of the application of a mandatory rule by a national court, it is clear 
that the judge has to assess the compatibility of the substance of the mandatory rule 
against the values of the lex fori. U.S. doctrine also requires the judge to decide whether 
a rule of foreign legal system must be applied due to the policy reflected in that rule. 
The question that arises in the international arena, specifically before an international 
arbitrator is: which body of rules form the yardstick by which the arbitrator is to assess 
the substance of the foreign rules in absence of a lex fori? 
 
A number of scholars opine that the arbitrator  –  in the absence of a forum – cannot and 
should not refer to any national notion of ordre public but must measure the substance 
of the rules against the “transnational ordre public”.380 The use of the transnational 
ordre public can be either positive or negative. The negative approach uses the 
transnational ordre public to deny only such rules application that violate these must 
fundamental values of the international community.381 The positive approach requires 
that mandatory rules protect vital interests of the international community as a whole.382 
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It is true that the substance of mandatory rules must be assessed before they are applied. 
The notion of the transnational ordre public is at first glance a rather obvious choice as 
this yardstick. It is the lowest common denominator amongst states. The international 
character of arbitration and the requirements of practice prevent the national 
conceptions of ordre public to be a useful tool in this respect. The negative approach 
described above, however, seems to be overly broad. It is undoubtedly true that rules 
which violate the transnational ordre public may not be applied. However, this leaves a 
very broad margin of potentially applicable rules. It would have the consequence that in 
international arbitration mandatory rules could be more readily applied than before 
national courts. However, arbitration is constructed on the autonomy of the parties 
which therefore have a greater importance in arbitration than in proceedings before 
national courts. As mandatory rules limit the autonomy of the parties, they must be 
applied with greater restraint in arbitration. Therefore, the mere negative application of 
the transnational ordre public seems to be an insufficient criterion when deciding on the 
application of a mandatory rule. 
 
The positive approach is more limited. To be applied a mandatory rule must secure 
some vital interest that is common to the international community. By applying the 
notion of the transnational ordre public an international tribunal is free from any 
national concepts of ordre public. A reference to the ordre public of any of the legal 
orders connected to the arbitration, such as that of the lex causae or the seat of the 
arbitration may be arbitrary as they will often have been chosen for reasons of 
neutrality. Therefore is seems very appropriate to refer to the transnational ordre public 
as a yardstick against which to assess the substance of the mandatory rule. However, the 
difficulty with this approach lies in the definition of the transnational ordre public. If 
the transnational ordre public is to comprise the values protected by all legal systems of 
the world, one may wonder whether the intersection of all these legal systems will be 
large enough to provide a viable basis for a decision of an arbitrator. Certain values will 
undoubtedly be counted to the transnational ordre public, such as the prohibition of the 
sale of drugs, trafficking in human beings, the human rights reflected in the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights, embargos enacted by the United Nations or the like.383 
However, it is doubtful whether an arbitrator in practice will be able to use these very 
general notions to determine whether a rule is part of the transnational ordre public or 
not. Apart from the mentioned very basic elements, it is difficult to see a broad 
acceptance of values relevant in the commercial arena which are accepted by all legal 
orders of the world.384 One example for this is the Hilmarton v. OTV arbitration in 
which the arbitrator considered a contract to be invalid due to a mandatory rule of 
Algerian law prohibiting the use of intermediaries for the procurement of state contracts 
stating that the values of the rule would be shared by the principle European 
legislators.385 This award was set aside by Swiss courts for the reason that the Algerian 
rule did not reflect fundamental interests of Switzerland or the international 
community.386 It must be acknowledged that the development of the concept of the 
transnational ordre public is by no means finished and the notion is therefore not finally 
determinable.387 
 
The solution submitted to this problem here is to limit – if possible – the scope used to 
define the transnational ordre public. There seems to be no cogent necessity for an 
arbitrator to examine all or most of the legal orders of the world and then to determine a 
rule pertaining to the transnational ordre public to establish a yardstick against which to 
assess the substance of a mandatory rule. If he can do so, such as in the cases mentioned 
above, the arbitrator will face no problem in assessing the substance of the mandatory 
rule. However, states often enact rules which reflect legitimate and strong policies but 
are generally not considered to pertain to the transnational ordre public. One example of 
this is rules of competition law. As rules of competition law are customized to the 
economic realities in various states, it is not possible to count the conservation of 
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competitive markets to the transnational ordre public.388 However, the correct 
conclusion cannot be that - as mandatory rules pertaining to competition law do not 
reflect the transnational ordre public - they are not applicable in arbitration. In this case, 
a solution could be to determine the substantive yardstick against which to measure the 
rule not by reference to the transnational ordre public but to the legal orders of all 
concerned states. Such concerned states and legal orders are those of the seat or the 
parties, of the place of performance, of the place the effects of a contract are felt, of the 
place where goods are located and the like. The arbitrator needs to compare the 
common interests protected in these states and by their legal orders and attempt to 
determine a common denominator among them. This approach serves the interests of 
the parties, as the values against which a mandatory rule is measured was foreseeable 
for them and will derive from legal orders with a connection to them or their 
transaction. Also, doctrine recognizes the substance of the transnational ordre public 
can be derived from a comparative approach to the legal orders of the states connected 
to the case.389 Therefore, if the arbitrator can determine that a mandatory rule of a 
closely connected legal order reflects a value also protected by the legal orders of the 
states which are connected to the case, this – it is submitted – would be sufficient to 
show that the substance of the mandatory rule reflects not only the interests of one 
single state but of at least a part of the international community and would ensure that 
mandatory rules that only serve the selfish interests of one state, e.g. bilateral embargos, 
are not applied.  
 
e) Rules that do not meet the above criteria 
 
 
Some mandatory rules may not meet the above criteria but may nevertheless have an 
impact on the relationship of the parties by effectively preventing or influencing 
performance of one of the parties. An example for this would be the case of a bilateral 
embargo of a state against another. If the goods to be delivered under a contract are on 
                                                 
388 Karrer in BaslerKomm IPRG² Art 187 no 287 with reference to the jurisprudence of 
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the territory of the state imposing the embargo, a seller may effectively be prevented 
from delivering. Nevertheless, if the embargo has been imposed for some interests 
which are not shared or are even disapproved of by the international community, the 
arbitrator should not apply the rule as he should not abet the interests of one state which 
are not shared by others. In this case, the arbitrator must accept that the seller is in no 
position to perform under the contract. The only solution if the arbitrator does not want 
to render an unjust decision is to recognize the factual effects of the mandatory rule on 
the contractual relationship and to take them into account as facts. This has been 
proposed for the same situation under national law390 and there is no good reason why 
not to transfer this approach into arbitration.  
 
f) Summary  
 
It thus seems accepted by literature that mandatory rules of third states need not be left 
unconsidered in the realm of international commercial arbitration.  
 
In order to be applicable a mandatory rule in question must fulfil certain prerequisites: 
 
(1) It must have a legislative “will” to be applied to a contract, regardless of the 
otherwise applicable law 
(2) The facts of the case must have a sufficiently close connection to the enacting 
state 
(3) The contents of the rule must be in conformity with the notion of transnational 
ordre public. If no rule of transnational ordre public can be established, the 
arbitrator can limit himself to determining a common interest of all concerned 
states 
(4) If the rule does not meet one of the above criteria, the arbitrator must consider 
whether it effectively prevents performance by a party or influences it and 
handle it as a fact of the case 
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Some authors have concluded that these elements could constitute a general principle of 
private international law.391 With view to the numerous schools of thought and methods 
in this field, one may legitimately doubt that there exist rules that are so hard and fast as 
to make this a general principle. It is however submitted, with the authoritative backing 
of a great part of literature, that the elements set out above are a practical tool and 
constitute a legitimate and workable method of applying foreign mandatory rules. 
 
g) The Relevance of the criteria set out in the case law of arbitral 
 tribunals. 
 
The above criteria for determining the applicability were extracted from national legal 
orders of various legal systems and not from arbitral case law. The approaches of 
national case law were partially adapted so as not to copy the approach valid before 
national courts to arbitration. In the following it will be examined whether the method is 
reflected in arbitral jurisprudence. A number of awards will be scrutinized for the 
approaches taken for the application of mandatory rules and compared to the criteria set 
out. 
 
ICC Award No. 6320392 
The dispute arose out of a construction contract for a power plant which contained an 
arbitration clause for arbitration in Paris and the application of Brazilian law. A dispute 
arose in which claimant, owner of the plant to be constructed (a Brazilian party), 
asserted that the contractor (a U.S. power plant equipment manufacturer) had violated 
the U.S. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act393 [hereinafter RICO 
Act] and claimed treble damages.  
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393 18 U.S.C. (1961). 
  118
The tribunal started by holding that in some cases the autonomy of the parties to choose 
a system of law must be subjugated to overriding interests reflected in mandatory rules. 
Accordingly, the RICO Act was such a mandatory provision. For its application the 
tribunal required two criteria: firstly, the enacting state must have strong and legitimate 
interest in the application of its law and, secondly, there must be a connecting factor 
between the case at hand and the enacting state. The tribunal scrutinized the provisions 
of the act and the policies furthered by it. It concluded that the RICO Act had been 
enacted to protect the U.S. economy and reflected U.S. public policy. It further held that 
there was an international consensus on the struggle against the practices prohibited by 
the RICO Act. However, there was no international consensus on the means in which 
these practices had to be combated. It held that the treble damages provision which had 
been invoked was not a universally accepted method in these practices. The aim 
accordingly was universally accepted, not however the means (i.e. the treble damages 
provision). Thus, the tribunal found that the interest of the U.S. law was not given in the 
present case. 
 
The tribunal also held that the connection between the facts of the case and the U.S. was 
too distant to command the application of U.S. law, as the alleged fraud took place 
outside the U.S. and the “centre of the relations” between the two parties was outside 
the U.S. 
 
This approach bears strong resemblance to the criteria set out above. The tribunal first 
dealt with the interest of the U.S. that was reflected in that RICO Act and sought to 
determine whether the rule had the legislative intent to be applied beyond the territory 
of the U.S. It held that to be applied in international arbitration, the rule would have to 
reflect an interest shared by the “international marketplace” and not only by the U.S. 
The tribunal therefore combined the examination of the legislative intent with the policy 
protected by the rule. It denied that the application of the rule outside the U.S. was 
justified as it did not protect the international marketplace by means accepted by other 
legal orders it compared the U.S. approach to.  
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Secondly, the tribunal searched for a close connection between the facts of the case and 
the enacting state. It took the place where the alleged fraud had taken place and the 
“centre of the relations” of the parties into consideration and found the connection of 
the facts of the case to the U.S. to be too remote to command the application of the rule. 
 
ICC Case No. 8528394  
The case concerned a joint venture contract between a Turkish construction company 
and a U.S. construction company for a construction project tendered by a Turkish public 
works authority. The U.S. construction company was to provide the financing for the 
project, while the Turkish company was appointed as the “Leader of the Joint Venture” 
and was to represent it to the Turkish tax authorities. 
 
The Turkish tax authorities granted the joint venture two “Export Incentive Certificates” 
that exempted it from a number of duties, taxes and customs. The dispute arose over the 
benefits granted by these exemptions. While the Turkish company asserted that only it 
was entitled to the benefits, the U.S. company claimed payment of half of the benefit. 
The Turkish company contended that a mandatory provision of Turkish law prohibited 
the sharing of benefits granted to the Turkish company, as the “Export Incentive” 
privileges, which should promote Turkish exports, could only be granted to Turkish 
companies. The contract included an ICC arbitration clause. A tribunal seated in 
Geneva, Switzerland, had to assess whether to apply the provisions of the Turkish law, 
even though Swiss law was applicable to the joint venture agreement. 
 
The tribunal acknowledged that even though Swiss law was applicable, foreign 
mandatory rules might claim application. It started by examining article 19 SLPIL. It 
seems that the tribunal did not actually consider article 19 SLPIL directly applicable. 
Far more, it mentioned the “principle set out in article 19 SLPIL”.395 It then went on to 
examine other legal instruments with similar provisions, such as article 7 (1) Rome 
Convention or article 16 (2) of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts 
and on their Recognition. It came to the conclusion that all those provisions envisage 
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the same concept. After citing a number of commentators and court decisions, the 
tribunal regarded itself entitled to apply the Turkish law if the preconditions set out by 
“the principle expressed in article 19” were fulfilled.  
 
The tribunal held that the Turkish provisions were mandatory in nature. Then the 
tribunal concluded that a close connection between the contract and the legal system of 
law from which the mandatory rule emanated existed.  
 
Finally the tribunal examined the legitimate interests of the parties, as set out by article 
19 SLPIL. It held that the defendant had a preponderant interest in the application of the 
Turkish provisions, as he would be burdened by severe penalties if he were be ordered 
by the award of the tribunal to share the tax benefits with the claimant. The tribunal 
therefore sought to interpret the Turkish legislation and tried to find a “reasonable 
solution”. It differentiated between tax benefits, which were granted to the Turkish 
company and could not be shared with the claimant, and tax savings which were profits 
and accordingly could be shared according to the joint venture contract without 
infringing Turkish law. 
 
In this award the tribunal applied the principle expressed article 19 SLPIL which 
reflects the theory of “Sonderanknüpfung”. It thus analyzed the criteria mentioned 
above when deciding on the applicability of the mandatory rule. The respect for the 
parties interests were stipulated by article 19 SLPIL, which in that point differs from 
article 7 (1) Rome Convention. 
 
ICC Case 8404396 
In ICC Case 8404, a tribunal had to decide whether or not to apply European Antitrust 
law to a contract otherwise governed by Swiss law. It considered article 19 SLPIL and 
article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention. Thereafter it followed that a tribunal could apply 
mandatory rules of a legal order other than that of the lex causae, if three prerequisites 
were met. Namely, the rule must pertain to a category of rules, which wish to be applied 
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irrespective of the otherwise applicable law. Secondly, there must be a close connection 
between the facts of the case and the enacting state. Lastly, it held that the application of 
the rule must be justified after balancing with the interests of the parties. It then stated 
that the more the values are universally protected, the more likely that an arbitrator will 
have to apply them. Here again, the tribunal used the criteria set out above but added the 
criteria of the parties interests.397  
 
It remains however, that the tribunal used the “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie” as guidance 
when considering foreign mandatory rules. 
 
ICC Award 9333398 
In this case, a dispute arose out of a contract in which claimant, a Moroccan Broker, 
undertook to provide services to respondent, a French building company to obtain and 
perform a contract. After respondent had paid 40% of the commission on to a Swiss 
bank account, he refused to pay more. It had become part of a U.S. group and this 
group’s policy prohibited it from paying in a country other than that where the agent 
was located or the services rendered, as any other payment would be considered bribery. 
This policy was in conformity with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [hereinafter 
FCPA]. 
 
The parties had stipulated that Swiss law be applicable and the place of arbitration was 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
The sole arbitrator was thus faced with the applicability of the FCPA to the contract, as 
the payments were legal under Swiss law. The arbitrator used article19 SLPIL to judge 
on the applicability of the FCPA. 
 
He started by analysing the reach of the FCPA by its legislative intent. He found that the 
only respondent in this case was the French subsidiary and not the U.S. group. He 
analysed the policy of the FCPA and the values it sought to protect and found that the 
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FCPA did not - by its will - apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Further, the 
only territorial connection with U.S. law was the fact that the French company had 
become a subsidiary of the U.S. group. The arbitrator did not stop to analyse the 
interests of the parties. 
 
It is not quite clear why the arbitrator felt bound by article 19 SLPIL. Perhaps he 
deemed it appropriate to use this provision as he was seated in Switzerland. From the 
theory constructed above, it does not however matter whether he applied article 19 
directly or would have used the criteria set out in this provision as these criteria are a 
consensus that seems to hold true also for arbitral practice. 
 
ICC Case 9298399 
This case concerned a contract for the sale of shares. Respondent argued that the 
contract was invalid, as it violated foreign exchange provisions of the lex causae. The 
arbitral tribunal held that the choice of law of the parties did not include public law 
matters, but only contractual matters. It applied article 187 SLPIL to establish whether 
the foreign exchange regulations, which had been invoked, had a sufficiently close 
connection to the case. 
 
What is to be noted from this case is that it is a clear rejection of the 
“Schuldstatutstheorie”. The mandatory rule invoked was one of the lex causae. Still the 
tribunal did not blindly apply the rule, but stopped to consider whether or not the rule 
had the legislative will to be applied. This approach is laudable as it shows that also 
mandatory rules of the lex causae do not enjoy preference, but must be analyzed just 
like any other mandatory rules. 
 
 
 
                                                 
399 unpublished, the author refers to the analysis of this case by Naón, Choice-of-Law 
Problems 311. 
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h) Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the case law underlines that arbitral tribunal – where they are willing to 
apply mandatory rules of third states – use the criteria set out above. Often they base 
their analysis on the methodology of provisions such as Art 19 Swiss PILA or Art 7 (1) 
Rome Convention. In several cases, the tribunals analysed the interests protected by the 
mandatory rules and have examined whether they are shared by the international 
community or at least a large number of states. The tribunals also determined the spatial 
reach of the rules by interpretation and assessed whether they actually were intended to 
be applied to the case and whether the case had a connection with the enacting state 
close enough to justify the application. 
 
5. The Relevance of mandatory rules of the seat of the arbitration 
 
The arbitrator is not an organ of the state where he happens to have his seat. The place 
of arbitration will in many cases have been chosen only for reasons of neutrality and 
because it has no connection for to the facts of the case. Therefore, according to the 
above proposed theory of application of mandatory rules, an application of the 
mandatory rules of the mandatory rules of the state in which the arbitrator has his seat 
will fail for lack of a close connection. 400  
 
Mandatory rules of the seat of the tribunal may however become relevant not for 
dogmatic reasons but merely for practical ones. The courts of the seat of arbitration are 
entitled to set aside an award rendered on their territory. An arbitrator must therefore 
consider the risk of his award being set aside, if he disregards rules of the state in which 
he has his seat as he has the obligation to render an enforceable award and may become 
liable to the parties if he fails to do so.401 Therefore, an arbitrator should at least 
                                                 
400 Drobnig in FS Kegel 95 (106); Reiner, ICC Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 244 (1989); 
Mayer, ArbInt 1986 274 (283); Voser, The Amercian Rev. Int. Arb. 1996, 319 (338); 
Schnyder, RabelsZ 1995 292 (301); cf. Schiffer, Handelsschiedsverfahren 182.. 
401 e.g. article 25 ICC Rules 1998. 
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consider the mandatory rules of the state in which he has his seat if only to ensure that 
their non-application would lead to the setting aside of the award.402 
 
6. Relevance of the mandatory rules of the place of enforcement 
 
The same considerations valid for the application of the mandatory rules of the state in 
which the arbitrator has his seat are valid for the application of the mandatory rules of 
the place of enforcement. 
 
The place of enforcement (if known at the time of the decision of the arbitrator) may 
have a close connection to the facts of the case. This will be true if one of the parties has 
its seat in the place of enforcement. However, the potential enforcement of an award 
does not for itself establish a close connection to the case.403 As detailed above, the 
close connection must be determined between the facts of a case and the enacting state. 
The winning party may seek enforcement in any country were the losing party has 
assets. The mere location of assets of a party, however, does not for itself constitute a 
close connection to the facts of a case. A multinational corporation with possesses 
assets in numerous countries would otherwise be subject to the mandatory rules of all 
those countries, even if the assets have no connection to the case.404 The only reason to 
consider the rules of the place of enforcement could be to ensure that the winning party 
can enforce the award. This, however, is a consideration which is not sufficient to 
justify the application of mandatory rules.405 The application of mandatory rules of the 
seat of arbitration may be justified in situations in which the non-application could lead 
                                                 
402 Lazareff, ArbInt 1995 137 (140), who however does explicitly state that this 
approach is merely a pragmatic one; Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, 235. 
403 Schwab/Walter, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Chp 55 no 9. 
404 Of course, if the enacting state in which a party has assets can and will enforce its 
rule against these assets, the arbitral tribunal may take this into account as a fact. 
405 contra Beulker, Eingriffsnormenproblematik, 286ss arguing that if an award may 
likely be enforced in a state, this place can be considered the place of performance 
which justifies the existence of a close connection. However, this approach seems 
inappropriate. The close connection must exist between the facts of the case and the 
enacting state. The potential later enforcement of an award is no real connection. Such 
connection, if any, would only come into existence after the arbitration in concluded by 
the rendering of the award. 
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to the setting aside of the award. This danger to the existence of the award, however, 
does not exist if mandatory rules of the place of enforcement are not applied.  
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VII.  TH E  RE L E V A N C E  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  F O R  
S E T T I N G  A S I D E  P R O C E D U R E S.  
 
A.  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
After the award has been rendered, the underlying party may challenge the award before 
the courts of the seat or may seek to prevent its enforcement.406  For the scope of this 
thesis it is relevant in which circumstances the application or non-application of 
mandatory rules by the arbitrators can have an influence on the decision of the court. 
 
B.  T H E  I N F L U E N C E  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  O N  S E T T I N G  A S I D E  
 A N D  E N F O R C E M E N T  P R O C E D U R E S  
 
In the following first the legal framework for the setting aside and enforcement 
procedures in Austria, Germany and Switzerland will be outlined. As the framework is 
very similar in all three jurisdictions, the influence on mandatory rules on these 
procedures which is subject to doctrinal debate rather than jurisprudence will be 
discussed for all three jurisdictions subsequently. Thereafter, the situation in the U.K. 
and the U.S will be examined. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
406 This is the position of most national arbitration laws, the New York Convention and 
the Model Law; see s.1059 German CCP; s.611 Austrian CCP; s.190 Swiss PILA; 
s.67ss U.K. Arbitration Act; s.10 Federal Arbitration Act; Judgement of the OGH, 22 
October 2001, 1 Ob 236/01i, in which the OGH denied international jurisdiction 
(“internationale Zuständigkeit”) for setting aside an award rendered in China. It held 
that under the system of the New York Convention only the courts of the seat of 
arbitration have jurisdiction to set aside an award unless the parties had agreed 
otherwise. 
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1. The Situation in Austria 
 
a) Setting aside an award due to a violation of the ordre public 
 
According to s.611(2)(8) Austrian CCP, an award can be set aside if it violates the 
Austrian ordre public.  
 
The old Austrian arbitration law allowed for setting aside an award for a violation of 
either the Austrian ordre public or of a rule which the parties cannot derogate by a 
choice of law. This distinction provoked a doctrinal discussion on the relationship 
between the notion of ordre public and the rules from which the parties cannot derogate 
by choice of law. As the old Austrian arbitration law only applies to proceedings 
initiated before 1 July 2006, it is of no longer of particular relevance. It suffices for the 
scope of this thesis to summarize that the dispute was essentially about whether 
mandatory rules in the sense used in this thesis (therefore excluding rules of consumer 
protection, labour law and the like) were included in the rules from which a party 
cannot derogate from.407 Consequently, it was disputed whether a violation of 
mandatory rules that did not form part of the ordre public could lead to the setting aside 
of an award or whether the rules the parties could not derogate from only referred to 
rules of private law or rules which enforced a contractual equilibrium against 
commercial reality (such as in the case of labour law or consumer protection law). 
 
As this distinction is no longer made in the new Austrian arbitration law, a challenge of 
an award for the violation of a mandatory rule must allege the violation of the ordre 
public. The discussion on the meaning of the term “rules from which the parties cannot 
derogate by choice of law” used in the old Austrian arbitration law is therefore now 
moot. Of course the term ordre public used in section 611 Austrian CCP is not clearly 
defined. However, the often cited equation between the notion of ordre public relevant 
for setting aside procedures and the one used in s.6 of the Austrian Private International 
                                                 
407 Gamauf ZfRV 2000, 41 (52); Liebscher, wbl 1999 493 (496); Melis, FS Bülow 129 
(138). 
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Law Act has rightly been criticized.408 The notion of ordre public in s.611 Austrian 
CCP determines to what extent the Austrian legal order will tolerate erroneous awards. 
It will also sanction the failure of an arbitrator to apply rules forming part of the ordre 
public which the court considers must have been applied. The notion of ordre public in 
section 611 Austrian CCP therefore functions in a broader way than the ordre public 
referred to in section6 of the Austrian Private International Law Act, which will only 
prevent the application of foreign rules. 
 
Unlike other jurisdictions, Austrian courts do not distinguish between the international 
ordre public and the “domestic” ordre public.409 Semantically this makes no difference, 
as what is generally considered to be the international ordre public is part of the 
Austrian ordre public.410 However, the remoter the connection of the case is to Austria, 
the more intolerable the result must be the arbitrator reached for it to violate the 
Austrian ordre public as it is established (at least in doctrine) that the functioning of the 
ordre public requires a certain connection between the facts of the case and the 
forum.411 Therefore, if two foreign parties chose Austria as a place of arbitration merely 
for reasons of neutrality to decide a case with no connection to Austria, the award 
should not be set aside for parochial notions of the ordre public, but only if the award 
violates more generalisable rules.412 The result would be the same as Swiss courts reach 
when applying the international ordre public. 
 
The Austrian Supreme Court has as of yet seldom discussed the possibility of setting 
aside an award due to the violation of the ordre public and the relationship of this term 
to mandatory rules. In some instances, the Austrian Supreme Court has defined certain 
                                                 
408 Liebscher, wbl 1999, 493 (496). 
409 Judgement of the OGH, 11 May 1983,  3 Ob 30/83 and the critical comment to this 
decision from Seidl-Hohenveldern, ArbInt 1983, 322.   
410 Seidl-Hohenveldern, ArbInt 1983 322 (326).   
411 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht5 344; Kegel/Schurig, Internationales 
Privatrecht9 521. 
412 Cf. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austrian Public Policy and the Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards ArbInt 1983, 322 (327) who states that only if a case has nothing to do 
with foreign law, the domestic ordre public applied, but that a balance must be struck if 
a case is embedded in foreign law between that foreign law and rules of the forum.   
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mandatory rules as belonging to the Austrian ordre public. These include specifically 
Art 81 and 82 EC Treaty413, the prohibition of so called “Differenzgeschäfte”, i.e. a 
contract foreseeing the payment of the difference in price for a product between two 
dates, that has characteristics of a bet,414 and specific rules of the Austrian currency 
export laws.415 
 
In a rather recent decision on this matter, the Austrian Supreme Court showed doctrinal 
inconsistencies. The Supreme Court had to decide on the validity of an award rendered 
by an arbitral tribunal seated in Austria concerning a dispute arising out of a 
construction contract of terraced houses.416 Due to delay in the building process, the 
owner refused to pay the full amount according to the contract. The arbitral tribunal 
awarded the full amount out of the contract including interest. Further – and this was the 
point were the case becomes relevant for the scope of this work – the tribunal awarded 
20 % VAT for the interest. The ECJ had however held that interest is to be considered 
as damage and thus not subject to VAT.417  
 
According to the Austrian Supreme Court, awards can only be set aside if they violate 
the most fundamental notions of the Austrian legal order. This number of fundamental 
notions is smaller than the number of mandatory rules. The Austrian Supreme Court 
held that the judgment of the ECJ was binding for it. It went on to hold that rules of tax 
law do not only deal with the relationship between the parties but serve interests of the 
whole society. Thus, tax laws are mandatory in nature. According to this decision of the 
Austrian Supreme Court, this circumstance was sufficient to set the award aside 
partially. 
 
                                                 
413 Judgement of the OGH, 23 February 1998, 3 Ob 115/95. 
414 Judgement of the OGH, 11 May 1998, 3 Ob 30/83; 26.11.1996 1 Ob 639/95. 
415 Judgement of the OGH, 22 February 1989, 3 Ob 148/88. 
416 Judgement OGH, 5 May 1998, 3 Ob 2372/96m, EvBl 1998/179. 
417 BAZ Bausysteme AG v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften, Case 222/81, 
Judgement 1. July 1982, ECR 1982-VII, 2527, 2541. 
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The judgment obviously contradicts itself as it at first correctly states that the ordre 
public does not consist of all mandatory rules and then goes on to state that only 
because the award violated a mandatory rule was its setting aside justified.418 
 
It is important to note, as the Austrian Supreme Court did itself and has also been noted 
by the majority of scholars, that mandatory rules and ordre public are two separate 
matters. According to Austrian law, an award cannot be set aside merely because it 
violates mandatory rules. In this case the Austrian Supreme Court did not stop to 
consider whether or not the judgment of the ECJ constituted a rule forming part of the 
ordre public, which arguably it did not.419 It merely judged its mandatory character. 
This approach is inconsistent with the words of the law and scholarship.420 
 
Regarding the extent of review, Austrian jurisprudence and literature do not provide 
such an extensive discussion as German scholars and courts do. It is established that a 
court is not entitled to review the tribunal’s solution of questions of law or of fact ab 
initio.421 However, it has correctly been noted that such a limited measure of review 
would effectively prevent any effective possibility for the court to examine the 
accordance of an award with the ordre public.422 The Supreme Court has therefore 
adopted a prima facie approach to the extent of review holding that a violation of the 
ordre public must be obvious.423 Accordingly, this does not mean that the award will be 
reviewed as to the factual holdings or the legal evaluation. The Supreme Court will 
merely review an award to the extent necessary to decide whether or not the Austrian 
ordre public has been violated.424 Some authors, however, recommend that for a court 
to be able to examine the accordance with the ordre public, a court may not be bound 
                                                 
418 Oberhammer, RdW 1999, 62 (67). 
419 Achatz/Burgstaller, JBl 1999, 403 (404). 
420 Liebscher,  ArbInt (2000) 357  (359s); Gamauf, ZfRV 2000, 41 (45).  
421 Hausmaninger in Fasching, section 611 no 205; Zeiler, Schiedsverfahren,  section 
611 no. 34 both with further references. 
422 Reiner, IPrax (2000) 323 (326). 
423 Judgements of the OGH, 23 February 1983, 3 Ob 185/82; 30 October 1985, 3 Ob 
89/85; 15 November 1989, 3 Ob79/89; 25 April 2001, 3 Ob 84/01a; 23 October 2002, 3 
Ob 251/02m; 20 October 2004, 3 Ob 73/04p; Liebscher, ArbInt 2000, 357 (363). 
424 OGH, 26 January 2005, 3 Ob 221/04b. 
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either to the factual findings of the tribunal nor to its legal arguments and may even 
admit new evidence.425 This is essentially the position of the German Supreme Court 
and may be the more realistic approach if the compatibility with the ordre public should 
really be examined. 
 
2. The Situation in Germany 
 
a) Setting aside of an award due to a violation of the ordre public 
 
According to § 1059 of the German CCP, an award can be set aside for a number of 
reasons. Relevant in the context of this examination is § 1059 (2)(2)(b) which allows a 
court to set aside an award for the violation of ordre public.  
 
Also under German law the violation of a mandatory rule can be sanctioned by a 
challenge or refusal of enforcement if this violation also amounts to a violation of the 
ordre public. The standard of ordre public for the setting aside procedures and the 
recognition procedures is the same. Therefore, the influence of mandatory rules on both 
an application to have an award set aside and on the enforcement procedures will be 
addressed in one. 
 
Under German law, only the result of the award is decisive for a possible violation of 
the ordre public, not the factual or legal findings of the tribunal. It is therefore not 
relevant whether the law was applied incorrectly but only whether a wrong application 
of the law led to a result that violates the ordre public. Also regarding the application of 
mandatory rules this means that not every non-application or wrong application of a 
mandatory rule will lead to the setting aside of an award. Scholars who have argued 
that, at least for domestic awards, every violation of mandatory rules must lead to the 
setting aside of the award have stayed the minority.426 Also, German law does not apply 
                                                 
425 Reiner, IPrax (2000) 323 (326). 
426 Metzger, NJW 1970 368 (369); Münch in MünchKomm ZPO, section 1051 no 23. 
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different standards of ordre public when setting aside domestic and international 
awards.427  
b) The extent of review 
 
To establish whether the result of an award violates the ordre public, the court will have 
to review the award. However, the extent of review is limited and has been subject of 
various judgements of the German Supreme Court. 
 
Regarding the extent of review of the factual holdings of the tribunal, the German 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is not bound by the factual or legal holdings 
of the arbitral tribunal, when deciding whether or not an award is in conformity with the 
German ordre public.428 In following decisions the German Supreme Court broadened 
its extent of review, holding that it was entitled not only to review the legal evaluation 
of the arbitral tribunal but also the factual holdings and to determine additional facts 
where the tribunal had failed to do so.429 This practice may be appropriate only if the 
court could not decide whether or not a violation of the ordre public has occurred 
otherwise.430 In other cases, the court is not bound by the legal evaluation of the facts 
but by the factual determination of the tribunal. 431 
 
Regarding the legal evaluation of the arbitral tribunal, the German Supreme Court in a 
noteworthy decision of 1966 seemed to consider itself to be a second instance that was 
entitled to review the legal evaluation and set aside an award rendered after the tribunal 
had decided (after an evaluation) not to apply a German mandatory rule.432 It held that 
even though the legal opinion of the tribunal was tenable, the award could be set aside 
as the German Supreme Court had a different legal opinion. It has been criticized as 
                                                 
427 Schlosser in Stein/Jonas, Anhang § 1061 no 134. 
428 Judgement of the BGH, 12 May 1958, BGHZ 27, 949. 
429 Judgement of the BGH, 23 April 1959, BGHZ 30, 89; Judgement of the BGH, 31 
May 1972, NJW (1972) 2180; Judgement of the BGH, 26 October 1972, NJW (1973) 
98.  
430 Trappe, BB (2000) 7 (9); Kornblum, NJW 1969, 1793 (1794). 
431 Trappe, BB (2000) 7 (9); Kornblum, NJW 1969, 1793 (1794). 
432 Judgement of the BGH, 25 October 1966, NJW (1967) 1178,1179. 
  133
German law only allows the German courts to review whether or not the recognition of 
the award as a result would violate the German ordre public; it does not set up German 
courts as courts of appeal.433 This criticism seems partially unfounded now as the 
German Supreme Court has explicitly stated that, even if a mandatory rule has been 
applied incorrectly, the award will only be set aside if the award based on this error 
violates German ordre public. The mere misapplication for itself is no ground for 
setting aside the award.434 Here the solution of Schlosser may also be of help.435 He 
proposes that the terms of a rule that pertains to the ordre public have a clearly defined 
core (“Begriffskern”) and a less clearly defined border area (“Begriffshof”), which is 
subject to debate.436 Accordingly only the core of rule can be part of the ordre public. If 
an award however has only been rendered that is based on a different approach to the 
border area, this cannot be a violation of public policy. 
 
3. The Situation in Switzerland 
 
The relevant section for setting aside awards under the Swiss PILA is s.190. According 
to s.194, the recognition and enforcement of awards in governed by the New York 
Convention. Both s.190(2)(e) and article V(2)(b) of the NYC provide for recourse 
against awards which violate public policy.  
 
The notion of ordre public used in these two provisions is, however, not the same. Art 
190(2)(e) does not refer to Swiss ordre public. It is therefore disputes whether this terms 
refers to Swiss international ordre public,437 transnational ordre public or also may 
include foreign notions of ordre public.438  
 
 
                                                 
433 v.Brunn, NJW 1969, 823 (827); Wolf, RabelsZ 1993, 643 (652f). 
434 Judgement of the BGH, 27.2.1969, NJW 978, 979 (1969). 
435 Schlosser in Stein/Jonas, Anhang § 1061 no 141. 
436 critically, Reiner, IPrax 2000, 323 (326).  
437 Poudret/Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration² 765. 
438 Bucher, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 131ss. 
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The Swiss Supreme in a recent judgement confirmed that the notion of ordre public in 
Art 190(2)(e) Swiss PILA refers to the Swiss international ordre public and does not 
include notions of ordre public of third states.439  
 
a) The extent of review 
 
The Swiss Supreme Court has stated that it will examine the award freely to establish 
whether or not a ground for setting aside an award exists. It will not, however, review 
the factual holdings of the arbitral tribunal.440  
 
The correct application of foreign law and thus also of foreign mandatory rules is a 
disputed subject in Swiss literature. Heini441 argues that the Swiss Supreme Court 
cannot review the application of foreign law as this would run counter to the concept of 
Swiss law to limit the possibility of review of awards as far as possible. Only if the 
foreign ordre public which was violated also forms part of the “universal” ordre public 
which accordingly is part of the Swiss ordre public, could the Swiss Supreme Court set 
the award aside. 
 
Both Bucher442 and Blessing443 consider that the Swiss Supreme Court has a broader 
powers of review and can also examine the application of foreign law to the merits of 
the case. This approach is consistent which their opinion on the possibility of reviewing 
the correct application of rules pertaining to a foreign ordre public. The Swiss Supreme 
Court has, however, rejected this approach. 
 
                                                 
439 Judgement of the BG, 8 March 2006, BGE 132 III 389. 
440 Judgement of the BG, 2 September 1993, BGE 119 II 383; Heini in ZürchKomm 
IPRG² Art 191 no 14. 
441 Heini in ZürchKomm IPRG² Art 191 no 151. 
442 Bucher, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 137. 
443 Blessing, Das neue Internationale Schiedsgerichtsrecht 81. 
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4. The influence of mandatory rules of third states in setting aside 
 and enforcement procedures 
 
Above the approaches of Austria, Germany and Switzerland regarding the setting aside 
and enforcement procedures and the ordre public was outlined. It was established that if 
an award violates a mandatory rule which forms part of the domestic ordre public of 
any of these states, it will either be set aside or denied enforcement. The violation of 
other mandatory rules of the forum state will not have this effect. 
 
There is, however, far less scholarly writing and no jurisprudence on the question of 
whether and under which circumstances an award can be challenged or set aside if it 
violates not a mandatory rule of the forum but of a third state. Several authors support 
the idea that the violation of a mandatory rule not part of the law of the forum may 
under specific circumstances violate the ordre public of the forum. The idea seems to 
have been first formulated by Remiros Brotóns who argued that international 
obligations of states are part of the ordre public of any state.444 Accordingly, there is a 
duty of cooperation between states, which also obliges states to respect the mandatory 
rules of other states. Therefore, the non-application of a mandatory rule of a third state 
by an international tribunal may amount to a violation of the ordre public of the forum. 
Schlosser argues that arbitrators are obliged to apply mandatory rules. States can 
legitimately expect their mandatory rules to be applied by them as they increasingly 
consider more types of disputes to be arbitrable. The ordre public of also protects the 
framework of international trade. Therefore, the non-application of a mandatory rule of 
a third state which is part of this framework, may violate the German ordre public.445 
The same approach has also been taken by Swiss authors, who argue that Swiss law 
protects the “bonnes mœurs” of international commercial relationships, which may also 
be protected by mandatory rules of third states.446 Bucher argues that the notion of ordre 
public used in Art 190(2)(e) Swiss PILA also includes the ordre public of third states 
                                                 
444 Remiro Brotóns, RdC (1984-I) 169 (247). 
445 Schlosser in Stein/Jonas, Anhang § 1061 no 145; Schlosser, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit² 
634ss.  
446 Jermini, Die Anfechtung von Schiedssprüchen im internationalen Privatrecht, nos 
580ss, 
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and therefore also the mandatory rules of these states which reflect their ordre public.447 
Which rules are part of the “framework of international trade” is unclear. Certainly, 
rules prohibiting corruption, trade in drugs and the like are part of this framework.448 
Violations of competition law seem not to be part this framework.449 A slightly different 
approach compares the values protected by the foreign mandatory rule to those 
protected under the laws of the forum.450 If both legal orders consider a rule to be part 
of the ordre public, the award can be challenged. 
 
The respect for foreign mandatory rules in the framework of the ordre public may be a 
necessity to ensure that arbitration is not abused as a tool to circumvent mandatory rules 
by designating a place outside the jurisdiction of the state enacting a mandatory rule and 
thereby bereaving the enacting state of any possibility of influence on the award, 
especially if it can be enforced in a third state.451 States consider ever broadening 
categories of disputes arbitrable. However, this concession to the autonomy of the 
parties should not lead to the disregard of rules which a state can legitimately expect an 
arbitrator to apply.  
 
From a dogmatic point of view the setting aside of an award due to the violation of a 
third states mandatory rule is difficult to argue. An award is set aside due to a violation 
of the (international) ordre public of the forum. Only if one agrees that the undefined 
notion of the “framework of international trade” is part of the ordre public or if there 
are international treaty obligations obliging a state to apply foreign mandatory rules 
(such as article VIII(2)(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement), can the ordre public of the 
forum be violated by the non-application or incorrect application of third states’ 
mandatory rules. Outside these two categories, the violation of third states’ mandatory 
rules can only be relevant if this violation at the same time constitutes a violation of the 
                                                 
447 Bucher, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 132. 
448 Jermini, Die Anfechtung von Schiedssprüchen im internationalen Privatrecht, nos 
580ss. 
449 Judgement of the BG, 8 March 2006, BGE 132 III 389, E.3. 
450 Lörcher, BB Beilage 17 1993,  3 (7) who requires that the forum has enacted a 
similar rule; Berger, ZvglRWiss 1997 316 (327ss); Bucher, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 131; 
with a similar approach Broggini, in FS Siehr 95 (110). 
451 Schlosser in Stein/Jonas, Anhang § 1061 no145. 
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notion of ordre public used by the forum. 452 This will presumably not be the case for 
the majority of mandatory rules. The ordre public can therefore only be violated if it 
includes values which are the same as those protected by the foreign mandatory rule, 
though this need not necessarily be expressed in a mandatory rule of the forum.453 This 
approach, however, is not entirely reconcilable with the traditional function of the ordre 
public.454 The concept that the ordre public of the forum can be violated by the non-
application of a mandatory rule of a third state requires the forum judge to apply certain 
values protected by a foreign legal order. The prerequisite for this is that they are 
compatible with the values protected by the ordre public of the forum. This is, however, 
not the negative function of the ordre public but the application of foreign values 
protected by foreign mandatory rules based on the compatibility with the values of the 
ordre public of the forum. This use of the ordre public of the forum includes a conflict 
of laws analysis based on a compatibility of interests. Nevertheless, the necessity to give 
a judge a possibility to set aside an award which grossly violates mandatory rules of 
third states which - from the perspective of the forum judge -  legitimately protect 
values of the foreign state, may guide a court to apply this concept of ordre public. 
 
Further, the review of awards should not serve as a basis for the control of the correct 
application of the law by the arbitral tribunal. The supervising court should therefore 
not review whether a mandatory rule was applied correctly or not.455 Only if the non-
application or misapplication of the rule leads to a result which is obviously 
incompatible with the standard of ordre public used by the court, can an award be set 
aside. The supervising judge may therefore not step into the shoes of the arbitrator and 
review whether or not he should have applied a mandatory rule or applied it differently. 
He must, however, be aware of the foreign mandatory rule and sanction obviously and 
absolutely wrong results reached by an arbitrator. 
 
                                                 
452 Berti/Schnyder in BaslerKomm IPRG² Art 190 no 80; Heini in ZürchKomm IPRG² 
Art 190 no 48. 
453 Berger,  ZvglRWiss 1997 316 (327). 
454 Michaels, ZfRV 1999, 5 (6). 
455 Berti/Schnyder in BaslerKomm IPRG² Art 190 no 80. 
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5. The Situation in the United Kingdom 
 
a)  The setting aside of an award 
 
Unlike many other arbitration laws, U.K law does not provide for a challenge of an 
award for a violation of public policy. Under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
public policy is only relevant regarding the procurement of the award but not its merits. 
However, under s.69 of the Arbitration Act, a party can raise an appeal on a point of 
law. The courts will then review the legal evaluation of the arbitrator. Under this 
provision, English courts will review whether arbitrators seated in England applied 
English law correctly. As English courts consider questions of foreign law to be factual 
questions, s.69 is only applicable when the arbitrators applied English law deciding the 
dispute. 
 
As was laid out above, U.K. law will to a limited extent respect foreign mandatory rules 
under the English notion of ordre public. As a challenge cannot be based on this notion, 
an English court would have to be applying English law for an appeal on a point of law 
based on a violation of the ordre public to be successful. Essentially the same holds true 
for appeals based on illegality under the lex loci solutionis. As this rule is a rule of 
contract law, its application could only be appealed if English law were applicable. 
 
If this is the case and the parties so agree or the court grants leave (s.69(2) Arbitration 
Act), the court can then review the award. Under s.69 the court, however, can not only 
confirm or set the award aside, but can also remit the award back to the tribunal for 
reconsideration or may even vary the award. Therefore, under this provision, English 
courts can scrutinize under very limited circumstances whether the correct approach to 
mandatory rules under English law was taken. There is, as far as could be ascertained, 
no jurisprudence on the appeal against an award based on the violation of the lex loci 
solutionis or the violation of the English ordre public due to the misapplication or a 
foreign rule. 
 
  139
b) The recognition and enforcement of awards 
 
The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in England can be applied for under 
various instruments, such as by an action on the award, summary enforcement under 
section 66 of the Arbitration Act, under the Administration of Justice Act 1920, the 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 and the New York Convention 
which has been implemented in s.100 to 104 of the Arbitration Act. The enforcement 
under the New York Convention is by far the most efficient under English law and is 
usually chosen.456 
 
Under s.103(3) recognition and enforcement of an award can be denied if the 
enforcement of the award would violate public policy. This provision has also been 
invoked to prevent the enforcement of awards which violate foreign mandatory rules, 
though this term was not used by the English courts. 
 
In Soleimany v. Soleimany,457 the Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award that had 
been rendered by the Beth Din, the Court of the Chief Rabbi. In that case, a dispute had 
arisen out of contract between to Iranian jews, a father and his son, to smuggle carpets 
out of the Iran and sell them in the West in violation of Iranian export law. The Beth 
Din had acknowledged that the contract violated Iranian law, but held that Jewish law, 
which it was applying, did not prevent it from arbitrating the matter or rendering an 
award in the favour of the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff tried to enforce the 
award in England. 
 
The Court of Appeal held, first, that the illegality of the contract did not affect the 
validity of the arbitration clause. It then went on to hold that an illegal contract would 
not be enforced in England and that the inclusion of an arbitration clause and the 
resulting award does not strip the contract of its illegality.458  Consequently, the Court 
                                                 
456 Tweeddale/Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, no 30.44. 
457 Court of Appeal, QB (1999) 785. 
458 Ibid., 800; see also the discussion on this point in Westacre Investments (Panama) v. 
Jugoimport-SDPR Holdings and others, All ER (1999) 570, in which Colman J, holds 
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of Appeal held that – just as it did in cases involving the enforcement of illegal 
contracts – it could not enforce awards which enforced contracts that violated the laws 
of a foreign and friendly state.459 It emphasized that it did so because the award found as 
a fact that the contract had been entered into with the intent to violate Iranian law but 
nevertheless enforced the contract in disrespect of its illegality. It stated that it may have 
come to another result had the tribunal found that there was no violation or simply made 
no such findings.460 
 
Also in Westacre the illegality of the underlying contract was invoked; the result, 
however, was different.461 The Commercial Court enforced an award which settled a 
dispute over a contract for the lobbying and alleged bribing of Kuwaiti officials by the 
plaintiff in order for the defendant to obtain contracts for the delivery of weapons. The 
tribunal applying Swiss law had held that it could not determine the allegations of 
bribery and the contract did not violate the international ordre public. A subsequent 
challenge to the Swiss Supreme Court had failed. Enforcement of the award was sought 
in England where the defendants came up with new evidence on the illegality. 
 
Colman J, first established that the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to decide on the 
matter of illegality and held that this was due to the fact that there was an English policy 
in the favour of sustaining arbitral agreements that overrides the policy against the 
enforcement of corruption and that international arbitrators of great esteem can be relied 
upon to find the correct facts and base their decision on them.462  
 
He went on to hold that the enforcement of the illegal contract must be distinguished 
from the enforcement of the subsequent award. The latter depended on the public policy 
                                                                                                                                               
that and award could only free the contract from illegality if the arbitration mechanism 
displaced this illegality, which under English law it does not; Sheppard,  IntArbLR, 
1999, 78 (79). 
459 Soleimany v. Soleinmany, Court of Appeal, QB 1999, 785 (803). 
460 Ibid. (797) 
461 Westacre Investments (Panama) v. Jugoimport-SDPR Holdings and others, All ER 
(1999) 570. 
462 Westacre Investments (Panama) v. Jugoimport-SDPR Holdings and others, All ER 
(1999) 570. 
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of England while the former depended on Kuwaiti public policy. In applying the rule 
established in Lemenda Trading Colman J. held that only if the contract violated both 
Kuwaiti and English public policy could the defence against the enforcement of the 
award be successful. In the present case, the contract did not violate English public 
policy as outright bribery could not be established and the use of personal influence was 
not contrary to English public policy. Consequently, the defendant could not invoke a 
violation of English public policy based on the England’s obligation of comity with 
Kuwait. The application for the refusal of the leave to enforcement was therefore 
dismissed. 
 
On appeal, Waller L.J., who had also delivered the judgment for the court in Soleimany, 
confirmed the argument of Colman J. on Lemenda and held that as long as the tribunal 
did not find the enforcement of a contract contrary to the public policy of both England 
and the place of performance, an award based on the contract would be enforceable in 
England.463 If, however, the contract was subject not to English law but to the law of 
another country and was not contrary to the public policy of either the lex arbitri or the 
lex causae, it could validly render an award enforcing the contract, which would then be 
enforced in England unless it was contrary to a “fundamental rule” of English public 
policy. 
 
Also, in OTV. v. Hilmarton464 Walker J. held that the alleged illegality of a contract, in 
that case based on the violation of a rule of Algerian law, did not necessarily influence 
the enforcement of the award. He held that he was deciding on the enforcement of the 
award and not on the validity of the contract and that other courts or tribunals may 
legitimately come to other conclusions on the point of illegality than an English court 
would have come to. The mere fact that English courts may have decided differently, 
does not render an award unenforceable. The enforcement would only be denied, if it 
would violate fundamental rules of English public policy. Accordingly, there is a rule of 
English public policy to uphold awards, unless they violate fundamental rules of 
                                                 
463 Judgement, 12 May 1999, 3 All ER (1999) 864. 
464 Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A v. Hilmarton, QB (Commercial Court) 
XXIVa YBCA (1999) 777. 
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English public policy. Again discussing the Lemenda case, Walker J. held that there are 
fundamental rules of English public policy which would render the award unenforceable 
whatever the otherwise applicable law and the law of the place of performance of the 
contract. Other rules of (foreign) domestic public policy will only be a valid basis for 
the refusal of enforcement of an award if they at the same time are considered to be 
shared by English public policy. As outright bribery had not been established and 
contracts for the purchase of personal influence do not violate a rule of English public 
policy to justify the enforcement of the award, the court granted leave for the 
enforcement. 
 
From the above cases the following considerations can be deduced. In Westacre the 
contract was legal under the lex causae and the lex arbitri and illegal in the place of 
performance (Kuwait) while in Soleimany the illegality of the contract had been taken 
into account under the lex causae, which however did not foresee its unenforceability as 
a consequence.465 Thus the legality under either the lex causae or the lex arbitri is 
relevant for setting aside the award if the underlying contract is illegal in the place of 
performance.466  
 
Secondly, as Colman J stated in Westacre, there seems to be a scale of illegality. As 
stated in the cases above, there are “fundamental” rules of English public policy which 
will render an award unenforceable regardless of the applicable law or the law of the 
place of performance. A contract for drug trafficking, prostitution or the like would 
more likely lead to unenforceability of a subsequent award than the sale of influence. 
Perhaps one must also set smuggling on the list.  Offences that do not amount to such 
crimes such as the use of influence short of bribery and corruption will not lead to the 
unenforceability of the award. Thirdly, if a contract is violates the ordre public of the 
law of the place of performance and at the same time also violates English ordre public, 
enforcement can be denied. 
 
                                                 
465 See also Tweeddale/Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 302. 
466 See generally Wade, IntALR 1999, 97  (101). 
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English law has taken up a clear stance on the violation of fundamental rules of English 
public policy (which obviously correspond to the notion of the international ordre 
public).467 Awards violating these basic notions will never be enforced. Awards 
violating rules of a foreign state that form part of that state’s public policy and at the 
same time also violate English public policy, will also not be enforced. This rule, 
however, does not apply if the contract is valid under the lex arbitri and/or the lex 
causae. 
c)   The extent of review. 
 
Just as in Continental Europe, a court will have to decide to what extent it wishes - if at 
all - to re-open the case which was before the arbitral tribunal. This problem arouse in 
the Westacre case. In that case the defendant had brought up new evidence in the 
enforcement proceedings which allegedly showed the illegality of the contract. Colman 
J, held that the re-opening of the facts of the case pleaded by the defendants could only 
be admitted if the policy against corruption (which was the alleged illegality) 
outweighed the policy in the finality of the award.468 This balancing would have to 
include factors such as the extent to which the tribunal dealt with alleged illegality and 
the nature of the illegality.469 The defendant was not allowed to adduce further 
evidence. On appeal, Waller J, held that courts could not turn such a blind eye on 
corruption, at least if there is prima facie evidence of illegality. Accordingly, new 
evidence must have ‘sufficient cogency and weight to be likely to have materially 
influenced the arbitrators' conclusion had it been advanced at the hearing’ and the party 
adducing the new evidence was unable to present it either to the arbitral tribunal or to 
the court with supervisory jurisdiction. After thus establishing that a court could re-open 
the facts of the case, he held that the court must balance between the finality of the 
award and the illegality. In this case accordingly, the illegality was very serious and 
justified the re-opening of the facts. However, Mantell L.J. disagreed stating that he 
could not see how such the re-opening of the facts based on prima facie evidence should 
                                                 
467 Brown, IntALR 2000, 31 (34). 
468 All ER (1999) 570 
469 Wade, Westacre v. Soleimany: What Policy? Which Public? IntArbLR 96, 100 
(1999). 
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function in practice. The third judge, Sir David Hirst agreed with Mantell L.J.. 
Therefore, the facts of the case were not to be reopened. The latter two judges therefore 
came to the conclusion that in the specific case the policy of the finality of awards 
preceded over the policy against corruption. This decision may have been different if 
the alleged violation of fundamental rules of English public policy had been at stake.  
 
6. The Situation in the United States 
 
a) Reasons for Setting Aside Awards 
 
Under U.S. federal law a domestic award rendered in the U.S. can only be vacated for 
the reasons listed in s.10 FAA. This list does not include a provision allowing the courts 
to review the merits of the award and does not explicitly provide for the vacation of the 
award due to a violation of public policy.  
 
Nevertheless, U.S. courts have introduced a test allowing them to review the merits of a 
case, even if only to a limited extent. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Wilko v. Swan 
that the interpretation of the law by arbitrators is not subject to review by courts, except 
in cases of “manifest disregard of law”.470 Further, the Supreme Court has also 
established that domestic arbitral awards can be challenged for violations of public 
policy.471 
 
However, it is disputed whether “non-domestic awards” are subject to recourse under 
section 10 FAA or whether they can only be vacated for the reasons of Art V NYC.472 
The term non-domestic award has not been defined by U.S. courts, but is considered to 
include awards in disputes in which one of the parties is domiciled outside the U.S473, in 
                                                 
470 Judgemment, 7 December 1953, 346 U.S. 436ss. 
471 Judgement in Grace & Co. V. Local Union, 31 May 1983, W.R. 461 U.S. 757. 
472 For the discussion see Born, International Commercial Arbitration 727-729 with 
extensive references to U.S. jurisprudence. 
473 Judgement of the Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit in Industrial Risk Insurers v. 
M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 22 May 1998, 141 F.3d 1424. 
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which property located abroad is involved, in which performance abroad is envisaged or 
disputes which have some other reasonable relationship with one or more foreign 
states.474 
 
While it is therefore clear that an award can be challenged under any of the reasons 
listed in Art V NYC, of which a challenge due to a violation of public policy is most 
relevant in this context, it is unclear whether the reasons under section 10 FAA and the 
manifest disregard of the law – test apply.475 Therefore, only a possible violation of 
public policy by disregard for mandatory rules will be elaborated on in the following. 
 
b) Violation of Public Policy 
 
 
As U.S. law has not incorporated the distinction between mandatory rules and other 
rules of law, there is no express provision to sanction a violation of such ruled. Any 
challenge alleging such a violation must therefore be brought under Art V(2)(b) NYC. 
U.S. courts have yet to establish a clear notion of the term ordre public and to determine 
whether U.S. courts will accept the distinction between international ordre public and 
domestic ordre public. In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc. v. Societe Generale 
de l’Industrie du Papier the Court of Appeals held that notion of ordre public in Art 
V(2)(b) NYC had a “supranational emphasis”.476 Another line of jurisprudence, 
however, indicates that courts interpret Art V(2)(b) to refer to domestic public policy.477 
A review of the judgments, however, reveals that most courts paid little attention to the 
distinction between the two notions of ordre public. The essence of the refusal of the 
                                                 
474 Born, International Commercial Arbitration 725. 
475 Born, International Commercial Arbitration 809 citing extensive jurisprudence 
denying the applicability of the grounds ofsection10 FAA and the manifest disregard 
test to non-domestic awards. 
476 Judgement of the Court of Appeals, 23 December 1974, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 
477 Judgement of the District Court for the Norther District of Gerorgia of , Laminoirs-
Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, SA v. Southwire Company, 484 F.Supp 
1063(N.D.Ga.1980) in which the court held that an interest rate of 14,5% and 15,5% 
was penal and therefore violated national public policy; Judgement of the Court of 
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit  in Waterside Ocean Nav. Co. v. International Nav., 18 June 
1984, 737 F.2d 150, 152 referring to the “public policy of the United States”.  
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court in Parsons & Whittemore to deny enforcement of the award seems to have been 
less an application of an international standard of ordre public and more a distinction 
between the U.S. international politics and U.S. ordre public. In that case the defendant 
had argued that the decision of the U.S. government to withdraw financial support for 
the contract between the litigants was evidence of a U.S. policy against the contract. 
The court held that U.S. foreign policies had to be distinguished from U.S. ordre public. 
Courts seem to handle on a case-by-case basis whether specific policies are applicable 
to international cases or not.478  
 
c) Violation of Foreign Law as a Violation of U.S. Public Policy 
 
U.S. courts have in very few cases decided on the influence of violations of foreign laws 
on the alleged violation of U.S. public policy. In Northrop Corp. v. Triad International 
Marketing SA the U.S. Court of Appeals479 had to decide on the action to vacate an 
award which dealt with an agency agreement for the sale of military equipment from the 
U.S. to Saudi Arabia. Triad, the arms seller, refused to pay the full amount of the agreed 
commissions as Saudi Arabia had, five years after the contract had been concluded, 
issued a decree declaring the payment of commission payments for arms deals illegal. 
From this point in time onwards, Triad argued, it was illegal to make the commission 
payments. As the contract was subject to the laws of California, the arbitral tribunal 
ignored the Saudi decree and ordered payment by Triad. Triad sought to have the award 
vacated, arguing that the decree expressed a Saudi policy which essentially was also a 
policy of the U.S. Department of Defence. The court held that for an award to be set 
aside for a violation of public policy, this policy must be “well defined and dominant”. 
Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Defence did share the policy prohibiting the 
payment of commissions for arms deals as this ultimately increased the costs for arms. 
However, the U.S. Department of Defence also had adopted a policy furthering the sale 
of U.S. manufactured arms to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the court held, there was no well 
                                                 
478 Born, International Commercial Arbitration 827. 
479 Judgement of the Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit, 29 March 1988, 842 F.2d 1154 
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defined and dominant U.S. policy on this point which would serve as a basis for the 
vacation of the award. 
 
In Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo AB480 the U.S. Court of appeals decided on the 
enforcement of an English award against assets of a company which was involved in 
Swedish insolvency proceedings. According to the Court U.S. courts have long 
recognized the need to extend comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings in order to 
ensure the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets. Under U.S. bankruptcy laws, 
foreign bankrupts can file ancillary proceedings in U.S. courts to prevent piecemeal 
distribution of their assets. The Court of Appeals then relied on the general principle of 
comity and the rational of U.S. bankruptcy laws to establish that the enforcement of the 
award would violate the public policy to ensure the equitable distribution of the 
bankrupt’s assets. The claimant, so the court concluded, would have to seek 
enforcement of his awards before the competent Swedish court. 
 
Both awards show that U.S. courts are at least willing to respect foreign laws under the 
notion of public policy. In Northrop v. Triad the U.S. court, however, explicitly 
analyzed a “policy” of the U.S. Department of Defence. The Saudi law incorporating 
the Saudi policy was only relevant to the extent that the U.S. policy coincided. The 
policy of the U.S. Department of Defence as described in the judgment, however, seems 
not necessarily to be what is generally understood to be ordre public. The court 
analyzed a commercial policy of the U.S. government, namely that the government 
wanted to support arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia and at the same time disapproved of 
commission payments, but failed to explain why this policy was part of the ordre public. 
To this extent the judgment seems inconsistent with the decision in Parsons & 
Whittemore in which the court had explicitly stated that public policy “was not meant to 
enshrine the vagaries of international politics.” It is hard to see why the policy of the 
U.S. Department of State could touch upon the most basic notions of morality and 
justice and this is also not elaborated on by the court. The notion of ordre public 
employed in this case is vague and seem loaded with national parochialism.  
                                                 
480 Judgment of the Court of Appeal for the 2nd Circuit, 5 August 1987, 825 F.2d 709 
(1987).  
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The Court of Appeal in Victrix seems to have a clearer idea of the notion of ordre public 
and established by reference to statutes a clear U.S. policy against the piecemeal 
distribution of the bankrupt’s assets. In this case it was of course not the contents of the 
award which violated U.S. policy but the potential enforcement. Nevertheless, the court 
included the Swedish proceedings and the possibility for Swedish courts to decide about 
the distribution of all the bankrupt’s assets including his foreign assets in the U.S. 
policy by relying on the principle of comity. The Court of Appeal takes a broad 
approach to the ordre public in this decision. It includes foreign rules of law which 
reflect a policy of a foreign state, if this policy is compatible with U.S. policies. It is 
noteworthy that the Court did not only rely on a U.S. policy as in Northrop v. Triad but 
explicitly on a foreign policy which was identical with a U.S. policy. This judgment 
shows that U.S. courts may respect what is considered a mandatory rule in continental 
doctrine under their notion of public policy. 
 
d) The standard of review 
 
Whatever standard of ordre public may be applied, U.S. courts have stated that they will 
not second guess the application of law to the facts.481 This does not, however, mean 
that U.S. court will not examine whether mandatory rules of U.S. law have at least been 
considered by the arbitrators. In Mitusubishi Motors the U.S. Supreme Court famously 
held that it would be able ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of U.S. 
antitrust law would be addressed by the arbitrators and to review whether the arbitral 
tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.482 If the 
                                                 
481 Judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of NY in Brandeis Intsel 
Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemical Corp., 5 January 1987, XIII YBCA (1988) 543; Judgement 
of the Court of Appeals in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc. v. Societe Generale 
de l’Industrie du Papier Wilkinson, 23 December 1974, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Note, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards on Antitrust Matters After Mitsubishi 
Motors, 26 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 407, 418 (1987-1988). 
482 Judgement of the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler 
Plymouth Inc, 2 July 1985, 473 US 614, 638. 
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arbitral tribunal failed to do so, U.S. courts would have little hesitation in denying 
recognition and enforcement of the award.483 
 
The Supreme Court did not elaborate in detail, which standard of review it would apply 
when reviewing an award dealing with statutory claims. It held that “review at the 
award-enforcement stage remain[s] minimal”484, which obviously means that it will not 
in detail review whether the arbitrators have applied U.S. statutory law correctly but 
will limit itself to inspecting whether the antitrust law has been considered at all by the 
arbitrators.485  
 
It seems likely, however, that whatever standard the court chooses to apply, it will take 
a close look at a violation of U.S. statutory law that claims application to a case.486 
 
 
VIII .  SU M M A R Y 
A.  T H E  D E T E R M I N A T I O N  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  
 
Doctrine in the examined legal orders in continental Europe has developed several 
criteria to determine whether a rule is mandatory. The only coherent criterion that can 
serve this purpose is the determination by the interests served by the rule in question. A 
judge or arbitrator must ascertain whether the rule serves over-individual interests or 
merely the interests of individuals. Only in the first case, can a rule be mandatory. In 
this context, a careful distinction must be drawn between rules which protect contractual 
equilibria in situations in which it has been distorted by commercial reality such as 
rules of consumer protection. The rules re-establishing the bargaining power of the 
weaker party which the legislator considers diminished, does not serve over-individual 
                                                 
483 Ibid. fn. 19 of the Judgement. 
484 Ibid. 473 US 614, 638. 
485 Carbonneau, Vand. J.T.L. 1986, 265 (285); Note, Judicial Review of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards on Antitrust Matters After Mitsubishi Motors, 26 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 407, 413 (1987-1988). 
486 Paulsson, Journal of International Arbitration 1989, 101. 
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interests but only those of certain groups such as consumers. These groups are best 
protected by the rules of the lex causae. A legislative trend in this area seems to be the 
restriction of the choice of law when specific groups are concerned. This may further 
ensure that specific groups are not bereft of the protection they may need. However, 
such conflict of laws rules are irrelevant when an arbitrator or court is deciding of the 
characterization of such a rule of a foreign state.  
 
Neither of the two common law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, have yet established a comparable concept.  
 
In England foreign mandatory rules will be – if at all – applied as a party of English 
public policy. This approach does therefore not require a definition of the concept of the 
mandatory rule.  
 
The approach taken in the United States does not consider mandatory rules to be a 
concept of their own. The conflict of laws approaches in the United States examine the 
policies which are reflected in the individual rules and the intentions of the legislator. 
To this extent they bear a resemblance to the continental European approach. However, 
mandatory rules are not a category of their own in this system, all rules are treated 
equally.  
B.  T H E  A P P L I C A T I O N  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  B Y  N A T I O N A L  
 C O U R T S  
 
Continental European scholarly writing has established a plethora of approaches for the 
application of foreign mandatory rules. Each of these approaches is disputed with regard 
to is details by its proposers. However, the only convincing theory that has been put 
forward in the last century is the so-called “Sonderanknüpfungstheorie”. According to 
this theory, a foreign mandatory rule may be applied if the legislative intent of the 
foreign legislator, that the rule be applied also by foreign courts, can be determined. 
Further, the facts of the case must show a close connection to the enacting state. Under 
which circumstances this criterion can be considered fulfilled will have to examined on 
a case-by-case basis as due to the possible constellations in which a transaction is 
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connected to a state make the establishment of general rules impossible. Lastly, the 
interests served by the foreign mandatory rule must be compatible with the values of the 
forum state. This last criterion is to be applied with care. The interest of the forum state 
need not have been set out in explicit provisions of the forum state’s law. The judge 
must ascertain only whether the legal or social order of the forum state as such can be 
considered to share the protected interest.  
 
As mentioned in the preceding sub-section, the conflict of laws system of the United 
Kingdom does not provide a coherent system for determining and applying foreign 
mandatory rules. Their application is dependent on whether they form party of the 
English ordre public. The only exception to this rule was established for rules of the lex 
loci solutionis which rendered the performance of a contractual obligation illegal. This 
approach has now been enshrined in Art 9(3) Regulation 583/2008. If the place of 
performance is considered to be a factor creating a close connection, the English 
approach and that of the European legislator resemble the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie 
even if only to a rather minor extent as the element of the close connection is pre-
determined taking a rather random factor, the place of performance, into account.  
 
The United States approach focuses on the interests of the enacting state. This interest is 
also the basis for the application of the rule. Such interest may be, at least according to 
the approach taken by the Restatement (Second) based on the contacts between the facts 
of the case and the enacting state. Such contacts, however, are used only to justify an 
interest and are not a connection factor for themselves.  
 
C.  T H E  R E L E V A N C E  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  F O R  T H E  
A R B I T R A B I L I T Y  O F  A  D I S P U T E  
 
The impact of mandatory rules on the question of arbitrability has triggered 
controversial and contradicting decisions of national courts.  
 
The protection of the mandatory rules of the forum state has, especially in German 
jurisprudence, induced national courts to declare disputes inarbitrable. The courts are 
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concerned that the arbitrators may not feel inclined to apply German mandatory rules in 
cases in which German law was not the lex causae. Especially in cases in which the seat 
of arbitration was not in Germany the loss of control over the arbitral award made 
judges believe it to be the safer option to deny the possibility of arbitration completely. 
The more stringent approach is of course to limit the supervision of the arbitral 
tribunal’s work to examination of whether an award violates the national ordre public. 
This barrier exists both in setting aside proceedings as well as in proceedings for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. Though of course the control is limited 
compared to that over national courts, the denial of arbitrability of such disputes lacks 
any justification, especially as in German law there is no rule which would provide a 
basis for such denial. The U.S. Supreme Court in the notorious Mitsubishi decision 
confirmed its trust in the ability and willingness of arbitrators to pay the necessary 
attention to U.S. antitrust rules even if the place of arbitration in that case was in Japan. 
In the recent past, also German courts seem to be overcoming their concerns and are 
widening the scope of arbitrability of disputes governed by mandatory rules.  
 
The impact of third states’ mandatory rules declaring disputes inarbitrable has been 
subject only to very scarce jurisprudence which makes it difficult to determine finally 
their relevance, if any. The Swiss Supreme Court leaves only a very narrow margin of 
application for such rules. Accordingly, only foreign mandatory rules which declare a 
dispute inarbitrable and are to be applied for reasons of order public should be given 
effect at all. This approach will, in practice, obviously limit the number of foreign 
mandatory rules which will be applied by national courts. However, as there is no 
reason why arbitrators should be less inclined to apply foreign mandatory rules to merits 
of a dispute, there is also no reason to restrict the arbitrability of disputes. The ever 
widening scope of arbitral disputes, however, conversely should make arbitrators aware 
of their function when deciding on the application of mandatory rules and the fact that 
parties’ instructions are the most relevant but by no means the sole maxim they should 
be acting by.  
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D.  T H E  A P P L I C A T I O N  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  B Y  A R B I T R A L  
T R I B U N A L S  
 
As arbitrators do not have a forum, all mandatory rules are “foreign”. Mandatory rules 
may therefore either derive from the lex causae of a third legal order. In both cases the 
arbitrator is to apply the same methodology for applying the rule. The rules of the lex 
causae take no precedent. 
 
The conflict of laws approaches providing for the application of foreign mandatory 
rules before national courts do not apply to arbitrators. This does not, however, mean 
that arbitrators may not or cannot apply foreign mandatory rules. The conflict of laws 
rules of arbitrators found in modern arbitration laws and rules are rudimentary and leave 
arbitrators a wide margin of appreciation in deciding which law to apply.  
 
As the theories providing for the application of foreign mandatory rules before national 
courts are not uniform, arbitrators will serve the parties’ expectations best, if they apply 
a theory incorporating the common elements of these approaches. Consequently, they 
should decide on the application of mandatory rules based on the legislative intent of 
the rule to be applied extraterritorially and the close connection of the facts of the case 
and the state enacting the rule in question. Arbitrators also need to ensure that the 
substance of the rule in question comply with the transnational ordre public, or, if this 
concept cannot be established in a case, the ordre public of all concerned states. These 
elements are also employed by arbitral tribunals, though not always completely and 
stringently.  
 
E.  T H E  R E L E V A N C E  O F  M A N D A T O R Y  R U L E S  F O R  T H E  
C H A L L E N G E  O F  A N  A W A R D  
 
 
Awards will be set aside or denied recognition if they violate the ordre public of the 
forum. To the extent that mandatory rules of the forum reflect its ordre public, their 
non-application can lead to the setting aside of an award or the refusal of its recognition 
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and enforcement. This notion is also the only gate for taking the violation of foreign 
mandatory rules into account after the award has been rendered. It will, however, be 
necessary to establish that the violation of the foreign mandatory rule constitutes a 
violation of the ordre public of the forum. This will only be the case in a very limited 
number of cases. 
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